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In 2003, the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 
Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) 
implemented a revised work plan that focused 
on mandate-specific activities and UNMEE 
Peacekeeping Force (PKF) demining assets. 
The novel and successful integration of the 
Force Mine Action Centre (FMAC) with the 
MACC represents a first in UN peacekeeping 
history, as Force demining assets are now 
coordinated by a single body and they work to 
International Mine Action Standards (!MAS). 
Unanticipated national events in mine action 
in Eritrea in 2002 prompted an opportune 
moment for the UNMEE MACC to demon-
strate the key role that military demining 
componems can play in humanitarian mme 
action when effectively integrated. 
Backgrmmcl 
Between 1998 and 2000 , a devas-
tating two-year border conflict between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea left behind an abundance 
of mines and UXO in the countries, particu-
larly along rhe border shared by rhe twO coun-
tries. In Eritrea, this legacy compounded an 
already serious landmine problem-a result of 
the nation's long struggle for independence. 
After the countries' signing of the 
"Agreement on Hostilities" in 2000, rhe UN 
Securi ty Council promulgated Resolution 
1320, which aurhorized a UN peacekeeping 
mission- the UNMEE-as well as estab-
lished rhe T emporary Security Zone (TSZ) 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This resolution 
states that a key mandate of VNMEE is "ro 
coordinate and provide technical assistance for 
humanitarian mine action activities in rhe 
TSZ and area adjacent ro ir." In supporr of 
this mandate, the UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) of rhe UN Departmenc of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) began 
implementing a mine action assistance pro-
gramme, establishing the MACC as parr of 
UNMEE in mid-2000. By November 2000, 
the MACC was fully established. Since then, 
it has played a leading role in management 
and coordination of all mine action activities 
in the Mission area. 
2000-2002 
Between August 2000 and July 
2002, the MACC responded to numerous 
requests for assistance to non-governmental 
o rganizations (NGOs) conducting mine 
action operations in the TSZ as well as 
observed the PKF demining and UXO clear-
ance programs. In addition, with the official 
agreement of the government of Eritrea 
(GoE), rhe MACC, during this period, con-
centrated much of its efforrs on rhe critical 
need to coordinate all NCO mine action 
activities and ro assist rhe GoE to build 
national capacities for mine action. The 
MACC worked to balance the creation of an 
indigenous humanitarian mine action capaci-
ty and to coordinate rhe PKF mine action 
requirements. Indeed, it expended consider-
able resources in the creation and deployment 
of the national mine action capacity and 
ensured that these assets worked safely and 
efficiently alongside the UNMEE assets. Until 
mid-2002, this UN mine action srrucwre and 
support functioned well and served the inter-
est and needs of all affected parries in the 
country, in particular all those working and 
living in the TSZ and adjacent areas. 
by Bob Kudyba and Andrea Poelling, UNMEE 
I 
EventR of July 2002 
Unancicipated national events in 
mid-2002 , however, disrupted the UN mine 
action operations in Eritrea. In July 2002 , the 
GoE enacted a new national policy for mine 
action. It issued Proclamation No. 123/2002, 
which dissolved the enti re national mine 
action configuration and put inro place new 
structures: first, the Eritrean Demining 
Authority (EDA) and later the Erirrean 
Demining Operations (EDO). Representing a 
significant change of attitude within the 
national mine action programme, chis also 
brought about the loss of humanitarian mine 
action capacity in the TSZ. The GoE directed 
a majority of international NGOs (IN COs) ro 
leave the counrry. By early September 2002, 
the only non-UN mine action agencies that 
were permitted ro remain in the country were 
the HALO Trust and RONCO Consulting 
Corporation , which is contracted to the U.S. 
Department of State. The HALO Trust was 
subsequently asked tO leave in June 2003. 
Abruptly deprived of essen rial activ-
ities, the UNMEE MACC was forced to 
reconsider the realities for carrying out its 
mandated responsibilities. By removing three 
major mine action international NGOs with 
less than a month's notice, the original transi-
tional concept from emergency to develop-
ment mine action for Eritrea had tO be entire-
ly revisited. Thus, immediately following rhe 
adoption of the new national policy for mine 
action, the UNMEE MACC re-examined its 
mine action role, with a view to redefining its 
objectives and activities while at the same time 
confirming its resource requirements. 
ERtahliRhing the :Force 1\line 
Action Center 
In the fall of 2002, the MACC pre-
pared a revised work plan focusing on the 
restrucwring of existing mine action elemenrs 
within the MACC and UNMEE, including 
resources under command and control of 
UNMEE PKF, the UN Military Observers 
(UNMO) and the MACC, to continue to 
carry out irs primary responsibilities as man-
dated, first and foremost, by the UN Security 
Council. These are as follows: 
• UN Security Council Resolution 
1320 (2000): "T o coord inate and provide 
technical assistance for humanitarian mine 
action activities within the T SZ and areas 
adjacent to it." 
• UN Security Council Resolution 
1344 (200 I): "T o facil itate mi ne action in 
coord ination wirh the United Nations Mine 
Action Service, in particular through exchang-
ing and providing existing maps and other rel-
evant information ro rhe United Nations." 
• UN Security Council Resolution 
1430 (2002): "Demining in key areas ro sup-
port demarcation." 
The rapid MACC restructuring 
process focused on establishing an integrated 
civilian and military mine action headquarters 
within UNMEE by combining the PKF's 
Mine Action Cell (MACE), the Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD ) Officer and the 
UNMEE Mine Risk Education (MRE) Cell 
with the structural componems of the MACC 
Operations Section. This unique integrated 
mine action establishment is referred ro roday 
as the Force Mine Action Center (FMAC). 
At the same time, the United 
Nation's responsibility for assistance in 
national capacity-building shifted entirely to 
the UN Developmem Program (UNDP) and 
the UN International Children's Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF). The MACC now only 
assists UNDP and UNICEF with rheir capac-
ity building efforts. 
With the aim of implememing 
UNMEE's mine action mandates, the 
MACC/FMAC became fully responsible for 
prioritization and issuance of all UNMEE 
mine action tasks. It has both coordination 
and operational functions covering all aspects 
of mine action including MRE, EOD, med-
ical coordination, mine clearance, demining 
for demarcation as well as an emergency 
response function, and as such is responsible 
for providing support to the PKF in the TSZ 
and adjacem areas. In this capacity, the 
MACC/ FMAC is now able to put into effect 
a consistent and well-coordinated UNMEE 
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m ine action response in the mission area. 
The MACC/FMAC manages and 
coordinates a full set of PKF demining assets. 
These assets c urren rly include a Kenyan 
Engineer Company, which consists of cwo 
human itarian-trained manual demining 
t roops; I a Slovakian dem ining company, 
which is made up of both a manual and a 
mechan ica l demining ca pacity; and a 
Bangladeshi dcmining company, which con-
sists of manual deminers as well as a mine 
detection dog (MDD) ream. In addition, rhe 
MACC employs MECHEM, a Sourh African 
civil ian conrracror, for road clearance opera-
t ions, as well as a n Emergency EOD field 
ream and rwo MRE field reams. 
T he prima1y ro le and responsib ility 
of rhe Force dcmin ing assets is ro support 
rhe mobiliry and safery of rhe PKF as well as ro 
provide specialist operational capability. Once 
demarcation commences, rhe mai n focus of 
work fo r rhe Force demining assets will be rhe 
clearance of roads and access routes ro pillar 
sires as well as clearance of the actual p illar sires 
along rhe delineated bo rder becween rhe two 
counrries. Currenr preparat ions for dem ining 
in support for demarcation inrend co deploy 
rhe Force demining assets as an imegrared 
operation, where all assets work alongside each 
other in a murually supportive manner. 
The Emergency EOD field ream is 
tasked to support the Force d emining assets in 
their effort to respond to immediate needs for 
disposing of UXO. Most commonly, UXO is 
discovered by members of the local popu la-
tion, who report these discoveries ro the 
MACC MRE field teams. The MRE reams 
are chen responsible for submitting the discov-
ery reports ro the MACC/FMAC headquar-
ters, including the MACC EOD ream. In 
mosr cases, rhe MACC EOD ream is subse-
q uently tasked ro d ispose of these UXO in rhe 
field. T he EOD ream and the MRE reams 
have an excellem and effective working coop-
eration, wh ich enables a quick response ro 
UXO d iscoveries. 
The MACC MRE reams regu larly 
deploy ro rhe rh ree sectors of rhe M ission area 
within rhe TSZ and adjacent areas, where they 
carry our community-level interventions, pro-
vid ing much-needed mine risk train ing to an 
average of 2,000 men, women and children 
per week. 
The MACC MRE personnel also 
conduct landmine safery training for mission 
personnel, both mil icary and civilian, and 
orher h uman itarian actors operating in 
Erit rea. 
In 2002, the MACC determined a 
need for a road verification/clearance capacity 
for locating presumably deep-buried mines 
and UXO and for increasing rhe safery of 
movement and mobil ity of the PKF and 
humanitarian operations in the TSZ. The flrsc 
co be contacted ro do this job was UXB Africa 
(Pry.) Ltd. 
During UXB's contract period until 
2003, che UNMEE MACC planned the oper-
ations and tasked che rouce clearance capaciry. 
In mid-2003, with the realisation char deep-
buried mines d id nor pose the threat that was 
initially assumed, rhe MACC recommended 
char the contract of UXB not be cxrcndcd. 
UXB concluded operations in Eritrea in mid-
July 2003. 
Jn mid-2003 , rhe roure clearance/ 
verification conrracr was relet, this rime to 
address the need co clear roads in support of 
the border demarcation process of rhe 
Ethiopian Ericrean Bound ary Commission 
(EEBC) more rapidly as well as to address rhe 
existing threat of newly laid mines (30 newly 
laid m ines on roads were reported in 18 
months) . This rime, the contract was awarded 
co MECH EM. MECHEM has three clear-
ance components: a mechanical ream, a man-




A ll mine accion tasks carried our by 
rhe Force demining assets are closely planned, 
coordi naced and supervised by the UNMEE 
MACC/FMAC. An experienced sec of boch 
civilian and military staff members of rhe 
MACC/FMAC is responsible for rhe receipt 
of casking requests, issuance of tasking orders, 
monitoring of tasks, implemencario n of quali-
ty assurance as well as supervision of activities 
in completion of task orders. 
The operations section of che 
MACC works alongside rhc FMAC. Three 
Liaison Officers (one from each demining 
contingent) work ar the FMAC. They are in 
charge of directly liaising and coordinating 
tasks char are issued by the MACC operations 
section. T hese officers report to rhe civilian 
Operations Officer of the MACC, who is 
responsible for rhe coordination of the assets 
and tasking priorities. 
In addition, chcre arc military 
officers working at the MACC/FMAC. These 
officers arc in fact UN Military Obse1vers 
(UNMOs) seconded to the MACC for specif-
ic assignments. For example, cwo UNMOs acr 
as FMAC MRE Officers; one acts as rhe 
Project Officer Dcmining for Demarcation; 
one aces as the Field Mine Action Liaison 
Officer; and one acts as the Mine Action 
Liaison Officer in Addis Ababa, Echiopia. In 
coral, there are currently five UNMOs second-
<::d ro the MACC in rank from Major ro 
Lieucenant Colonel. 
The civilian international staff of 
the MACC are predominantly ex-military 
staff from a variery of countries. The majority 
of chem have considerable demining and oper-
ational m anagement experience. At the 
MACC, they fi ll positions such as Programme 
Manager, C hief of Operations, O perations 
Officer, Regional Liaison Officers, EOD 
Officer, Chief of Informacion , Logistics 
Officer and Programme/Tra ining Officer. As 
a ream, they are responsible for the smooth 
functioning of the UNM EE MACC. 
The }'uture 
T he largest cask yet awamng rhe 
MACC/FMAC is the continuation of coordi-
nating clearance task~ of roads, access routes to 
pillar sires as well as pillar sites in Sectors 
Cemer and Wcsr to support rhe demarcation 
project of the EEBC. O riginally, it was intend-
ed that chis p roject would commence in 2003. 
However, due to rhe poli tical sralemare 
bccween the cwo countries concerning the 
delineation of their border, the EEBC has been 
unable to proceed with demarcation. As a 
result, the sires for pillars in Sectors Center and 
West of che TSZ remain undecided, holding 
back the Force assets to demine rhe necessary 
areas in preparation for marking rhe border. 
Pillar sites in Sector East have already been 
idencified and cleared in prepa ration fo r 
demarcation as chis was underway prior to che 
disagreement becween che two countries con-
cerning the way ahead of the EEBC. In the 
interim, while che international communiry 
anticipates an agreement becween Ethiopia 
and Eritrea concerning demarcation, rhe Force 
demining assets will continue to effectively 
conduct UNMEE and humanitarian clearance 
tasks in areas where populations are most 
affected by the chreat of mines and UXO. 
Currently, chis require ment is grearesr in the 




Since its inception, the MACC has coordinated, 
managed or supervised the following clearance opera-
tions: 
• Clearance of 51,058,794 sq m o f land 
• C learance of 9,2"'7 km of roads 
• D isposal of 3,739 AP mtncs 
• D isp osal of2,514 AT m ines and 48,256 items o f UXO 
These figures are the results of a combined military 
and civilian composite of demining operations since the 
beginning of the MACC through January 2004. They 
are a reflection of the commitment and cooperation to 
demining operations across the Mission area-an 
achievement that has been realised through joint efforts 
among contributing local authorities, NGOs and Force 
demining assets. 
Conclusion 
The integration of a MACC into a peacekeeping o peration 
has w itn essed a successful management of assets coupled with a unique 
skills base. This is rhe first rime in UN peacekeeping history that a 
peacekeeping mission has effectively incorporated into the establish-
ment of rhe mission structure an integrated civilian and m il itary mine 
action headquarters. This unprecedenced achievement has been 
accomplished in addicion co mine clearance of large areas of land in 
Eritrea and a significant reduction of the land mine and UXO threat 
for rhe local population. Being the first UN mine action establishment 
to effectively integrate all civilian and military mine action compo-
nents of a UN peacekeeping mission within a single headquarters 
structure, the UNMEE MACC has che potencial to se1ve as a template 
for che creation of futu re mine action centers that are parr of UN 
peacekeeping operations where a mine action element is required. 
"'Photos c/o the authors. 
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rhe needs and goals of rhe ocher. As John W ilkinson points o ut, " ... 
ic's che same rh ing, but d ifferent sides of rhe same coin,"3 and gening 
those rwo sides ro work in concert wirh one another is key to the 
progress of humanitarian demining and will undoubtedly benefit both 
as rhey work towards the murual objeccive of a world safe from mines 
and UXO. 
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by lan Mansfield, Operations Director, and Eric 
M. Filippino, Head, Socio-Economic Unit, GICHD 
including communication and medical back-up, and are organized to 
operate as a ream. Local military forces may have rhc necessary equ ip-
ment for demin ing, bur if not, this can be provided by visiting forces 
bilaterally or multilaterally. 
Thus, in many contexts, military forces have been widely 
used in mine action, including humanitarian demining, although with 
varying degrees of success. In Nicaragua, for instance, all demining has 
been carried ou t by the Nicaraguan army and its effectiveness has been 
greatly enhanced by support from visiting milirary forces operating 
under rhe auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). On 
the other hand, in Bosnia Herzegovina, the usc of entity armed forces 
(EAF) in demining has been expensive and demining accidems have 
been unacceptably high in rhe initial phases when compared to com-
mercial companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) . In 
Cambodia, the armed forces have made a relatively limired contribu-
tion to humani tarian demining ro dare, rhough rhe srudy recommends 
that their role and contribution be reviewed. This is due to the recenr 
improvements in organization, training and equi pment of the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), as well as rhc declining donor 
funds for rhc civilian mine action structures in-country. 
M ilitaty forces often operate in environments where info r-
mation is restricted and con trolled, and rhey may be reluctant ro pro-
vide data and information to others. T his makes coordination diffi-
cult, if nor impossible, and duplication and gaps likely. In many con-
texts, local military forces are reluctant to accept coord ination or 
instruction from a civilian aurhoriry. For example, this appears to be 
the case in C ambodia. In Lebanon, the militaty has seemed reluctant 
to take external advice on mine action, although in fo rmation sharing 
has reportedly improved. Similarly, in N icaragua, after early difficul-
ties, coordinarion with rhe National Demining Commission and vis-
piles of mines requires logistic support, such as inventory control, trans-
port and unpacking prior to destruction. The local military can under-
take these labour-intensive tasks. 
Visiting Military Forces 
M any armed forces possess considerable expertise m mine 
action, including managing and overseeing demining and explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD) programmes, especially in emergency siruarions. 
T he positive elements they may bring are experience, knowledge of tech-
niques and advanced EOD skills, and in a number of cases, some knowl-
edge of the International Mine Action Standards (!MAS). A number of 
the case studies in the GICHD report, notably Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
N icaragua , show that demining accidents have been reduced due ro 
training and oversight from visiting military forces. 
However, in mine-affected countries where rherc is both local 
miliraty and civilian involvement in the mine action processes, visiting 
mil itary forces tend ro view their mission as fulfilling a rather narrow 
service. Cooperation and coordination with civilian structures are nor 
always accorded adequate priority, which can lead to compartmentaliza-
tion of rhe assets being delivered. Certain missions may even be under-
taken withour any direct knowledge of rhe civili an organ izations operat-
ing in the same tl1eatre. 
Bilateral arrangements between militaries can be appropriate 
when the local military is largely or entirely in charge of a country's mine 
action programme. Such agreements, however, may not provide an ade-
quate planning and programming framework when there arc multiple 
local and international actors involved, as programming complexity 
increases geometrically as the number of actors increases. As an example, 
it is possible that a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) or a UN 
Mine Action Centre (MAC) may be working in conf ormity with local-
iting military forces seems ro 
have sign ificantly improved. 
The srudy did not 
find much evidence of the usc 
of the military in the other 
areas of mine action. While 
the military may be able to 
provide warnings about the 
technical dangers of land-
mines and UXO, they are not 
suited to undertake commu-
nity-based MRE pro-
grammes, where social issues 
and helping to develop alter-
native coping mechanisms are 
important. In a few cases, the 
local military may have pro-
vided immediate medical care 
Clearing mines for humanitarian purposes demands 
specific expertise, which may not necessarily be gained as a 
result of ordinary military training or experience. Also, morale 
among deminers serving in local military forces may be low, 
depending on salary and conditions, and conscripts do not 
make the best deminers. It should not be forgotten that mili-
tary deminers are first and foremost soldiers and as such will 
be used as combat engineers if hostilities re-emerge. In the 
aftennath of an internal anned conflict, the national anny 
may not be perceived as neutral and may not be 
ly adapted standard s, bur a 
visiting military fo rce may be 
training on a different inter-
pretation. The !MAS repre-
sent an international set of 
standards char may be adapt-
ed and interpreted differcnrly 
by each host country, making 
no two countries' technical 
procedures or standard oper-
ating procedures (SOPs) 
exactly ali ke. Often , such dis-
parities will become evident 
only !are in rhe programme 
cycle as an increasing amount 
of operatio nal respo nsibility 
is assumed by the national 
authority. The implications 
of this may involve duplica-
tion, unnecessary cost or the 
need to re-clear land. Again, 
welcomed by affected communities. In these situations, it is 
better not to use the military or assign them tasks that do not 
to a civilian mine victim, 
though they d o nor become 
involved in the provision of 
bring them into contact with a community, such as the clear-
ance of military barracks or airfields. 
prosthetics or rehab ilitation activities. Very few militaries anywhere in 
the world have played an active role in calling for a ban on AP land-
mines. T he one other area where the local military has been seen to 
play a significant role is in stockpile destruction in those countries that 
have signed the AP Mine Ban Convention (MBC). Destroying stock-
rhe need for a strong, central national coordination body establ ished 
early in the life of a programme is seen as impon ant in avoiding these 
situations. 
UN peacekeepers have rarely engaged in large-scale humani-
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Thus, although UN peacekeepers have been present in Lebanon for 
more than rwo decades, they have rypically conducted only mine clear-
ance co support their own operations, and according co their own 
national military procedures. Though this may be consistenr wirh the 
obligations of parties ro a conflict under international law ro be 
responsible for mines, booby-uaps and other explosive devices laid by 
those parties, it docs not necessarily lead to substantial remediation of 
the problem in humanitarian terms. In fact, throughout the more than 
20-year experience in Lebanon of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), as seemingly simple a task as the handover of records, con-
cerning the mine clearance work between incoming and outgoing con-
tingents, appears not co have been accomplished. 
Use of Military TAs 
Visiting militaries have often assigned military personnel ro 
serve as TAs to the various MACs and project implementation units. 
Many of these have performed admirably, and the secondmenr of 
active military personnel appears to have been a successful strategy for 
getting a mine action programme up and running in an emergency 
phase and in highly specialized roles, such as EOD. 
However, the GICHD smdy has concluded that the overall 
contribution of these secondmenr programmes has proven modest in 
the long term. There have also been criticisms of the role played by 
some TAs, on the basis of unclear chains of command and reporting 
lines and confused terms of reference. It has also been claimed that 
coordinating authorities have sometimes failed to exploit fully their 
skills and potential contributions ro the programme. Thus, a number 
of rhc case studies in the GIC HD report, while acknowledging an 
important role for in-kind military advisers at the o utset of a mine 
action programme, express concern about their conrriburion over rhe 
longrerm in a development context. This is the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Cambodia in particular, where TAs may not neces-
sarily have been equipped with the skills needed to sustain mine 
action. Nor are TAs necessarily experienced in building local capaci-
ties through advising their local counterparts. 
In 1999, in Cambodia, for instance, the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC) hosred 76 TAs, both military and civilian. A 
review by UN Development Program (UNDP) concluded that, "while 
the military has made an impressive contribution in developing capacity 
within the CMAC, partimlarly technical capacity, in gmeral milif<lry advisers 
are less suited to meet the training needs and capr1ciry demands CMAC now 
foces. " Indeed, TAs may end up learning more abom mine action than 
do their national counterparts. These difficulties are compounded by 
tours of dury-rypically six months-that are often roo short for the 
individuals to make an effective contribution to the programme. 
TAs can represent a significantly high cost for a mine action 
programme. The incremental costs associated with any foreign dury 
assignment of personnel from visiting military forces may be at least as 
high as the full cost of engaging equally well-qualified civilian person-
nel for the same assignment. In addition, a different framework for 
employment would allow for the termination of the assignment of an 
employee whose performance proved to be unsatisfactory-something 
that cannot readily be done with personnel seconded on a temporary 
basis from a visiting military force. 
Enhancing Combat Capacity 
The provision of assistance to local miliraty forces for mine 
action purposes, in the form of training and/or equipment, has some-
times been controversial as these can also enhance combat capaciry. 
The nation providing military assistance must carefully consider the 
potential ramifications of supplying training or equipment ro a mili-
raty force. The historical evolution of the conflict, rhe current peace 
and reconciliation developments as well as the nature of the militaty 
structure and deployment must all be weighed against the potential 
benefits of military support for mine action prior to rhe provision of 
assistance. There is no real mechanism ro decide this, as most military-
to-military assistance is provided on a bilateral basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The GICHD study on the role of the military in mine 
acrion found rhat the military has played a significant role in a num-
ber of national mine action programmes. This can be either through 
involvement by the local military forces or wirh support from a visit-
ing milirary force. Invariably, at rhe end of a conAicr, local militaries 
will need training and equipment to enable them to undertake 
humanitarian demining tasks according to international standards. 
T he decision to provide such support will need to be carefully weighed 
against the risk of enhancing their war-fighting capabili ties, and what 
phase of the post-conflict period it is. The study was unable to deter-
mine if it was cheaper to use the militaty for demining tasks, as pro-
ductivity and cost effectiveness are areas that require further study in 
the whole mine action sector. The use of visiting military forces on the 
other hand, has been found to be most effective in the emergency or 
starr-up phase of a national mine action programme. 
Wherever there is a mine or UXO problem, humanitarian 
and developmental ini tiatives necessarily involve a high degree of con-
tact and interaction among military personnel, non-military mine 
action personnel and local communities. Militaty capabilities, if prop-
erly directed and controlled, can bring important skills and organiza-
tional assets to complement many mine action activities, particularly 
in the emergency or srarr-up phase of a programme. Military organi-
zations are normally trained to be mission-oriented and to complete 
these missions as quickly and efficiently as possible. This works well 
for almost all military problems, and indeed for many humanitarian 
problems like infrastructure repair, bm establishing national mine 
acrion programmes under post-conAict conditions normally requires a 
longer-term approach than a militaty "task-oriented" one. Military 
actors are unlikely to have the best idea how mine clearance firs into 
the larger mine action picture. 
The component activities of mine action have to be closely 
coordinated if they are to work at all and military staff are well-versed 
in the concept of how many interlocking compo nents make up a plan. 
Mine action plans require a similar degree of integration, bm this 
planning has to take place with a number of different agencies, both 
military and non-military, which often have different perspectives and 
agendas. All the actors must be prepared to submit to overall coordi-
nation and direction. T his does nor mean interfering in the established 
military "chain of command," but that rhe broader issues like nation-
al strategies and prioriry setting for all the aspects of mine action are 
-
developed in a consultative manner with the full range of actors. 
* Copies of the study, The Role of the Military in Mine 
Action, are available in hardcopy from the GlCHD or can be down-
loaded form the GICHD website at www.gichd.ch. 
* Photo c/o AP. 
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HDTC, continued from page II 
of epidemiology and public health methods of assessment to analyze 
and present clara used for planning and monitoring. Additionally, the 
HDTC hosted representatives from the Psychological Operations unit 
to discuss specific needs and recommendations. This interactive 
course developmenr process allowed the center to update and imple-
ment changes for subsequent classes. 
New Plans for Training 
The HDTC is planning to add rwo additional trammg 
modules ro its curriculum. The first is a Level I UXO C learance 
course that will enhance training of technicians ro perform barrie area 
clearance (BAC) in contaminated areas. Students attending this course 
will graduate with specialized knowledge gained from hands-on train-
ing and mission-specific lesson material in-hand for use in teaching 
students in the specific host nation. 
The second new training module pertains to an 
information database manager's course on the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), the Geneva 
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (G ICHD) 
standardized mine action database. The HDTC responded ro requests 
from its "cusromers" to add this module to our curriculum and 
already uses a version of 1M SMA that incorporates digitized maps of 
the local training area at Fort Leonard Wood. This allows srudenrs to 
work with actual survey data collected from simulated hazard areas and 
incorporate them into IMSMA. 
Final Comments 
Landmine clearance is a deadly serious business. With rhis 
ever in mind, rhe HDTC staff works diligently to conduct all training 
in accordance with IMAS and to find and teach safer ways to perform 
HMA operations, thereby fully supporting rhe U.S. government's 
Mine Action Program. 
*Graphics c/o the author. 
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THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING 
TRAINING CENTER 
A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 
Introduction 
Humanitarian mine action (HMA) 
is a field known for irs paradigm shifrs. Just as 
technological advances create more efficient 
and less expensive alternatives to old products 
and methodologies, emerging technologies 
offer newer and safer ways to derecr land-
mines. I nregraring rhese advances into rhe 
HMA community and thereby rhe training 
curriculum, is o ne challenge faced by rhe staff 
of rhe U.S. Department of Defense 
Humani ta rian Demining T raining Cenrer 
(HDTC). 
Background 
Established 111 1996, HDTC is 
located ar Fort Leonard Wood, M issouri, and 
is rhe U.S. Deparrmcnr of D efense training 
facil ity for HMA. T he cemer is in a modern 
15,000 sq ft. building set amid the rolling hills 
of the Ozarks. In December 2003, rhe Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) directed 
HDTC be transferred to rhe Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency for oversight and direct 
superviSIOn. 
The typical studenr attending rhe 
rwo-week HMA course comes primarily from 
the Army's Special Operations Fo rces (SOF). 
T he students come to rhe HDTC ro prepare 
rhem to deploy on HMA training missions in 
one of the 43 mine-affected nations presently 
su pported by the U nited Stares. These mis-
sions range from establishing a new program 
ro maintaining on-going mine action initia-
tives. SOF soldiers are well-suited to perform 
HMA missions due to their experience work-
ing overseas in small units, their ability ro 
work independently and an innate cultural 
awareness. T he last trait is extremely impor-
ranr, since these "unofficial ambassadors" rep-
resent rhe Uni ted States-its people, govern-
ment and military-to rhe citizens of rhe host 
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
natio n. The contact these soldiers have with 
their counterparts and students may be far 
more personal and inrense in nature than rhar 
which many diplomats experience. 
Training Curriculum 
The basic HDTC curriculum is rhe 
same for all students during the first week. 
This common-core training focuses on the 
basic premises of mission planning, U.S . 
Policy, and the International Mine Action 
Standards (!MAS). All students are exposed to 
rhe rigors of demining during an introduction 
to the use of mine detectors and bas ic mine 
clearance procedures. lr is d uring th is training 
rhar all studenrs d on protective equipment 
and locate and expose a mine in a one-meter 
training lane while ar rhe same rime practicing 
safe and proper techn iques and procedures. 
W hile rhe novelty of the task first amuses rhc 
soldiers, rhis training q uickly demonstrates 
the d ifficulties and ted ium of clearing vegeta-
tion, avoiding trip wires and finally, of prepar-
ing rhe mine for destruction in place. 
D uring rhe second week, students 
arc trained according ro their specific respon-
sibilities for the upcoming mission. Generally 
speaking, Special Forces soldiers focus on 
demin ing skills throughout the second week 
of training, as ir will be their responsibili ty ro 
train deminers in rhe host nation. These par-
ticular soldiers arrive ar rhe HDTC with many 
of rhe skills necessary to reach d emin ing; rhey 
are experienced trainers, possess advanced lan-
guage skills and have extensive training wirh 
explosives. 
Civil Affairs soldiers arrive already 
trained and experienced in working with min-
ister ial levels of government. T his background 
lends itself well to the program management 
and infrastructure d evelopment aspect of 
HMA These students are given additional 
training on general management, the U.S. 
Department o f Stare's Country Plan 
Assessment, rhe host nation 's curren t work 
plan, and an overview of other organ izations 
involved within the counrry. Armed with this 
knowledge, rhese soldiers are called upon ro 
reach or assist in srraregic p lanning, coordi-
1-------------------- - - - tlv Lloyd D. Carpenter, Course Manager, Paul Arcangeli, 
Director, and Rodney A. Robideau, Technical Director, HDTC 
narc efforrs with other HMA activities, and 
advise in logistical planning. 
Additional Components of HMA 
Mine risk education (MRE) is a 
viral aspect of H MA, allowi ng rhc grearesr 
reach and influence ar rhe lowest program 
cost. To achieve this goal, soldiers from rhe 
U.S. Army's Psychological Operations orga n-
izations bring product development skills ro 
rhe table. These skilled warriors receive much 
of the same training as C ivil Affairs soldiers 
regarding the H MA situation in a host nation. 
Additionally, they receive mission-focused 
train ing on MRE methodology, idenrificarion 
of at-risk groups, and integration of commu-
ni ty-based MRE efforts inro the larger coun-
try-wide p rogram. 
Another group of soldiers supporr-
ing the U.S. governmenr's H MA efforr come 
from rhe U.S. M il itary's Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) specialty. These highly 
trained technicians hail from all branches of 
rhe Armed Forces. A typical class may include 
soldiers, sa ilors and Marines. Iris rhis specific 
diversity rhar ofren strengthens the group's 
skill sets and experience leveL EOD students 
receive the same basic HMA instruction as all 
students attending trai ning at rhe HDTC. 
Since they already possess a strong back-
ground in rhe UXO disposal, their mission 
preparation concentrates primarily on rhe type 
of tlueat and the type of traini ng rhey will 
have ro plan for rhe host nation. EOD techni-
cians leave HDTC wich a perspective of how 
ro address explosive conraminarion from an 
HMA perspective. 
HDTC Museum 
Students and visirors are often sur-
prised at the level of sophistication awaiting 
rhem ar rhe HDTC. T he H DTC Museum is 
ar the recep tion area, where all manner of 
mines, o rdnance and interactive displays are 
available for evaluation. The inerr mines are 
displayed on shelves, intact or as cur-away 
models, or even in an underground sid e-view 
of emplacement. The museum includes an 
ever-expanding variety of fuses, ami-ha ndling 
devices, bombs, rockets, sub-muni t io ns, 
detectors, protective equipment and ammuni-
tion. 
Given the cenrer's varied contacts 
throughout rhe HMA community, many dif-
fe rent people, organizations and agencies have 
come together ro provide inerr samples of rhe 
many items fo und in counrries where rhe U.S. 
government HMA program is involved. More 
than just an inreresting place to visit, the 
museum allows students and visitors an 
opporruni ry ro safely see and touch "rhe rea l 
thing. " This enhances the learning experi-
ence, and gives all a keener understanding of 
rhe rhrear from these indiscrim inate killers. 
Teaching at the HDTC 
Cou rse Managers ar rhc HDTC all 
have a primary area of expertise. In addition , 
they each fill alrernare or assistant instructor 
positions in one or more orher courses. At first 
glance, this broad-reach ing collaboration may 
appear less difficult than it is in application. 
T he expectation is rhar all staff members reach 
beyond the Cenrer's currenr activities and 
scope ro become subject matter experts in o ne 
or more HMA-relared areas. This directly sup-
ports rhe Deparrmenr of Defense's visio n for a 
"Cenrcr of Excellence" in HMA tra ining. 
With over I 00 acres of land avail -
able for training, rhe HDTC provides stu-
denrs with full-scale layouts of mine clearance 
operations, ro include associated supporr areas. 
Each area is constructed in accordance wirh pro-
visions of rhe !SMA. Orher lanes show exam-
ples of indigenous marking systems used in 
clearance operations throughout the world . 
O ne particularly inreresring display depicts 
landmines rhar were emplaced several years 
ago, wirh vegetation and terrain allowed ro 
"age" naturally. Purposely, rhe area is nor 
mainrained or changed in any way so students 
are able ro observe mines 
thar have become more 
or less visible, changed 
colo r, become rotted or 
migrated due ro rhe 
effects of wea thering. 
What srudenrs leave wirh 
is an innate understand-
ing of the effects nature 
may have o n actual 
mined areas. Fallen limbs 
and heavy undergrowth 
underscore the difficul-
ties faced by demi ners in 
many parts of the world. 
T he HDTC 
staff is comprised of 
experienced profession-
als-most wirh prior mil-
itary experience. T hese 
sraff members have 
extensive backgrounds in 
areas such as EOD, engineering, Informacion 
Technology and Special Operations. Along 
wirh U.S. personnel, a mil itary representative 
of rhe Royal New Zealand Army also aug-
ments rhe staff. While the bulk of rhe H DTC 
sraff is U.S. government employees, rhe New 
Zealand Army representative is the only cur-
rem active-duty military member of the staff, 
and brings in-depth experience gained 
throughout his engineering career. 
The H DTC has d eployed irs sraff 
members on military training missions and 
assessments ro numerous countries ro aug-
ment and advise military H MA ream trainers. 
T hese deployments provide several direct ben-
efits: they provide a ready source of informa-
tion to the military training team and they 
allow staff members to gain fi rsthand observa-
tions of HMA operations rhrougho ur the 
world. This in turn ensures rhar rhe H DTC is 
up-to-d ate on the latest techn iques and tech-
nology in use by the H MA communi ty. 
Another way rhe HDTC conrinues 
ro evolve is through feed back from rhe "cus-
tomer," namely, the students or rheir units. 
Recently, Psychological Operations students 
indicated additional areas they felt would be 
benefi cial ro their trai ning and understand ing 
of HMA. In response, the H DTC senr a rep-
resentative ro attend trai ning with rhe United 
Nations Ch ildren's Fund (UNICEF) and rhe 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in Arlanra, GA. T his training focused 
on rhe laresr find ings and associative relevance 
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Support to Humanitarian Mine Action 
Introduction 
Humanitarian mine action tasks fo r 
rhe military are almost exclusively assigned ro 
rhe Canadian Military Engineers (CME). 
During rhe Cold War, the CME spent a great 
deal of rime training for mine warfare, while 
maintaining a keen eye on rhe North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization's (NATO's) Central 
Front. Fortunately, the CME did nor have ro 
exercise their full capabilities. However, some 
of the skills the CME had acquired proved 
useful in unexpected ways as the confronta-
tion between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
began to fade. 
Between 1989 and 2003, Canadian 
sold iers participated in rhree significant 
humanitarian mine action programs in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH). In addition, smaller num-
bers supported survey programs tn 
Mozambique and Angola. Canadian troops 
deployed to Kuwait, Iraq, C roatia, BiH, 
Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Erhiopia/Erirrea and Afghanistan 
conducted mine and UXO clearance, which 
contributed to rhe overall demining effort. 
>akistanl Aie:hruustan 
The Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in 1979 created a severe mine 
rhreat in Afghanistan and a large Afghan 
refugee population migrated to neighboring 
Pakistan and Iran. The 1988 Geneva Accords 
set rhe rerms for Sovier withdrawal, bur the 
way home for rhe Afghan refugees was-all 
roo literally-far from clear. The first human-
itarian mine action programs and rhe first 
general usage of the term "humanitarian dem-
ining" developed in response ro rhis situation. 
The United Nations, which had 
established an office in Islamabad to coordi-
nate rhe humanitarian demining effort, pro-
posed to address the mine threat there by 
training select refugees in basic mine clearance 
and mine awareness. When rhe projected large-
scale repatriation of refugees began following d1e 
withdrawal of Soviet troops early in 1989, ir was 
anticipated mat rhis selection program would 
provide refugees wirh needed skills and capa-
bilities. In preparation for humanitarian dem-
ining efforts, rhe Mine Awareness and 
Clearance Training Program (MACTP) was 
established in August 1988. The Unired 
Nations appealed to member stares to support 
rhe new program. Nine countries, including 
by Rohan Maxwell, Major, Canadian Army 
Canada, agreed to provide military personnel, the first of which began 
ro arrive in February 1989. Canada also provided a Colonel to rhe 
MACTP Headquarters to acr as the Assistant Controller and Senior 
Technical Advisor. Between March 1989 and July 1990, four 12-
member CME teams rorared through the MACTP. 
Initially, the MACTP had two goals. The first was to train 
15,000 Afghan men who were then distributed according to place of 
origin so as to ensure their knowledge concerning rhe basics of locat-
ing, neutralizing, and destroying mines and booby rraps. The second 
goal was to provide mine awareness, which consisted of recognition of 
mines and potential mine locations, self-extraction from a mined area, 
and marking techn iques. Subsequently, when rhe pace of refugee 
return proved slower rhan expected and more training rime became 
available, rhe following positions and additional courses were added: 
basic mine clearance instructor, unit leader, small unir operations and 
survey. 
During rhe developmental stages of humanitarian mine 
action, issues such as the broader management of clearance operations 
and quality assurance were nor addressed. Training was conducted in 
two camps near Peshawar and Quetra, each with a capacity for an 
average of 250 students. Pakistani army engineers, who also served as 
additional camp support and administration , established both camps. 
Working our of these facilities, MACTP personnel trained some 
11 ,000 Afghans in 15 months. Canadian personnel conducted train-
ing, updated curricula and verified the technical content of rhe demi-
ning courses. 
Mine awareness training was conducted under rhe auspices 
of the Inrernational Rescue Committee (IRC) on behalf of rhe United 
Nations. IRC mine awareness training presented a particular challenge 
to female refugees, as Afghan culture restricts the use of male trainers 
for the refugee women and girls. This difficulty was resolved through 
a peculiarity inherent in the Canadian training system. All CME offi-
cers are required to train for both combat engineer and garrison infra-
structure support tasks. Female officers, who were at that time prohib-
ited from serving in combat units, nevertheless had ro undergo rhe rel-
evant training. This inequity ended the following year when the 
restriction was lifted. 
Canada was thus in a position to provide qualified demi-
ning instructors who could go into the camps to train female refugees. 
Three members of each 12-member ream were women. These officers 
assisted IRC with curriculum development, raugh r different aspects of 
mine awareness to Afghans of borh sexes and monitored rhe insrruc-
rors once they began to reach rheir own courses. By July 1990, an 
average of 40,000 refugees per month were receiving mine awareness 
training. However, access to female refugees continued to remain 
problemaric due to con tinued cui rural obstacles and a limited number 
of female instructors . 
The last of rhe 50 Canadians to serve with rhe MACTP lefr 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 1990. The program had begun to 
d iversify some time earlier wirh the srarr of clearance operations with-
in Afghanistan and continued to evolve as rhe number of qualified 
Afghans increased. The number of foreign instructors decreased as the 
scope of clearance operations expanded. In the long run, however, rhe 
use of unpaid civilian deminers who lacked logistic and medical sup-
port was not viable, and focus shifted to non-governmental organiza-
tion (NCO) and commercial operations. In this respect, the MACTP 
concept of civilians clearing mines around their villages proved ro be 
invalid. This was not a reAecrion on rhe trainees or on rhose who had 
provided the training; rather, this was a reflection of the narure of dem-
ining, rhe requirement for reasonable salaries and me availability of 
appropriate support. 
Cambod1a 
In October 1991 , after decades of aggression, rhe government 
of Cambodia and irs opponents agreed to end rhe conAicr by permi tting 
rhe United Nations ro run the country for 18 months. The United 
Nations was also responsible for conducting elections and supervising 
demobilization. United Nations troops began to arrive at the close of 
1991 and began ro withdraw in mid-1993, having shepherded rhe 
counny th rough a reasonably successful set of elections, despite rhe fact 
rhar the Khmer Rouge had nor cooperated. Ir was clear from the begin-
ning of rhe United Nations mission rhat Cambodia faced an extreme 
mine rhrear; one that continued ro increase until rhe final round of 
figh ring weakened at the end of rhe 1990s. 
U nired Nations forces conducted mine clearance efforts in 
Cambodia, which included limired survey, marking and mine awareness 
activities in order ro support their own operations. During 1992, 
United Narions personnel contingents began to rrain Cambodians 
under rhe auspices of rhe Mine Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU). 
In 1993, with United Nations withdrawal nearing, rhe MCTU evolved 
into rhe Cambodian Mine Acrion Centre (CMAC). The CMAC is a 
government agency with foreign civil ian and military Technical 
Advisors, financed through a U nited Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) trust fund , with rhe Unired Nations Office of Project Services 
(UNOPS) as the executing agency. CME members were heavily 
involved in this process. The Canadian govern ment agreed to provide 
continual military support to CMAC. Incidentally, the term "min e 
acrion" appears ro have been coined in the process of naming CMAC. 
Initially, the 12-member Canadian group was the largest 
national demining conringcnr, comprising more than one-rhird of rhe 
first group of military Technical Advisors. However, rhe Canadian 
group was gradually reduced to seven, until finally me Canadian com-
mitment was terminated in 2000. Members of the Canadian contingent 
occupied a range of positions includ ing rhar of C hief Technical Advisor, 
which would remain a Canadian post until mid-2000. Other Canadians 
served as Technical Advisers in the field and as operations and technical 
dcvelopmenr sraff ar the CMAC headquarters. The Canadians and 
other technical advisers assisted wirh mine clearance operations, plan-
ning, procedures, equipment testing, acquisition, mine awareness and 
information management. In 1999, seven Canadians occupied four 
positions at CMAC headquarters, including that of Chief Technical 
Advisor, and three positions in two of CMAC's fou r demining units. 
International support helped CMAC establish irself rather 
quickly. By rhe middle of the decade, the organization could field 42 
plaroons of deminers wirh the requisite adminisrrarive and logistics sup-
port, as well as survey, mine awareness and traini ng elements. By 1997, 
there were approximately 2,500 national staff and 50 expatriate techni-
cal advisers employed by CMAC; in 1999, there were some 60 platoons 
wirh nearly 2,800 national sra.ff and 50 expatriate technical advisers. 
















Unfortunately, this success was marred by increasing con-
cerns about mismanagemenr and corruption, and funding eventually 
ceased. Lack of funding led to a halt in operations in late 2000, when 
the organization could no longer sustain itself. The simarion was even-
mally resolved by implemenring a national mine action authority, rhus 
separating responsibility for clearance operations from rhe strategic 
planning, quality assurance and oversight of those operations. 
Following previous setbacks, a chastened and reorganized CMAC 
resumed operations, focusing on clearance. Wider demining responsi-
bilities had been transferred to the newly created Cambodian Mine 
Action Authority. The success of the changes helped to significantly 
restore donor confidence. 
Bosn1a-Hcrzep;ovnta 
The fighting that swept across the western Balkans during 
the 1990s left BiH with a significanr mine and UXO problem. After 
rhe signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995 and the subsequent 
deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR, later rhe 
Stabilization Force or SFOR) in conjuncrion with a variety of organi-
zations ranging from NGOs to indigenous armed forces, the collabo-
rating organizations began to conduct mine action operations. In May 
1996, rhe United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs estab-
lished a mine action center (MAC) in BiH. T he MAC operated under 
a mandate from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to act as the 
lead agency fo r all mine action activities in the counrry. These respon-
sibilities were turned over to the newly created Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Mine Action Center (BH MAC) in J uly 1998. 
The situation in post-war BiH was further complicated 
because the country was divided into two Enriries. Each had substan-
tial powers rhar, by design, left the State governmenr with limited 
spheres of authority and responsibility . For example, each Entity 
maintained its own armed forces and civil protection forces. T he divi-
sion between State and Entity levels meant that BHMAC's authority 
was limited, even though irs responsibilities included the accredirarion 
of demining companies, the promulgation of national standards 
(including technical standard operating procedures and accident inves-
tigation), and the coordination of information management and cen-
tralized financial management (including donor funds). Furthermore, 
the coordination of daily operations was the responsibility of rwo 
Entity Mine Action Cenrers (EMACs), reponing to their respective 
Entity governments and acting through a number of regional offices. 
The EMACs enjoyed significant latitude in planning and conducting 
operations, which would eventually lead to severe difficulties. 
Canada's involvement in humanitarian mine action in BiH 
began in 1997 when six military personnel were d ispatched ro support 
the United Nations MAC. The initial six Canadians would be the 
beginning of a five-year commitrnenr that would involve some 60 
Canadians serving in six-mo nth rotations. In the beginn ing, rhc 
Canadians made up approximately one-fifth of the BiH military 
Technical Advisers, although this proportion d iminished over the years. 
At various times, Canadians worked at the regional, enrity and stare lev-
els and were involved in training, operations, information manage-
ment, supply and finance. For example, in 1999, the four-member 
Canadian contingent occupied several posts including rhe following: 
• Quality Assurance Adviser (BHMAC) 
• Finance Adviser (EMAC) 
• Two field-level Technical Advisors at regional offices 
Demining operations in BiH were conducted by a wide variety 
of agencies including NGOs, commercial companies, teams equipped 
and managed directly by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), C ivil Protection forces in the Entities and dem-
ining units of the Entity armies. Although nor part of BHMAC, some 
members of rhe Canadian IFORJSFOR contingenr in BiH had acted 
and conrinued to act as mine monitors, ensuring that indigenous 
armed forces conducted mine clearance operations in accordance with 
their obligations under the peace accords. 
Over the years, mine action in BiH was accompanied by fre-
quent allegations of corruption, mismanagement and misuse of influ-
ence. Not surprisingly, donors lost confidence and began pulling fund-
ing from the operation as the 1990s progressed. Activities slowed and 
in late 2000 operations were sharply curtailed due ro lack of funds. The 
development of legislation ro centralize mine action under BHMAC 
and ro clearly subordinate rhe Entiry offices to the central agency even-
tually resulted from international pressure. This legislation was enacted 
in early 2002, rhus beginn ing the process of restoring donor confidence. 
T he siwarion has been gradually improving since then. 
Research and Development 
Drawing on the Canadian Landmines Fund (established to 
support implementation of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines), 
the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) was 
created in August 1998 as a partnership among the ministries for 
defense, fore ign affairs and industry. Working from defense research 
facilities and drawing on the capabilities of rhe defense research staff, 
CCMAT's mandate is to investigate and fund industrial participation 
in the development and commercialization of promising new demi-
ning technologies. As parr of rhis effort, the Cenrre facil itates rhe adap-
tation of military equipmenr for commercial use and the application of 
milita1y research efforts by commercial firms. CCMAT projects cover 
a range of activi ties, including the utilization of surrogate mines to sup-
port the testing of mechanical demining equipment, mechanical and 
handheld equipment trials, protective equipment, explosives technolo-
gy, and victim assisrance technology. 
T he Canadian defense research establishment proper has 
invested significant resources in the development of countermine tech-
nology. Much of rhis effort is focused on military operational require-
ments, bur there is potential for humanitarian demining applications . 
Some projects, such as the use of high-energy microwaves to neutral-
ize mines, are still a long way from the field; other projects such as rhe 
Improved Landmine Detection System (!LOS) are in operational use. 
!LOS is a remote-operared vehicle equ ipped with a variety of sensor 
arrays. Iris currently being used by Canadian troops in Afghanistan. 
Concluswn 
My purpose in wnn ng this article was ro provide more 
information about the involvement of Canadian military personnel in 
I 
humanitarian mine action and the several organizations and individu-
als which they worked alongside. It is undeniable many valuable les-
sons were learned during rhe period covered by this overview, and it 
is equally obvious that many issues remain the subject of debate. I am 
certain char rhe people whose efforrs form the basis of this article 
would join me in welcoming that debate, as it is essential to the con-
tinued improvement of humanitarian mine action. 
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The Quick Reaction Demining Force: 
The United States' Response to Humanitarian Demining Crises 
Introduction 
H umanirarian crises, particular! y 
crises in which landmines are involved, may 
occur without warning and require an imme-
diate response. Examples of such crises include 
Hurricane Mitch, which struck Central 
America in 1998, the rapid, post-air war 
return of refugees ro mine-infested Kosovo in 
1999, and tropical cyclones Hudah and Eline 
that ravaged Mozambique in 2000, displacing 
thousands of landmines. T o respond to such 
emergency situations quickly and efficiently, 
the United States developed a Quick Reaction 
Demining Force (QRDF). 
Overview of the QRDF 
In April 2001, the U.S. 
Department of State's Office of Humanitarian 
Demining Programs (now the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement), in coop-
eration with the Republic of Mozambique, 
established the QRDF as a result of lessons 
learned from rhe immediate post-conflict situ-
ation in Kosovo, where threats to returning 
refugees existed. The QRDF is a permanent, 
professional humanitarian demining group 
composed primarily of four 10-man reams of 
Mozambican mine clearance specialists aug-
mented by eight mine detection dog (MOD) 
reams of one dog and handler each. The teams 
can be deployed worldwide within 14 days of 
activation to provide immediate demining 
assistance in emergency humanitarian situa-
tions. The QRDF is deployed to demining 
crisis situations as directed by me u.s. govern-
ment. The force incorporates proven demi-
ning procedures, including rhe use of MODs 
and specially designed mechanical equipment, 
and is outfitted with demining-specific rools 
and materials. Once deployed, the reams 
locate, identifY, map, record and destroy land-
mines, U:XO and improvised explosive devices 
(lEOs) found in the areas designated for clear-
ance. The United Stares oversees recruitment, 
provision of equipment, training and supervi-
sion of QRDF personnel within and outside 
the Republic of Mozambique. The United 
States has also established an independent 
management unit in Maputo to manage 
QRDF operations in coordinat ion with 
Mozambican authorities. In between deploy-
ments o utside Mozambique, the QRDF 
engages in humanitarian demining in support 
of Mozambique's National Demining 
Institute, which allows the QRDF to both 
perform valuabk service in mat mine-affected 
nation as well as keep its professional skills 
finely honed. 
Demining Assistance to Sudan 
On January 19, 2002, the govern-
ment of Sudan and the Sudan People's 
Liberation M ovement/ Army (SPLM/A) 
accepted a formal cease-fire agreemenr follow-
ing the mediation of the United States and 
Switzerland for a war that had lasted 17 years 
in the Nuba Mountains. This war had result-
ed in massive population displacement within 
the region, and landmines had consistently 
been cited as a major threat to the civil popu-
lation and a barrier to freedom of movement 
and generation of income. The government of 
Sudan believed that between 1989 and 
February 2002, I , 160 persons became mine 
victims in the Nuba Mountain region. 
Following the cease-fi re, the displaced popula-
tion from both within and outside the region 
had begun spontaneous relocation and move-
ment despite advice from authorities to wait 
until their security and safe ty could be 
assured. The actual presence of landmines in 
some areas, their suspected presence in others 
and the inability to differentiate between the 
two situations all posed real threats ro the 
Nuba Mountains community. The landmines 
also threatened rhe implementation of the 
cease-fire and the sustainability of peace in the 
Nuba Mountains. 
The cease-fire agreement specifical-
ly referred ro the cessation of mine laying and 
1-------------------------o ... y Hayden Roberts, Frazure-Kruezei-Drew Fellow, JMU 
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the clearing and mapping of mines. The agree-
ment also gave the internationally led Joint 
Military Commission QMC)- in which the 
United States played a leading role-specific 
responsibility for supervising the mapping and 
clearing of mines. Immediate demining action 
was required in this region as it was critical to 
the success of the first phase of the cease-fire 
and the operations of the JMC. In addition , 
heavy rains in Sudan begin in June, which 
would have made ground movement and 
mine-related activities impossible or extremely 
difficult. The QRDF was deployed to Sudan 
during April-June 2002 to 
conduct mine clearance opera-
tions . The QRDF's mine 
clearance operations lessened 
the likelihood of casualties in 
this area as refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons (lOPs) 
began relocation into areas 
where mines were known ro 
exist and into other areas sus-
pected of being mined. In 
doing so, the mine clearance 
operations conrribmed to the 
success of the fi rst phase of the 
concluded cease-fire between 
the government of Sudan and 
rhe SPLM/A as well as the 
operations of the international-
ly led JMC. This initial opera-
tion was so successful that a second "ad hoc" 
QRDF deployment was conducted during the 
period of March 2003 through January 2004. 
Demining Assistance to Sri Lanka 
In March 2002, the government of 
Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam signed a cease-fire agreement and began 
planning for peace talks to take place in a neu-
tral country. The 18-year civil war left many 
landmines and UXO scarrered across Sri 
Lanka. Because no accurate countrywide sur-
vey of the mine/UXO threat has been con-
ducted, an accurate estimate of thei r numbers 
and the areas they affect is impossible to calcu-
late. The most heavily mine and U:XO-Iirrered 
areas are J affna in the north and the areas 
directly to rhe south of Jaffna. The deploy-
ment of the QRDF to Sri Lanka was in 
response to the government of Sri Lanka's 
request for assistance to resettle some 200,000 
IDPs who had to travel through heavily mined 
areas in the Vanni and Killinochchi regions 
and in the Jaffna Peninsula. The QRDF 
deployment provided an on-sire demining 
capability until the United Nations could 
begin irs program of assistance, which demon-
strated the U.S. government's continuing sup-
port for efforts to bring peace to Sri Lanka. In 
early May 2002, QRDF operations began in 
the key village of Sarasalai about 15 km from 
Jaffna where Tamil civilians, taking advantage 
of the cease-fire, were returning to their homes 
and fields. The QRDF team completed its 
work on October 25, 2002, by releasing near-
ly 123,000 sq m of land in this area to Sri 
Lankan authorities. The team cleared 980 
anti-personnel mines and 42 pieces of UXO 
and additionally collected and destroyed 
numerous other pieces of UXO that had been 
brought to irs attention by local residents. In 
early 2003, the United States demonstrated irs 
continued commitment to humanitarian 
mine clearance in Sri Lanka by returning the 
QRDF to render anomer six months of dem-
ining assistance. This provided a bridge of 
assistance while rhe United States geared up to 
support rhe next srep in the dcmining effort: 
establishing a humanitarian mine clearance 
training program for Sri Lankan civilian and 
military personnel so that Sri Lankans could 
continue rhe work in their own country. 
Demining Assistance to Iraq 
Under the direction of the 
Department of State, demining contractor 
RONCO deployed four QRDF teams to Iraq 
on May 3, 2003, ro provide demining and 
battle area clearance (BAC) assistance to the 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA). ORHA served as the ini-
tial governing body in Iraq and was eventual-
ly redesignated as the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA). As the governing body, the 
ORHA/CPA was able to immediately begin 
rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq and also 
quickly remove serious threats of mines and 
U:XO- a task char fell to the QRDF. 
Under the direct supervision of a 
RONCO Task Leader, EOD/Demining 
Supervisor and MOD Supervisor, the four 
eight-man demining reams and 
eight dog handler/MOD teams 
conducted operations with 
respect ro the reconstruction 
and threat removal effort being 
coordinated by the ORHA/ 
CPA along with Coalition 
Forces (CF). By incorporating 
proven barrie area and mine 
clearance procedures, with the 
added asset of MOD reams, 
the QRDF safely cleared nearly 
1.2 million sq m of land , which 
yielded over 2,000 mines and 
U:XO from BAC and demining 
tasks in and around farms, 
wheat fields, power lines, gov-
ernment buildings, and houses 
and along major highways in 
the Baghdad area. On August 
27, 2003, four months after the deployment 
to Iraq, the QRDF reams returned to their 
home base in Mozambique after they respond-
ed successfully once again to an imminent 
humanitarian crisis. Today, rhe QRDF 
remains "on call" to alleviate human suffering 
anywhere in the world while ir contributes to 
rhe establishment of a mine-safe 
Mozambique. 
*Photos c/o Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement, US Department of State. 
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Mine Action Training 
Argentina has always relied on irs 
military with respect ro demining. At the same 
rime, the government has con tinually taken an 
active role in promoting rhe use of military 
mine clearance throughout the international 
community. For instance, in 1993, three offi-
cers and one no n-commissioned officer 
(NCO) were sent as a ream, supervised by rhe 
Organization of American Stares (OAS), ro 
Nicaragua. There they took the role of train-
ing the Nicaraguan army in different mine 
clearance techniques. 
A few years later in June 1997, a 
senior officer was appointed United Nations 
Program Manager of rhe Department of 
Humani tarian Affairs (DHA) Support 
Program for M ine Action in Angola. In coor-
d ination with rhe White Helmers, 1 eight offi-
cers and three NCOs were later appointed to 
, 
enttna 
various Angolan provincial demining brigades 
unci! 1998. In January 1999, in coordination 
wirh rhe White Helmers, rwo senior officers 
along with one junior officer and one NCO 
were appointed ro be parr of a demining ream 
in Central America. Later in July, three offi-
cers and one NCO relieved them. Ar the com-
pletion of the year, all ream members returned 
to Argentina. 
Considering the increasing partici-
pation of Argentinean miliraty personnel in 
international demining activities, the army 
began training irs personnel on mine clearance 
techniques and procedures. T hese became 
known as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
courses, which focused mainly on the safety of 
operators. T his change in direction made a 
substantial difference from former militaJy 
procedures related to mine breaching. 
On April 12, 2000, the C hief of rhe 
General Staff of the army ordered the 
Humanitarian Demining Training Center 
(HDTC) to be created in the Engineer 
Battalion 601 in Campo de Mayo, Buenos 
Aires. Larer in September of 2000, the first 
course on humanitarian d emining was held, 
continuing on through 2001. Military units 
throughout the counny sent their engineer 
personnel to attend. 
Since its creation, the HDTC has 
assumed rhe responsibility of training irs own 
and foreign personnel in coordination with 
Joint Peacekeeping Operations Training 
Center in Arge ntina (CAECOPAZ). 
However, rhe financial difficulties faced by rhe 
country during 200 2 and 2003 made training 
of foreigners impossible; thus, the courses 
were limi ted to Argentinean personnel. 
by Carlos Nielsen, Adviser of Humanitarian Demining 
The U.S. Southern Com mand , 
between April and June 2002, o rgan ized a 
course for instructors about mine clearance 
program management in accordance with rhe 
U.S. Department o f Defense (DoD) mu!ti!ar-
eral agreement. They also contributed invalu-
able equipment for use at CAECOPAZ. 
Current Situation 
In 2004, there will be the following 
rwo courses on Humanitarian Demining: 
I. Humanitarian D emining Basic 
Course: The aim o f this course is to train per-
sonnel on the necessary techniques to carry on 
humanitarian demining operations. 
2. Human itarian Demining Ad-
vanced Course: The aim of this course is to 
train officers in the preparation needed for 
planning humanitarian demining operations. 
T he HDTC plans ro continue 
exchanging instructors with U.S. training cen-
ters in Fort Leonard Wood and especia lly in 
Fort Belvoir, which holds a wealth of informa-
tion penaining to mine detection d ogs. The 
HDTC has also requested personnel to be 
assigned to the Engineer Brigade in order to 
conduct speci fi c research. 
The Argentine Marine Corps has 
engineer personnel that parricipare in under-
water demining. M ost notable is their 
amphibious engineer course, which takes 
pride in training rhe army spec ifically in 
amphibian demining operations. Currenrly, ir 
also includes humanitarian demining training, 
bur in rhe future this training will be carried 
our by rhe HDTC. 
On October I, 2000, the 
Humanitarian Demining Office was created 
as parr of the Join t Staff: O ne of the main 
duties of rhe office is to ensure rhe application 
of internationally agreed procedures on mine 
clearance. Since 200 I , it has organized rwo 
seminars a year, in which office rs designated 
by each force are instructed on current UN 
demining guidel ines. 
The first seminar is normally held 
in May or June and focuses on rhe latest 
reports issued by the Meeting of Stares Parries 
of rhe Landmine Ban Convention, rhe 
Secretary General of the United Nations, rhe 
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), rhe 
International Campaign ro Ban Landmines 
(ICBL) and rhe Landmine Monitor Report 
(LMR). H owever, the second seminar, wh ich 
is normally held in October or November, 
focuses on the International Mine Acrion 
Standards (!MAS ) and the different ad vances 
on rhe issue stipulated by rhe Geneva 
Internatio nal Center fo r Humanitarian 
Demining (G ICHD). 
2004 Seminars 
During the Updating Seminar VII 
scheduled for June 7-11 , 200 4, rhe main 
topic will be based on rhe "Guide ro Mine 
Action." This guide was recently published by 
the GICHD and includes issues that are essen-
rial for understanding the current enforced 
doctrine. The second Updating Seminar VII 
being held in October or November will focus 
on the analysis of !MAS and other publica-
tions issued by GICHD. 
Future Plans 
In the future, the activities current-
ly planned for the 2004 seminars w ill most 
likely be included in regular courses organized 
by the HDTC for the three military forces. 
The HDTC will be closely related to the 
G JC HD. The HDTC will train irs own per-
sonnel, and any foreign personnel , to take parr 
in ongoing activities related to mine activities. 
T he ultimate goal of rhe HDTC is conrribur-
ing ro the elimination of landmines all over 
the world. 
The Joinr Sraff of the Armed Forces 
also plans to reorganize its activities to comply 
with the following aims: gathering demining 
information, coord inating and monitoring the 
application of topics agreed on by the member 
stares' meetings, and implementing actions 
issued by the UNMAS and ICBL/LMR. 
l. An official Secret ary for I nrernariona l 
Humanitarian Assistance. 
Photos c/o the author. 
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The Israeli Defense Force's 
Humanitarian Demining Efforts 
Introduction 
The Israel Defense Force (IDF) 
Engineering Corps is the mine action cenrer 
of lsrael. 1 Currently, IDF is engaged in vari-
ous activities in response to the Palestinian te r-
ror campaign and d ocs not have the resources 
ro participate in international demining pro-
grams.2 However, rhe Israeli government 
views rhe issue of inrernarional cooperatio n in 
rhe areas o f mine clearance, m ine awareness 
and mine victim rehabilitation ro be of major 
importance, despite rhe d ifficult budgetary sir-
uarion. In addi tion, IDF continues ro priori-
tize mine action internally.3 
mern01 Humannanan 
emlnina Efforts 
All minefields and areas contami-
nated by UXO are defined as military closed 
areas; therefore, the IDF Engineering Corps is 
responsible for any activities on mined rerrito-
ry.4 The lDF policy is based on rhe removal of 
outdated m ines and other mun itions. IDF 
continues to verifY the marking and fencing of 
minefields and suspected areas in acco rdance 
with the provisions of rhe Conventio n on 
Conventional W eapons (CCW) Amended 
Protocol II , which restrict rhe use of mines, 
booby traps and or her devices. T he renewal of 
fences and markings, where necessary, is car-
ried our within the context of rhe !OF's veri-
fication activities) 
T he 200 3 Landmine M onitor 
Report, produced by the I nternational 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (IC BL), reports 
that in N ovember 2002, Israel disclosed its 
annual program to destroy o urdared m ines 
and stared thar no new minefields were pur in 
place within the year. As a follow-up on rhis 
srarement, in February of 2003, Israel report-
ed thar 12 tons of mines were destroyed in 
2002.4 
\ (( 
D uring 2003, rhe IDF began work-
ing to improve rhe recording measures of sev-
eral m inefields and suspected areas via the use 
of specific global positioning sysrems (GPS) 
and orher equipment. This equipment will 
assist in rhe management and control of m ine-
fields and will enable the Israeli Mapping 
Center (IMC) ro update maps with more 
accurate locations of minefields.5 
l 
Israel has nor enacted any ad dirion-
al domesric legislation to implement the pro-
visions of Amended Protocol JJ.4 Israel main-
rains that rhe existing Israel i legislarion enables 
the government to implement the provisions 
of Amended Prorocol !I wirhour the need for 
additional legislation. This legislation 
includes, inter alia, exporr conrrol legislarion 
covering all d efense equipment, know-how 
and rechnology. There are also ID F regula-
tions and ord ers concern ing marking, fencing 
and moni toring as well as d emining and dis-
posing of m ines, booby-rraps and other 
devices.6 
Subseq uent ro Israel's ratificat ion of 
Amended Prorocol II . measures were taken ro 
ensure that the relevant authorities in rhe !OF 
were cognizanr of the provisions of the 
Protocol and their implications. In addition , 
IDF instrucrions and operating procedures are 
regularly reviewed to verifY rheir comparibil i-
ry with the provisions of Amended Protocol 
IJ.3 
The IDF Engineering Corps main-
rai ns a set of dera iled regulations and instruc-
rions regarding rhe management of archives 
and rhe recording of minefields and m ined 
areas. Moreover, rhe ID F School of M ili tary 
Law (responsib le for rhe disseminarion of rhe 
laws of war with in rhe IDF) includes the pro-
visions of the CCW and Amended Protocol II 
as parr o f rheir curriculum. In add ition , lec-
tures concerning the conventions and proro-
col are provid ed on a regular basis to com-
manders of the IDF Engi neering Corps.3 
Information provided fo r rhe gener-
al population regarding Israel's sta tus vis-a-vis 
Amended Prorocol II was disseminared upon 
by Aharon Etengoff and Professor Gerald Steinberg, 
Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, 
Bar //an University, and Jennette Townsend, MAIC 
Israel's ratification of rhe Protocol. To prevenr 
any accid ental cnny into pon:nrially danger-
ous areas, warni ng signs in rhrec languages 
(Hebrew, Arabic and Engl ish) are clearly posi-
tioned o n the perimeter of the minefields.3 
Organizers of field trips (conducted 
by schools, youth movements, workplaces and 
privarc citizens) are obligated ro coordinare 
their route with the relevant IDF Area 
Command. In this conrexr, field trip organiz-
ers are briefed as ro the location of minefields 
siruared in the area (or suspected areas that arc 
treated as mined until cleared and verified) 
and are given the appropriate mine awareness 
insrructions.7 
Commercially available land maps, 
issued by the IMC, contain clear markings 
regarding rhe location of mineficlds. The maps 
are periodically updated by the IMC based on 
information available to rhe IDF.7 
Isra el has been criricized for 
abstaining from voring on every annual pro-
landmine ban UN Genera l Assembly 
(UNGA) resolution since 1996, including 
UN GA Resolu rion 57/74 in Novembe r 
2002.4 Israel responded by staring that it 
views la ndmi nes as weapons thar should be 
carefully restricted, bur not totally banned, as 
they are ofren necessary to prevent aggression 
and arrack, particularly given rhe threarening 
envi ron ment in the region.2 
The Landmine Monitor Report cites 
the U nited Natio ns Children's Fund 's 
(UNIC EF's) assessmenr of rhe situation in rhe 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). In irs 
report UN ICEF srates: 
"Minefields dating from rhe !967 
Middle Easr war, locared in the fim defense 
line berween Jordan and the Wesr Bank, are 
mosrly nor properly fenced or marked. Israeli 
milirary training zones either are not properly 
fenced or nor fenced at all and U:XO is nor 
collected afte r the end of training. Many of 
rhese rraining zo nes are siruarcd near populat-
ed areas; as a result, civilians come into con-
race with VXO easily. In addirion ro rhar, in 
most areas of confrontation Israeli and 
Palesrin ian UXO and l ED are left behind.4" 
Israel maintains rhar with in its bor-
ders all m i neficlds are fenced and registered 
and a re updated on a timely basis by rhe IDF 
and rhe National Mapping Aurhority.4 
M aavarim: An Israeli Demining Company 
Companies like Maavarim complete mine clearance projects with-
in Israel for civilian purposes. However, the IDF Engineering Corps 
is required to be involved in any contract to remove landmines/ UXO 
within Israel. Like every mine action center (MAC) , IDF Engineering 
Corps has its specific procedures beyond the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). IOF requires any organizations that com-
plete demining in Israel to adhere to their procedures. For example, a 
different type of minefield marking, different lane width and much 
stricter safety procedures are required. They check the organizations' 
plans and approve them. They are responsible for external quality 
assurance. They also mon itor handover procedures. I 
At present, Maavarim is involved in a 2-3 month project in Ramat 
Hovav for the Industrial Council of Ramat Hovav. The project aims 
to clear an area that was a fire zone in southern Israel, near Beer-
Sheva. The area, contaminated with UXO, will be cleared for devel-
opment. ! 
Maavarim, in conjunction with the Turkish company ARMADA 
and others, is also in the process of planning to clear mines along the 
border to allow the area to be used for agriculture. During 2003, 
Maavarim checked suspected areas for the Jordan Gates Project. The 
project will establish a free trade area.3 
In addition, Maavarim has contributed to international mine 
clearing efforts: Maavarim experts conducted mine awareness work-
shops for Kosovo refugees in Albania prior to their return home.3 In 
2002, Maavarim cleared 700 ,000 sq m, including a rai lway station in 




During I 995 -200 I, Israel, in con-
junction with UNICEF, participated in a 
mine awareness project conducred in Angola . 
The project was established to educare rhe 
local popularion in various regions of rhe 
country abour the hazards of mines. Israeli 
involvemenr in this projecr increased during 
2002 when four Israeli volunteers, financially 
sponsored by rhc GO! (government of Israel), 
opera red in rhe area.3 
In 1997, Israel conducted a joint 
mine clearance projecr wirh Jorda n in the 
Arava Valley ro allow for agricultural use of 
rhe area.3 In 1998, Israel, Jordan, Canada and 
Norway participated in a quadrilateral project 
aimed ar mine clearance in the Jordan Valley 
and medical rehabilitation for Jordanian mine 
victims. As parr of rhe quadrilateral effort, 
Israel organized and hosted a workshop on rhe 
rehabilirarion of mine vicrims in April 1998.3 
Israel offers treatment and 
rehabilirarion ro Israeli citizens and to 
residenrs of rhe Mcdirerranean region.3 The 
Israel i medical esrablishment rrears and reha-
bilitates ind ividuals who have lost rheir limbs 
or have suffered multi-system injuries as a 
continut:d on page 23. Israeli D efense Force's 














humanitarian demining efforts 
In The Occupied 
Palestinian Territories 
Introduction 
In an August 2002 assessment of the Occupied Palestinian 
Terrirories (OPD . the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
reponed that the fo llowing areas in the OPT are not properly fenced, 
marked or cleared: 
• Minefields from the 1967 Middle East war- unmarked 
minefields were reportedly found between Jordan and the West Bank, 
in the Jordan Valley and in other strategic areas in the West Bank. 
• Israeli military training zones. 
• Areas of confron tation between Israel is and Palesrinians.1 
Though no minefields have been officially declared in rhe 
Gaza Strip, Ayid Abu Qtaish, mine awareness coordinator of Defence 
for Children International (DCI), Palestine Section, has no doubt the 
area is contaminated. 2 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) have drawn criticism for their humanitarian demi-
ning (HD) efforts, or lack thereof. However, a National Mine Action 
Committee, composed of both Palestinian and international organiza-
tions, has taken the lead in mine awareness efforts in the OPT. 
11u tnorrs cy lllt ana PNA 
In February 2003, Israel outlined its stockpile destructions 
efforts, stating rhar I 2 tons of mines were destroyed by the military in 
2002. However, Abu Qtaish of DC! told Aijazeera that Israel's efforts 
were not enough. Qraish rold Aijazeera, "Pr acticall y speaking, there 
has been no mine clearing. T here is a big difference between clearing 
minefields for military purposes and clearing them for humani tarian 
purposes. In the latter case, the number of mines must be zero."3 
Israeli HD efforts have also been cri ticized. Last year, IDF 
declared the village of Husan, in the West Bank, a mine-free zone. 
Aijazeera reports that, fo llowing the announcement, three people from 
the village died when a mine exploded.3 
Conversely, the PNA has made no recent official statement 
about banning anti-personnel mines. Palestinian groups have access ro 
both anti-personnel and ami-vehicle mines. Media reporrs indicate 
that these groups are using landmines and explosive devices, made 
from the explosives taken from landmines, in attacks against Israeli 
soldiers and civilians. l 
by Jennette Townsend, MAIC 
HD Efforts by the National MinE 
Action Committee 
In response ro the lack of mme 
action 111 the OPT, a National M ine Action 
Committee was established by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), UNICEF, the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the 
Palestinian government. 1 The Palestinian Red 
Crescent Society, DC! in Palestine, and the 
Palestinian Ministries of Education, Youth 
and Sports, Interior, and Health are also 
members.3 The committee, which was estab-
lished in August 2002, coordinates mine 
action activities in the OPT. Activities 
include: 
• Teaching MRE 
• Developing a national mme 
action plan 
• Ensuring UXO awareness mes-
sages are consistent and coherent 
• Carrying our surveys to assist 111 
the appropriate design and prioritization of 
activities 1 
Abu Qraish told Aijazeera that the 
emphasis on MRE and awareness activities 
versus landmine removal activities is due ro 
Israeli restrictions on removal of landmines. 
A Canadian iniriarivc tO demine the village of 
Husan near Bethlehem was stopped 
short due to an Israeli ban on the import of 
mine-cleaning materials and restrictions on 
the method of cleari ng.3 
Future Dan er 
ocr emphasized the increased dan-
ger that comes with the possible re-deploy-
ment of the Israeli army and the hand-over of 
those areas ro the PNA. T he tea r is that, with 
Israeli Defense Force's Humanitarian Demining 
Efforts, concinued from page 2 1 
result of landmines, UXO, lED and ocher 
devices. 8 
T he Landmine Monitor reports 
that, in recent years, Israeli rehabilitation spe-
cialists were sent, under the auspices of the 
United Nations and Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
to Sri Lanka, Viemam, El Salvador, C roatia 
and Slovenia. Israel also has a rehabilitation 
exchange agreement with Armenia, Cyprus, 
G reece, Turkey and several stares of the for-
mer Soviet Union.4 T he Landmine Monitor 
rhe increased mobility of Palestinians in the 
areas, the number of landmine/UXO acci-
dents will increase. ocr has made it a part of 
irs agenda to address this issue in hopes of 
avoiding the high number of casualties that 
occurred following the Israeli withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon. 2 
eterences 
I. "Pales£ine " International C1.mp:tign ro Ban Landmines. 
Uoulmine Monitor Report 2003. 
dntp:l/www.icbl.org/lm/2003/palesrine.htmb (M3rch 6, 
2004). 
2. Defense for Children lnrernarional: Palestinian Section. 
FACT SH EET: "The Problem ofl.andmines and UXO in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory." durp://,.vv.•w.dci ~ 
pal.org/repom/sepOOfS.htmb (March 25. 2004). 
3. Laila El-Haddad, " Landmines: Palestine's hidden dan· 
ger by in Gaza," Aijazeem, January 3, 2004. <hrrp://engli sh. 
aljazeera .net/ N R/exeres/5 72 F7C6F -802 B-4 27 E- 9 B8E-
5A l 4EOD04BB4.lum>. 
4. lDF Spokesperson's Office, "Four lD F Soldiers 
Wounded by Anti-T ank Explosive," March 21, 2004. 
<hrrp://wwwl .idf.ii/DOVER/site/homepage.asp?clr= t &si=E 
N&id=-8888>. 
5. Both attacks rook place in rhe Gaz.1 Stri p. International 
Campaign to Ban Landmincs. "lsreo1l" Lanrlmine Monitor 
Report, 2003. dmp:/ /www.icbl.org/lm/2003/isreal.htmb 
March G. 2004 cit ing Shahdi al-K.1Shif. "Palestinian Landmine 
Kills Israeli Tank Crew," Rmtn>, February 15, 200 3; "Six 
P~le.srinian 
Killed 
in Israeli Raid~." Au.snalian Broadcasring 
Corporation News, April 3, 2003. 
6. Margot Dudkevitcll, 'Three Soldiers Killed as T ank 
Hits Mine," Jerusalem Post, Marcl1 15, 2002. 
? .Israeli MinisrryofForeignAffiUrs, Palestinian Terrorism: 
Photos- November2000." <http://www.mf.1.gov.il/ mfa/ 
mfaarchive/2000 _2009/2000/ 11 /Pal estiniano/o20T crror ism-






Report also mentioned that the Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs funds an economic rehabil-
itation program in Guatemala. The microfi -
nance program seeks ro encourage landmi ne 
survivors to start their own business.4 
Reterconr: 
I. I shay Telavivi, Pro jeer Manager & Technical advisor 
for Maavarim, " Re: IDF " 29 March 2004, professional e-
mail (29 February 2004). 
2. Meir hzchaki. Miniscry of Foreign Affairs, imerview 
by Aharon Etengoff, Jerusalem, Israel, I April 2004. 
3. israel: National Annual Report. Geneva, November 
2003. Prcsemed ot the Fifth Annual Conference of State 
Parries w rhe Amended ProtOcol [J ro rhe Convention on 
Prohibitions or Rcsuicrions on 1he Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons \V'hich Ma y be Deemed to he! 
Excessively Injurious o r to Have indiscriminate Effects. 
4. '' lsraelt1 Imernarional Campaign to Ban L1ndmincs. 
Landmine Moniror Report 2003: durp://www.icbl.org/ 
lm/2003/isracl.html> (6 March 2004). 
5. In th is conccxr. updated information, which speci-
fied the exact location of minefields and suspected areas 
closed by the IDF1 was provided to local municipalities and 
other interested establishments. hrael- Nmional Annual 
Report. Geneva, November 2003. 
6. Ir should also be noted that Isr:1d has extended its 
unilateral mora10rium o n export of all :uui·personnelland· 
mines for an additional three years (until July 2005).1srael-
Nruional Annual Report. Geneva, November 2003. 
7. The IDF/ Engineering HQ updates the IMC on a 
quarterly basis. hmel: National Ammal Report. Geneva, 
November 2003. 
8. The primary Israeli hospirals and rehabilirarion cen-
rers acrive in rhe facilir~uion. of comprchcmivc rehahilit3-
rion are "Td H ashomer'' ("Shiba'') and "Lowens rein" in 
Tel Aviv. and "Rambam," and "Bcnei Zion" in Haif.1. 
hrael: National A mmal Report. Geneva, November 2003. 
Photos c/o AP. 
Contact Information: 
Gerald Steinberg, Program Director 
Ahacon Etengoff, Senior Researcher 
Program on Conflict Management and 
Negotiation 
















JMU: The Journal of Mine Action Issue 8.1







When you first arnve as a member of the 
Multinational Brigade North (MNB(N)), you 
are fu ll of promise. You know your team of 
highly trained professional soldiers will make a 
difference in the lives of those that live in BiH. 
Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty 
doesn't allow you ti me to finish what you 
starr. So what is ir you can do to make a dif-
fe rence in only six months? T his is the exact 
question rhar starred rhe process of developing 
rhe U.S. Army National Guard Demining 
Initiative in BiH. This initiative was under-
taken by the U.S. Army's National Guard, an 
adjunct to rhe U.S. Armed Forces. There are 
multitudes of issues you can work ro resolve in 
Boznia-Herzegovina (BiH). MNB(N) plays a 
supporting role in most of these, bur we want-
ed ro do something more. We wanted to bring 
a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO ) rhar 
would make a significant impact on one of the 
many critical issues facing BiH. To make our 
choice, we focused on two key concerns: 
"What will have the biggest impact on rhe 
daily lives of rhe people?" and "What will 
instill confidence in the international commu-
nity ro speed up economic recovery?" We 
chose the issue of demining. 
Relhinkinu How We Do Demining 
II 
So why choose demining? As a mil-
itary officer, I have always been told to stare 
rhe bottom li ne up front no matter how bad 
the situation. So here it is: seven years after 
Dayton, progress in clearing mines in BiH is 
far from what is required to create a safe and 
secure environment. Containment (marking/ 
fencing) efforts are almost non-existent. 
The mine threat in BiH is wide-
spread, of low density and dispersed.The 
IEBL is rhe dividing line between the entity 
< rethinking 
When you ftrst arrive as a member of the Multinational Brigade 
North (MNB(N)), you are full of promise. You know your team of highly 
trained professional soldiers will make a difference in the lives of those who 
live in BiH. Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty doesn't allow you 
time to finish what you started. So what is it you can do to make a differ-
ence in only six months? This exact question started the process of devel-
oping the National Guard Demining Initiative in BiH. There are multi-
tudes of issues you can work to resolve in BiH. MNB(N) plays a support-
ing role in most of these, but we wanted to do something more. We want-
ed to bring a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO) that would make a 
significant impact on one of the many critical issues facing BiH. To make 
our choice, we focused on two key concerns: "W'hat will have the biggest 
impact on the daily lives of the people?" and "What will instill confidence 
in the international community to speed up economic recovery?" We chose 
the issue of demining. 
armed forces at the end of hostilities as defined 
by the Dayton Peace Accord (GFAP). This 
heavily mined area is probably the single most 
important factor affecting our continued sup-
port of two key military tasks. 
I ,,, 
The first key military task affected 
is our ability to "provide a safe and secure 
environment" in BiH. So far in 2003, mine 
strikes have caused 13 deaths and five serious 
injuries1 1n the MNB(N) Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) alone. More than 2, 100 
sq km ofBiH requires a "Technical Survey" to 
determine if rhe area is mined.2 Technical 
evaluations have estimated rhar 400 sq km to 
1,000 sq km of this suspect area will require 
"Clearance Operations" of some sorr3 that 
include mechanical and manual clearing tech-
niques. The key pro perry of these operations is 
they must meer humanitarian demining stan-
dards if we are to provide a permanent solu-
tion for a safe and secure environment. 
H old on a minute. Military reams 
don't perform humanitarian demining. So 
why are we focusing on this issue? Mainly 
because we have to. In the modern world of 
the coalition forces, rhe military is nor always 
provided with defined limits for tasks that 
their forces must effectively perfo rm to meet 
coalition objectives. This is especially true in 
rhe world of Stabilization and Securi ty 
Operations (SASO) like the tasks we are cur-
rently performing in BiH and will soon per-
fo rm in Iraq. 
As we have seen in recent headlines, 
our military leaders are also realizing this 
truth. As you read this article, military leaders 
are working to implement these new prio rities 
before they become roadblocks to security 
around the world. If we are to be successful in 
rhis transitional process, we must be active ar 
all levels of expertise. While mili tary leaders 
are focused on changing policies that address 
our demining limits, we ar the tactical level 
must be ready to respond with a well-devel-
oped plan of action to meet these new SASO 
priorities. T he plan we are proposing is the 
first step in meeting one of rhese new priori-
ties. Our pro posal combines the cri tical 
strengths of solid leadership and unified com-
mand rhat military organizations possess with 
Humanitarian Demining 
tor coalition forces > 
1- -------------------------h-uy MAJ Tom Barnett and CPT Kyle Shaffer , 
MNB(N), SFOR 13, 35/D(M), ARNG 
I 
rhe technological advantages of a modern, 
well-equipped humanitarian demining ream. 
Such military organizations are something the 
U.S. Army National Guard is uniquely suired 
for. The U.S. Army National Guard in itself is 
an exceptional organization known worldwide 
for irs ability to quickly adapt to the ever-
changing req uirements of international securi-
ty environs. Our success in managing dynam-
ic peacekeeping operations is well-known. 
T he U.S. Army National Guard is 
currently involved in the New Horizons exer-
cises that focus on developing emerging doc-
tri ne and operational skills for humanitarian 
and civil assistance missions. These mandates, 
combined with our operational experience in 
peacekeeping operations, will rhrusr the U.S. 
Army National Guard into rhe forefront of 
modern humanitarian doctrinal development. 
This is why I say we must perform this mis-
sion of thinking outside the military norms of 
yesterday. 
"' n 
The second key military rask affect-
ed by the BiH mine risk is our abili ty to 
"maima
in 
freedom of movement." Freedom 
of movement is a key ingredient in eliminat-
ing threats to economic development and to 
allow displaced persons and refugees (DPRE ) 
to return. Bur today's slow and inconsistent 
demining processes are unable to meer the 
demands of rhese humanitarian missions. 
Over the past few years, the average clearance 
rate of all demining operations in BiH is six sq 
km per year. That's about 1.5 percent of rhe 
suspecred area of risk. The cost to dare for all 
demining in BiH is $100 million (U.S.) or an 
average of $ 16.6 million per year. To accom-
plish even this minimal level of success 
involves the work of the Armed Forces in BiH 
(AF BiH) demining teams and the efforts of 
42 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/ 
commercial activities that arc accredited to 
demine by rhe Bosnia-Herzegovina M ine 
Action Center (BHMAC) . These NGOs and 
commercial activities provide most of the 
mechanical supporr (flails and vegetation cut-
ters) required bur ar a premium cost. The AF 
BiH demining reams have far less equipment 
bur they have the most experienced and well-
trai ned deminers available; plus their hearts 
are in it. Of this six sq km total per year, the 
International T rust Fund for Demining (ITF) 
srated that NGOs and commercial acriviries 
completed 2.3 sq km in 2002.4 Based on this 
finding, the AF BiH dcminers appear ro per-
form rhe bulk of rhe demining efforts with the 
least amount of equipment and personnel. 
Let us nor forger the International 
Community (IC) is also watching. Based on 
various inputs from gro ups such as rhe 
Organization for Security Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and other key diplomatic 
agencies, the IC goal for demining success in 
BiH was derermined to be 12 sq km per yea r.5 
The IC feels this level of reduction is a key 
indicator for the economic growth of BiH and 
is one of the "confidence" barometers they use 
to judge rhe ability ofBiH to create rhe secure 
and stable environment that is paramount for 
joining the European Union (EU). This con-
fidence level equates to investment opportuni-
ty and faster economic recove1y for BiH. So 
here's some more bad news. Based on the suc-
cess of the current demining approacl1 in BiH , 
it will rake 60 to 200 years to demine BiH. 
The United Narions Development Program 
(UND
P) 
esrimares the funding required to 
accomplish this demining at $26 million per 
year.6 It is easy to see we lack the funds, we 
lack rhe rime and we lack the patience to sac-
rifice the life of another innocent human due 
to our inability to change an outdated military 
paradigm. 
\\,., 
The question for our team now is 
"What do we change?" I LT Richard Weber, 
Officer in C harge (OIC) of the SFOR 12 
Mine Cell , completed the initial concept for a 
Demining Brigade in early 2003. The original 
concept was to develop a Demining Brigade 
that could meet BiH domestic mandates as 
well as other international mandates. I L T 
Weber's unique design integrated rhe 
strengths of a military organization with the 
technological advantages of a modern human-
itarian demini ng team. T here have been vari-
ous equivalents of lesser size (i.e., Berlin Wall 
ream, ere.) bur never before has there been 
such a forceful effort to make humanitarian 
dcmining a permanent milirary mission. 
Before handing over the reins to SFOR 13, 
1 L T Weber developed a well-thought-our 
technical design fo r the brigade that became 
rhe basis fo r rhe T able of Organization and 
Equipment (TOE ) used in our current design. 
Based on this in itial design, SFOR 13 was 
ready to move the concept to rhe next level by 
build ing mili tary and diplomatic support for 
rhe initiative 
Time to Take It Up a Nolch 
J ll 
To build this support, we needed to 
show why this humanitarian demining ream 
would be successful where others fa iled . So 
what are the failings the initiative needed ro 
answer' While some of rhe lack of success may 
be attributed to rhc nature of rhe mine threat, 
much is due to inefficiency, mismanagement 
and the appearance of corruption in rhe 
bureaucracy. To answer rhese concerns, we 
concentrated on four critical areas of focus. 
1. An integrated demining effort 
is required: First was the need for a demi-
ning operation that is integrated from the 
state level down to the individual deminer. 
The current method of demining does not 
adequately integrate demining operations 
and wastes valuable time and resources. 
Military clearance procedures, although 
weH integrated and fast in nature, do not 
provide the 99.6 percent clearance level 
mandated by International Humanitarian 
standards in SASO environments. Our ini-
tiative must integrate mechanical means, 
manual demining efforts, Explosive 
Detecting Dog Teams (EDDTs) and con-
tainment practices. Although we use these 
four methods today, they are not integrated 
at the level required to be consistently effec-
tive. NGOs, commercial activities, and AF 
BiH are all used to perform these tasks in a 
fractional manner due to competing agen-
das and interests. 
2. The BHMAC and government 
control: The BiH Demining Law of 
February 2002 set standards for BiH demi-
ning in line with international protocols. 
This law is crucial leverage for the success 
of demining in BiH and must be fully sup-
ported by our proposal. This law allows the 
BiH government to endorse the BHMAC 
by providing two key mandates: 
• T he BH MAC is rhe sole national 
authority for rhc coordination of mine clear-
ance . 
• The BHMAC is the only 
inst itution responsible fo r nationa l 
standards and quality assurance. 
Since the formation of the 
BHMAC and the reorganization of its 
In his book l'rog>Yss in 1/mnmull/rt•W /Jemmmg: I ulmiml 1111d Polu I' Clutflntgo, 
Richard Garwin ha' csumatcd '' ,.;[ ta1,e 1,000 )can 10 d<·mtne the world ba~cd on roda• ~ 
tcchnolnl,'"\ an<l pr.lcllce,. A rhou•aml \<~n is roo long 10 "all for a mrm free \\orld. We 
mu.1 act nnw 1<1 ch~ngc th< \\urld \\£ an: handing In our thildr~n and rh~rr ~hrldr<,. 


















regional offices, some institutional coher-
ence has been achieved. However, many 
national interests continue to prevail in the 
decision cycle for prioritization and 
resources allocation. By providing the 
BHMAC with the operational tools neces-
sary to double its success rate, its ability to 
manage relevant national interests will be 
substantially reinforced. 
3 . Donor Fatigue: The general 
decline of world economies has caused 
international charitable aid and donor gov-
ernment funds to decline from previous 
years' contributions. One such example is a 
substantial donor to BiH demining efforts, 
the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). For 2003-2008, their 
funding is reduced to $750 miJiion as com-
pared to $1.0 billion over the previous five-
year period. Aggravating this lack of funds 
is the lack of progress toward BiH unifica-
tion. This is affecting donor focus on BiH 
and is allowing other more successful coun-
tries to take funding precedence. These IC 
donations are usually funneled through 
two main support areas: NGOs and the 
ITF. 
• NGO Aspects: NGOs provide 
exposure and financial conduits fo r interna-
tional inslitlltions and donors. Some NGOs 
provide only management services and some 
only provide mine-clearing resources, wh ile 
ochers even undertake demining operation; as 
quasi-commercial activities. However, com-
mercial activities rend to bid on rhe "easier" 
jobs as profit and risk factors limit their invest-
ment in the fu ll range of equipment available. 
NGOs arc also usually the first ro attract inter-
national donors, as donors don't pay directly 
ro governments due to suspicion of corrup-
tion. Bear in mind that with the exception of 
canine counrermining , NGOs arc nor critical 
to BiH d emining based on activities to dare. 
• The lTF and Commercial 
Aspects: Commercial dcmining is paid for by 
inrcrnario nal donors and rh us comperes with 
NCO and AF BiH dcmining dforrs for fund-
ing. Commercial dcmining reams also suffer 
from rhe stigma of corruption th roughout 
BiH. This corruption mani fests itself in many 
w,1ys and casts suspicion on rhc BHMAC and 
the ITF. The ITF is rhe major funding tool for 
commncial demining in BiH. Bur these funds 
arc waning also. In an arridc on the !Tf web-
sire, Mr. Ccm persek, ITF Director, scared, 
"There arc a lot of changes in rhc donors' deci-
sions as ro where they want to place their 
money, we are afraid thar rhe donations will 
go down and nor up."7 We wish to main tain 
our relationship with the ITF but reduce our 
dependence on NGOs and commercial opera-
nons. 
4. AF BiH Aspects: Here's the 
bottom line for the AF BiH: The 
Instructions to Parties (ITP) obligates the 
AF BiH to demine and they are also obli-
gated to sustain this capability. AF BiH 
deminers are capable manual deminers but 
lack consistent funding. The BiH govern-
ment is providing most of the administra-
tive costs, but this support may not survive 
the AF BiH restructuring now underway. 
The reality is that since Dayton, AF BiH 
demining has been largely sustained by 
donated capital and equipment. Donations 
have also maintained this equipment, 
bought consumables, and purchased acci-
dent insurance that is required on the dem-
ining laws. While factional interests some-
times still prevail, at the grassroots level, AF 
BiH soldiers wish to maintain their demi-
ning momentum. A commitment to demi-
ning is not so obvious at the senior level of 
the AF BiH command. AF BiH command-
ers view demining as a drain on the already 
austere defense budget and do not support 
incorporating the current 470 deminers 
into the new force structure. If we are to be 
successful, we must integrate demining 
units into the proposed 12,000 soldier-
restructuring plan and maintain a minimal 
force for combat engineers (mobility/coun-
termobility) . What the AF BiH 
Commanders fail to understand is that the 
IC sees their current demining components 
as the only element of the AF BiH produc-
ing a positive contribution to BiH unifica-
tion. As the AF BiH restructure to join 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), BiH demining 
expertise is seen as the specialized contribu-
tion the AF BiH can make as a potential 
member of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). In this sense, our 
demining initiative has global implications. 
Although it was a bold d esign, the 
im plications of funding challenges, the chang-
ing nature of rhe AF BiH restructuring, and 
rhe IC's red uced commitment to BiH demi-
ning demanded char we make changes ro 1 L T 
Weber's initial design. After review of th e 
design by the MNB(N) Commander, rhe 
Stabilization Force (SFOR ) Comm-ander and 
staff, the U.S. Ambassador to BiH, the OSCE, 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), 
and other members of the IC, we modified the 
in itiative ro meet rhc new sociopolitical 
dynamics. CPT Kyle Shaff e r, OIC of the 
SFOR 13 M ine Cell, assisted by MAJ Tom 
Barnett, SFOR 13 J oint Military Affai rs 
Liaison Officer to SFOR and IC, answered 
the challenges posed by these forward looking 
diplomatic and military leaders. The design 
now focused on creating a more flexible mili-
raty demining unit with a humanitarian mis-
sion at the state level of BiH char can be 
phased in based on national and international 
mandates. The design focused on several key 
objectives thar musr be supported. 
Specifically, rhe design must: 
• Provide significant performance 
improvements for AF BiH demining rates 
• Be supported by a sustained, ade-
quate and regular funding arrangemen t 
• Be integra red into the ongoi ng AF 
restructuring etforrs 
• Concentrate responsibili ty and 
capabili ties under one management organiza-
tion 
• Create a single organization with 
domesric and in ternational mandates 
• Be support ed by a legitimate 
NATO/EU supervisory ream 
Our Proposal for Militarv Demininu 
Team with a Humanitarian Mission 
The design we are proposing con-
centrates responsibility and capabilities under 
one management organization. This will allow 
the unit to immediately address any priorities 
designated by the BHMAC regardless of loca-
tion or size. The design creates a single organ-
ization with domestic and international man-
dares. Once fielded and proven in BiH, rhis 
design can be emulated in any of rhe 60 other 
nations requiring humanitarian demining. 
This will p rovide NATO and rhe world with 
a capabili ty rhar has never before been seen in 
military organizations, but that will soon be 
mandated by rhe changing face of military sta-
bil ization operations. T h rough the use of 
NATO/EU supervision, the proposed unit 
will reinforce rhe legitimacy of the BiH demi-
ning effort, which will in turn attract sus-
rained IC funding for state-of-the-an equip-
ment and training. This influx of equipment 
alone will enable the unit to realize significant 
performance improvements for AF BiH dem-
ining operations. Our proposed demining 
unit improves the security and long term sta-
bili ty of BiH by accelerati ng rhe removal of 
the de facto BiH "Berlin Wall." It also 
enhances the AF BiH restructuring plan, 
enhances BiH prospects for PfP cooperation, 
and provides a highly capable team for rhc 
implementation of humanitarian dem ining in 
NATO stabil ization operations. This demi-
ning initiative is an investmenr in a focused 
solution to the BiH mine problem as well as 
having implications ro meet global mine 
rhrcars. T h is fact alone will make our propos-
al a key contributor to the U.S . Demining 
2010 Initiative char aspires to clear the world 
of mines by 2010. The key is rhe simpl icity of 
rhe basic units and the flexibility that they 
provide. So what will the demining units look 
like? 
Based on the key objectives above, 
the demining initiative we arc p roposing is 
fo rmed from nvo key structures. These base 
structures are a Heavy Humanitarian Demin-
ing Company and a Light Humanitarian 
Demining Company. 
The H eavy Humanitarian 
Demining Company (HDC(H)) provides a 
combination of manual deminers, EDDTs, 
and mechanical clearing equipmenr to answer 
the needs of complex terrain minefields. This 
company p rovides additio nal mech anical 
assets rhar are currenrly nor parr of AF BiH 
demining reams. The new combination of 
mechanical assets will allow the HDC(H) to 
clear more congested terrain at smaller levels. 
Should heavier equipment be required, rhe 
battalion headquarters is equipped ro handle 
this need. The HDC(H) provides more readi-
ly available mechanical assets throughout BiH 
without the current dependence on commer-
cial activities. T his will allow rhe HDC(H) ro 
mechanically prepare min efields more quickly 
and ease the work of rhe manual deminers 
they support. 
The Light H umanitarian Demining 
Company (HDC(L)) is focused on manual 
demining, which is the only method to dare 
that can clear minefields ro humanitarian 
standards. Although ir focuses on manual 
demining operations, it may assist in prepar-
ing areas for mechanical clearing and EDDT. 
The key here is to retain the skills and experi-
ence of the current manual deminers in rhis 
company. T he light company may also be 
used to perform surveying that is now per-
fo rmed by the regional mine action centers 
and commercial activities. 
Based on mission requirements, 
these companies will be task-organized and 
placed under the control of a Humanitarian 
Demining Ba ttalion (H DBN) command 
ream. The barralion headquarters is a key 
component as it provides the additional heavy 
demining assets required in support of demi-
ning operations in BiH. Our goal is to place 
these more technologically advanced demi-
ning systems d irectly in rhe hands of rhe BiH 
demining u nits, allowing them to complete 
the more diffi cult dem ining tasks. Th is is a 
dynamic step for a demining unit that unril 
now was incapable of hand ling most mechan-
ical demi ning activities. Rather than depend-
ing on commercial companies for rhis equip-
ment, the demining battalion headquarters 
provides this equipment ar key locations 
througho ut BiH when required. Based on 
how rhe HDBN is organized, we calculate a 
demining rare of I 2-24 sq km per year8 can 
be achieved. 
The HDBN will report directly to 
rhe BiH Stand ing Commirree on Military 
Matters (SCMM), which is a state-level quasi-
equ ivalent to rhe U.S . Department of 
Defense. The BHMAC will continue provid-
ing operational direction for the HDBN, but 
it wi ll also be supported with direct 
NATO/EU supervision. T he NATO/EU 
supervision provides rhe required legitimacy 
that will attract sustained IC funding for scare-
of-the-art equipment. 
Commercia l activities have n or 
been eliminated from the process. 
Commercial activities are proficient in con-
ducting technical surveys and will continue to 
provide this service. However, we propose 
reducing commercial demining operations to 
focus fund ing on rhe BiH team. This will 
allow BHMAC ro leverage rhe already austere 
ITF funds ava ilable by focusing commercial 
activities on smaller and less costly demining 
projects. This in turn will provide an increase 
in rhe success rare of the commercial activities. 
To support this change, we are suggesting that 
once rhe BHMAC has contracted for rhe com-
mercial activiry, the demining battalion will 
coordinate the execution of the contract and 
will have oversight of rhc activity. This will 
require moving rhe current Field Operations 
Manager from rhe BHMAC liaison office ro 
rhe HDBN headquarters to ensure commer-
cial acriviries arc coordinated with the AF BiH 
activities. Making use of the latest computer-
ized demining support systems, the HDBN 
will ensure that commercial activities do nor 
"rework" sires, which is seen as the most sig-
nificant issue for commercial activities. 
As we stated earlier, rhe funds and 
diplomatic support for a demining brigade 
cannot be realized. But we arc confid ent that 
if th e proposed demin ing units are successful, 
rhe BiH demining teams will also be able to 
focus on international mandates. W ith over 
60 countries now in need of immediate demi-
ning support, th e need for a humanitarian 
demining brigade in NATO or the EU is 
inevitable. We view our initiative as rhe initial 
step in creating a dem ining unit rhar is capa-
ble of dynamic growth ro meet international 
demining mandates. This global ream has 
added impl ications. One such implication is 
assistance in driving the commercial develop-
ment of demining technologies. As rhe demi-
n ing uni t grows in size, it will generate long-
term marker drivers for enhanced equipment 
and research from the private sector. This in 
turn will help make demining more economi-
cally viable and accelerate an end to the glob-
al demining issue. 
Bottom line 
Based on rhe initial review of costs 
for the unit, it will require $20-23 million to 
implement this plan. Depending on the task 
organization of the HDBN, the estimated 
operational cost will be between $3 million 
and $1 7 million per year and should be total-
ly funded by the BiH government. This will 
require char we hold BiH accountable for th is 
cost through rhe restructured AF BiH budget 
and other BiH government funding. We are 
also srill advocating a strong relationship with 
the ITF to leverage their funds fo r commercial 
activities. If rhese funds are properly managed 
by BiH with assistance from rhe NATO over-
sight team, we are confident that past depend-
ence on uncertain donor funds can be signifi-
cantly reduced if nor eliminated. If something 
is nor done ro significantly reduce BiH d epen-
dence on rhe IC donors, rhe turure of BiH 
demining is uncertain at best. 
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An Interview With LTC Bob Crowley, U.S. SOUTHCOM 
IN MINE ACIION 
Nicole Kreger (N K ): \X'har has rhc military comr ibutc:d ro m ine 
action over the past 15 years? 
LTC Crowley (LTC C): I can on ly calk about wh at we've done in 
Larin America, in the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] 
AOR [area of responsibiliry], for rhc pasr I 5 years. Even before 15 
years ago, before rhere was a U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action [H MA] 
Program , which ar the rime was called Demin ing Program, we had 
Special Forces folks down in Honduras training the Hondurans how 
ro demine. Fi rst of all, the way the program works is the Department 
of Scare has rhc lead. They have the final determination on whether 
we' re going co have an H MA program with another country or not. So 
until that dete rminacion is made, we can' t do any demining training. 
Bur when ir is made, what wear SOUTH COM bring ro rhe cable is 
techn ical expertise, and we've had acrive demining programs in 
Guatemala and El Salvador char are closed down now; current pro-
grams are in Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru and the new one in 
Chile. 
So what have we done? We 
helped the Organization of 
American Scates [OAS] establish 
MARMINCA [Mission of 
Assistance for rhe Removal of 
Mines in Central America], which 
is an OAS program that relies on 
office rs and non-commissioned 
officers from throughout Larin 
America in the MARM INCA 
Center, which is in Managua. 
We've rrained deminers in all rhc 
countries I just mentioned, and in 
addition, we've built regional mine 
action centers [MACs] in Ecuador 
and Per u . 
What we do from rhe 
Department of Defense [DoD] side is a Train-the-T rainer program 
w irh three components to ic. We'll have a ream of experts that's assem-
bled in rhe United Scares char is comprised of military Special Forces 
personnel and sometimes conventional engineers as well. We always 
have Civil Affairs personnel and informacion operations specialises char 
go down. The ream will go to the Humanita rian Demining Training 
Center [HDTC] our at Fort Leonard Wood where they will be trained 
co the inrernarional standard as deminers. They need ro have char cer-
tification before they're allowed to go anywhere, and once rhey ger 
down there, there are rhree components ro rhe program. T he first 
componenr is rhc technical advice and assistance in training: how ro 
identifY a minefield, how to mark a minefield , how to clear it, how to 
remove the mines, working with dogs-the soup co nurs of demining. 
Bur manual or even mechanical d emining alone is nor a stand-alone 
operation. The two other compo nents are mine risk education-for 
example, I mentioned rhe Superman comic books [landminc aware-
ness tools published by DC Comics in cooperation with rhe U.S. 
Department of Defense and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)]. 
Thar's d1e second aspecr-rhc third aspect is in o rgan izing and run-
ning regional mine action centers, which includes rhe database train-
ing char we reach as well as rhe community outreach and development 
char our civil affairs personnel work on rhc demining missions. And 
we're very close co closing out programs in Nicaragua and Honduras. 
Ecuador and Peru will rake a little while longer. Chile has 273 mine-
fields on rheir northern border area, and chat will rake a few years. Bur 
in Southern Command, we are postured ro be rhe firs r regional com-
batant command char is mine-safe. That's a huge success. 
NK: H ow would you ~ay the role of rhc milir.1ry in h umanita rian 
dem ining ha~ changed or develo ped over rhc years? 
LTC C: Initially, the program, l wouldn't call it ad hoc, bur it rook 
Department of Defense and Southern Command awhile to establish 
the relationsh ips that we have with OAS, ro come up wirh rhe exacr 
right template of forces that arc needed for a problem. Righ t now, 
before any demin ing mission, we do a comprehensive pre-deployment 
sire survey ro ident ifY exactly whar the ream needs to do when they're 
down rhere, and char's done about six months before the m ission. 
During that period of ti me, the ream is gai ning the siruarional aware-
ness of rhe mine problem on the ground, what the community needs, 
rhe rypc of training rhe partner nation military needs, and is able to go 
th rough a very programmatic process and p reparation phase, so that 
when they go down, it's not a bunch of guys showing up saying, " Hey, 
we know how ro dcmine. What do you need?" lr's a thought-out, well-
organized, planned and executed procedure wirh a number of check-
by Nicole Kreger, MAIC 
l 
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lisrs ro make sure chat we're nor leaving anything out anti we're 
addressi ng all of che requirements char nor just the pa rtner nation mil-
itary bur also rhe communiry needs. Fifteen years ago, it was nor as 
well-programmed, and char's just a martcr of growrh and continuity of 
personnel in key positions and experience in rhe program. 
N K: You wn c jusr calking about adtlrc:~'ing the communil) ncc:d~­
how tloc~ rhe commu nity rcacr or how receptive are rhc: y ro the m ili-
tary co m ing in and conducting the demining opera tions? 
LTC C: First of all, all of the countries in which we're currently con-
ducting demining operations-Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, 
Peru-these are countries chat are used ro having a military presence 
because our demining operations and HMA programs started after 
their conflicts were over. They have gone from a period of either civil 
war or imernational conflict where people are killing each other ro a 
period where now the military is coming in and helping them get their 
land back. The communities are wonderfully receptive. lr is absolute-
ly unbelievable. We're received wirh open arms by community leaders 
and rhe population. We're rhere to help them solve their problem. The 
community relations is a critical componenr of it, and char's whar our 
civil affairs personnel work when they're down rhere. I can't chink of 
an instance where we've had anything but wonderful reception from 
rhe community-from the national level all the way on down ro the 
people chat are in a particular community of any size. 
NK: How would you say rhe m ilir.uy approach ro mine acrion i~ dif-
fc renr rro m the hu manitarian sector approach? 
LTC C: Thar's a great question. Probably rhe biggest difference is 
that we do nor acrually conduce demining operations. We rrain the 
trainers on how ro conduct demining operations. And char's a policy 
d ecision char the United States has made in which our forces are nor 
authorized to actually pick up or remove mines. Our m ission is to 
trai n rhc partner nation personnel in how ro do char. Now, if you look 
at HALO Trust or MAG [the Mines Advisory Group]-a number of 
rhc NGOs !non-governmental organizations] go out and rhey actual-
ly conduct the demining operations themselves. Our focus really is on 
capacity building in the demining area and not the conduct of the 
dcmining operations. 
NK: \XIhc n yo u' re saying char you train rhe trainer\, are you 
usually tra in ing the in-counrry milir.t ry? 
LTC C: Yes, we are. And in rhe case of MARMINCA, for example, 
MARM INCA again is an OAS organization, but thar's an internation-
al group of military personnel . Our focus for the procedures, the actu-
al dcmining operations, yes, we are training the ocher militaries on 
how ro demine in rheir own country. 
NK: What would you say are chc bcndlts or drawbacks o f using m il-
ita ry forces a~ opposed ro an NCO or a corporate organit<ltion carry -
ing our dcm ining? 
LTC C: First of all, l th ink it's right chat the military has rhe lead 
responsibili ty for demining wirhin rheir own country. The mines are 
rhere as a result of what had been a military problem, and I chink it's 
mosr appropriate that the military take care of char problem. I respect 
the Dickens out of NGOs char do ir. Ir's a wonderful humanitarian 
piece. Bur I would rarher see somebody in uniform risking h is life to 
do it because it's a military problem, rather chan seeing an NCO lose 
rheir life or limb. And hopefully our train ing is such rhar we won't 
have accidents where the dcminers wind up gerring hurt. 
NK: Can you give me an example of a success story that you know of 
of the milit.try in humanitarian demining? 
LTC C: The biggest success story we're going to have in the 
SOUTHCOM area is coming up. Ecuador and Peru were fighting a 
border war in 1994. Following their ceasefire agreement, the United 
Narions established rhe United Narions Mission ro Ecuador and Peru 
(UNME
P) . 
Now, there are still tensions in thar area between Ecuador 
and Peru. It's been a disputed border; the ccasefire agreemenr reestab-
lished the border. Bur, later on chis year-and we' re looking at rhe 
fourth quarter-we're going to be conducting a humanitarian mine 
action mission char is nor bilateral in nature. Mosr of them arc-we go 
ro country "X" and work wirh chose people. In chis case, we're going 
to have deminers from Ecuador and Peru rrain at the Peruvian 
Engineer School. We will train them in dcmining tactics, techniques 
and procedures. Then we will go up ro the border area, the 
Peru/Ecuador border, and those deminers will conduce demining 
operations on borh sides of the border. Whar does that mean? That 
means Peruvians are going co be demining Ecuador and Ecuadorians 
are going to be demining Peru. And chen from there, we'll go to 
Quito, Ecuador, where we'll conduct some follow-on training. Thar is 
a multilateral as opposed ro a bilareral mission. Absolutely a huge suc-
cess, and we're looking towards fourrh quarter of this year to execute 
chat mission. 
NK: Do you th ink it i~ important for mine actio n programs to have; 
visiting mil itary T echnical Advisors? 
LTC C: Ir depends on the capabilities of what they have .... Nor 
always. You cake a look ar Honduras and Nicaragua, right now chose 
programs are almost complete. There are Nicaraguan deminers right 
now in Iraq char were trained by the United Stares military. Now chose 
guys are as good as anybody. Do they need us now to cell rhem how 
to demine? No. They don't need our assistance at this point. So ir 
depends on rhe maturity of the program chat they have in their partic-
ular coun try. I expect when we gee down to Chile and starr the pro-
gram in Chi le in 2005, they've got a very professional army, so our 
technical assistance will hopefully be relatively limited and we won'r 
have to srarr ar the ground floor with rhe Chileans. So ir depends on 
rhe capabilities and rhe particular situation in any given country. 
NK: How d o you feel rhe tra in-rhe-rrainers program has helped our 
mil itary and host n.uions? 
LTC C: One of rhe ancillary benefits we ger from any operation we 
do of chis nature is the individual contacts and bonding, for lack of a 
















rary professionals o r whether they're doctors rhar are doing an 
exchange or academics, ir doesn't marrer. There's a cultur al under-
standing and growth that occurs through rhis program and our o ther 
human itarian programs that, in rhe long term, is a huge, huge benefit. 
So rhe individual contacts and mutual understanding that develop are 
as valuable as anyth ing else. 
NK: \X'har role d o you th ink rhc rnilir.uy can pl.t y in \t.mda rJ , for 
d cmin ing rcc.. hno logy? 
LTC C: l rhink rhe roles that we have right now wirh the HDTC 
doing the training rhcy do, plus the OSD SO/LI C [Office of the 
Secrctaty of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity 
Conflict] research and development folks do absolutely tremendous 
work. I wouldn't say it needs to be adjusted. They wi ll go to a coun-
try, look ar a particular situation in terms of terrain, weather, where 
rhe communities are located-any number of facrors-and they'll 
look at ir and say, "You know what might help here is a piece of equip-
ment or some sort of technology rhar could do this." Well whatever ir 
is they chink would work best doesn't exist, so rhey will go manufac-
ture that, and rhc:y'll rake it down to this country and they'll rest it. 
And the Office of the Secretary of Defense fully funds rhar program. 
We've gor equipment down in Ho nduras right now that rhey're doing 
a final rest on. The benefits to rhe partner nation are absolutely 
tremendous, and from a techno logy standpoint, it's those guys who 
work om of OSD SO/LIC a t Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, that bring a huge 
amount to the table, whether it's experimenting with unmanned aeri-
al vehicles, wirh ground penetrating radar ro idenrif)t m ines-rhose are 
tremendous technological advances that we can capitalize on . 
NK: Wh.n du you rhink is rhe role fil r the mili t.try in m ine ri>k 
.:duc...ll ion .rnd victim assisranc.: ? 
LTC C: That's rwo separate questions, so I'd like ro answer each sep-
arately. In mine risk education, our role is ro work wirh rhe commu-
nities and through the community leaders ro help them develop a 
good solid mine risk education program. You know, kids are kids, and 
so often, as you know, children are the victims of land mines; people 
working in rhe agricultural community are rhe victims of land mines. 
Our role is to help the communities in which they live develop srrong 
programs char are coherem, rhar receive rhe necessary funding, thar are 
well enough pur rogether so that they're sustained, thereby reducing 
the number of landmine victims while rhe demincrs go ahead and ger 
an area cleared of mines. 
The other question ... that is a great question , and I was 
talking to the guys from rhe Polus Ccnrer, because in rhe HMA 
Program we really don't have a role in victim assistance. Bur we have 
other programs within Southern Command rhat can assist wirh that. 
We have a humanitarian assistance program. W e have humanitarian 
and civic assistance programs. I would see an example of an organ iza-
tion like rhe Polus Center working in Leon, Nicaragua, where we've 
also worked, primarily after Hurricane Mitch, when Southern 
Command provided both immed iate and long-term disaster rel ief and 
reconsrrucrion ro Central America. In Leon, they have a victim assis-
tance center that need s renovation o r they're trying to build a new o ne. 
We have DoD-funded programs rhar can help with that type of thing, 
and that's rhe type of partnership that I think really goes a long way ro 
rhe mutual benefit of everybody concerned-the United Stares, rhe 
partner nation, the NGOs we partner with, rhe United States m il itary, 
the partner nation military, and rhe ultimate beneficiary being rhe 
mem bers of rhe community that live there. That's where I think we 
can make rhe most money and get the most yardage our of rh is pro-
gram. 
NK : Do you think the mili tilfy i' hertl'J 'u itc: d for m ine acrion rhan 
the h uman itarian s.:cror? 
LTC C: I wouldn't say that at all. I wou ld say there are professionals 
in the humanitarian sector, and 1 would say there are professionals 
in the military. We arc nor at all interested in competing. We're imer-
csrcd in working together to solve mumal problems rhar affecr the 
world community. 
N K: T hat was something you 'pok.: about earlier- partnerships 
and how im porr.rnr they .rre. I "'1.' wondering how you th ink 
rhe mil itary can compkm.:nr ot her o rg, mit.t tiom worki ng in humani-
t.lria n dcmining. 
LTC C : W hen I was just mentioning the humanitarian assista nce 
program, I rhink rhar's a great example. We've partnered wirh anum-
ber of NGOs throughout the region al ready, both international 
NGOs, the larger ones, as well as local, community-based civic acrion 
groups. Our partnersh ip opportuni ties arc more lim ited by imagina-
tion than they are by fu nd ing. Now, we certainly have some real-world 
concerns; we can't, from a military standpoint, say, "OK, let 's go do 
rhis type of project in this a rea" just because somebod y's asked us ro, 
bur there are many, many cases where there is a confluence of interest, 
and those need ro be pursued vigorously ro make sure rhar we gener-
ate a sort of synergy through the confluence of interest and maximize 
all of our capabilities ro achieve whatever particular objective ir may be 
ar rhe time-whether it's education, whether it's health, whether it's, 
as you mentioned, victim assisrance, rhar's another area rhar parmer-
sh ips are certainly viable. 
• Photo c/o MAl C. 
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The Role of 
Military Technical Advisors 
Introduction 
In 1989 a multinational contingent of soldiers began to 
arrive in Pakistan tO support a humanitarian mine action program for 
Afghan refugees. They were, in effect, Technical Advisors (TAs) in rhe 
field of humani ta rian mine action, and in rhe years since, military TAs 
have participated in many other programs. This has nor been withom 
irs controversial aspects. 
For rhe purposes of chis discussion (and acknowledging char 
some will not fir rh is description precisely) a military TA is a serving 
soldier who is attached ro a humanitarian mine action program in a 
training, advisory and memoring capacity. The military TA differs 
from visiting military forces in three respects. He or she is nor-or 
should nor be- a short-term visiror, bur rather is in theTA position 
for a period of six months ro one year. The military TA is nor parr of 
a fo rmed military unit, although national contingents within a pro-
gram are usually under rhe command of their senior representative for 
administrative, personnel and disciplinary purposes. Finally, he or she 
is nor armed and may nor necessarily wear a uniform. 
l must confess a certain bias on my part. I have been a mi l-
itary TA and I am immodest enough ro believe rhat my efforrs were 
nor entirely in vain. I have also known and worked with many mili-
tary TAs, from my own country and from others, and while they were 
nor all well-suited ro rhe task, I believe rhar most of them did good 
work. Somewhat inevitably, therefore, I am going to conclude rhar the 
use of military T As is not a bad thing. I have structured rhis discussion 
according to what I perceive ro be the three main concerns: ability, 
money and philosophy. Or, more simply, can they do the job, how 
m uch do they cost and should they be doing it an}'\vay? 
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Much of the d ebate revolves around rhe ability of military 
T As to train, advise and mentor indigenous personnel in various posi-
tions within rhe organization. These positions can be grouped in to 
three categories: rhe training and supervision required for specific mine 
action tasks, such as finding and destroying mines; the training, logis-
tics, planning, and command and control required fo r daily opera-
tions; and strategic planning, including integration with other devel-
opment activities and resource management. 
With respect to the first category, much has been made of 
the difference berween military-style minefield breaching and rhe exi-
gencies of humanitarian demining. This difference undeniably exists-
in immediate combat. H owever, even in wartime, follow-on activities 
are expected to achieve a high standard, and posr-conflicr clearance is 
expected to reach what is effectively a humanitarian standard. The 
same is true of military demining activities in rhe context of modern 
peace-support operations. It would be disingenuous to suggest that 
milira1y personnel do not possess the techniques to reach rhis standard, 
or the ability to understand and apply rhe International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) . 
Experienced mine action workers have stated that military 
and humanitarian demining d o not differ at the point where the dem-
iner and the ground come together, 1 and that military-style training is 
applicable ro the training of humanitarian deminers. 2 It has also been 
acknowledged that mili tary personnel can successfully form and train 
teams of deminers,3 even though many of these trainers lack "li ve" 
experience4 and even though some countries forbid their personnel 
from conducting actual demining while working as trainers.5 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that military personnel can 
effectively teach specific technical tasks such as d emining and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques, although they are not ad ept at 
tasks such as mine risk education (MRE), where there is no clear mil-
itary equivalent.6 
Since there is an acknowledged need for qualified and expe-
rienced instructors,? it appears that there is a valid role for suitable mil-
itary T As at this level so long as the tasks coincide with their skills. As 
with any other job, rhe key word is "suirabiliry." Technical skills and 
knowledge are not sufficient: military T As, like civilian T As, must be 
of a high caliber, able to transmit their ski lls and knowledge effective-
ly in a given culrural, environmental and organizational context, and 
remain in place long enough to be of real value.8 Ideally these require-
ments would be incorporated into the selection process used by rhe 
providing country, but there is no guarantee rhar this wi ll be rhe case.9 
Ir has been suggested that the receiving agency should play 
a decisive role in the selection process, IO but this is unlikely to occur 
under the most typical scena rio, where the receiving agency asks for 
assistance and nations respond by sending the military TAs of their 
choice. The militaiy personnel management system of the supplying 
country dominates this process, and it will continue to do so while 
military TAs are seconded to, rather than hi red by, the receiving agen-
cies. T his means that the suitability of an arriving military TA will be, 
to a limited extent, rhe luck of rhe draw. This is defini tely not the pre-
ferred staffing solution; however, my own limited experience working 
with and within international organizations-and more relevantly the 
judgement of those wirh more experience-suggests that rhis problem 
is nor necessarily limited ro the group under discussion. 11 
Military TAs have also achieved success in the second care-
gory, daily operations. One example is given by the Geneva 
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in The 
Role of the Military in Mine Action: " ... military T As provided an 
invaluable injection of expertise at a time when Cambodia was strug-
gling to rebuild its government and economy. Foreign military T As 
appear to have been particularly effective at getting demining teams on 
the ground."i2 T his makes sense, since deploying and sustaining large 
numbers of persons to work on difficult tasks, under demanding con-
ditions, is fundamental to milira1y operations. Given the personnel 
and material resources (however scarce those might be) and specific 
tasks within an assigned area of operations, military T As can perform 
effectively at this level. 
In contrast, most observers appear to believe that the mili-
tary has little if any role in the third category: strategic planning, 
resource management and integration wirh the wider developmental 
effort. T his roo makes sense as sustai nable development is not a core 
military skill, or is nor likely ro become one. As rhe United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) has noted, military personnel can 
assist in this category, up to a point, but in the long rerm, rhe requi-
site training and assistance should be provided by more appropriate 
j 
agencies.13 That being said, senior officers in most armed forces have 
ro possess strategic planning and resource management skills if they 
are ro carry out their military duties wirh reasonable proficiency. This 
is perhaps most notable in Western military establishments, where the 
language used in many documents and meetings echoes that found in 
civilian organizations, and where M.B.A. studies have assumed a sta-
tus formerly reserved only for 
advanced military training 
courses. 
A 1997 interview 
with the (military) Chief 
Technical Advisor (CTA) of 
the Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) appeared to 
show a sound grasp of mine 
action realities. He discussed 
the need to build a sustain-
able demining program with 
local buy-in, the desirabili ty 
of a long-term approach by 
donors and others, and the 
importance of "weaving 
together the various parts of 
the program" by applying 
business principles. He also 
spoke of capacity building 
and of the requirement for a 
comprehensive national survey and an associated database in order to 
support long-range planning.14 T he ability of military personnel ro 
adapt to the exigencies of mine action does of course depend on the 
individuals concerned , bur the option of using them should not be dis-
missed out of hand. 
Money 
Although some believe that milita1y personnel represent a 
net savings ro rhe receiving organization because their salaries are 
already paid, l5 a more common assessment appears to be that milira1y 
TAs, person for person, are rather more expensive than civilian staff. 
The GICHD's comprehensive study states, " ... the incremental costs 
associated with any foreign dury assignment of personnel from visiting 
milira1y forces may be at least as high as the full cost of engaging equal-
ly well-qualified civilian personnel for the same assignment ."16 If this 
were rrue, then it would clearly be a rational decision on the part of 
the receiving organizations to eschew the use of military TAs. But is it 
rrue? 
The authors of the study cite rwo sources in arriving at this 
conclusion. The first is a paper by rhe Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and D evelopment (OECD), which correctly points our 
that military operations are more expensive than civilian ones: a mili-
tary airlift will cost more rhan a civilian one, a militaiy medical facili-
ty will cost more than a civilian one, and so on. This is undeniable, 
even though the extra cost is not borne by the receiving agency (a 
point that is acknowledged in the paper). 17 As others have nored, iris 
true that "Military unirs cost more for a given operation than the 
equivalent carried out by a civil organization."18 However, we are dis-
cussing individuals, and it is a bit of a stretch to compare something 
like rhc airlift of relief supplies into Somalia with the deployment of 
individual military T As. 
The second source is an American analysis rhar seeks to 
quantify rhe incremental cost of deploying an individual soldier on 
peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo. 
The range given is $200,000 ro $250,000 (U.S.), and it is essentially 
calculated by d ividing the 
total annual cost of each 
force by the number of sol-
diers involved. The incre-
mental cost per so ldier, 
therefore, includes his or her 
share of the operating cosrs 
of everything used by or in 
support of American forces 
stationed in BiH or Kosovo. 
That is, everything from hel-
icopters ro armoured vehi-
cles ro camps to ammuni-
tion ro hospitals, for the 
richest army in the world. 19 
Obviously a military TA, 
operating sans artille ry, 
armored vehicles or arrack 
helicopters will be cheaper. 
The GICHD study takes 
this into account by lopping 
off a third of the incremental cost, thus arriving at a range of $135,000 
to $165,000 per year.20 
This still seems like a he fry sum; as the study no res, ir is "as 
much or more than appropriately qualified, experienced and morivar-
ed civilian personnel would cost (including recruitment and adminis-
trative support costs) if recruited directly."21 It is true thar rhe receiv-
ing agency would bear the entire cost of a civilian TA, while most of 
rhe cost of a military TA would be borne by the supplying nation. This 
might appeal ro a pragmatic mine acrion manager, who might rake the 
view that if there is ro be an incremental cost, ir would be better borne 
by a large government rather than a relatively small mine action pro-
gram. Still, the price seems inordinately high, irrespective of who is 
actually paying. If it really were that high, governments would be bet-
ter advised to conserve their military personnel for other purposes and 
send the money rhus saved ro mine action programs for civilian staff. 
The rrouble is that rhe marh does not work out. T he lower 
end of the proposed range translates to about $12,000 per month in 
incremental costs, and it is difficult to arrive ar that sum without 
reaching levels of generosity not normally associated with the military. 
Salary, medical and dental coverage, insurance, pension contributions 
and so on arc nor incremental costs. Neither are living allowances or 
local operating costs such as vehicles, drivers and interpreters, because 
they would be rhe same for any TA, whether military or civilian. This 
means that the entire incremental cost has to be derived from military 
allowances, administrative support and transpo rtation costs for 
deployment, redeployment and home leave. Even if a T A flies home 
once a month and is an acure administrative challenge, $12 ,000 
equates to an improbably high monthly allowance. Some militaries are 
quire genero us, but even so it would be difficult to arrive at a month-















rhan a bir for luck would give an annual incremental cosr of, say, 
$48,000: hardly enough ro recruit, pay and administer a civilian TA. 
I have belabored rhis point because I believe ir is chimerical. 
T he ofT-repeated assertion rhar military T As are more expensive is 
demonstrably incorrect, no marrer who is paying. One simply can nor 
exrrapolare from rhe per capita incremenral cosr of a fu ll-scale military 
operation, or even per capita incremenral cosr of "borrowing" soldiers 
from visiting military forces, ro rhe incremental cosr of deploying an 
unarmed military TA wirh no logistics, communications or infrastruc-
ture support beyond rhar which would also be provided to a civilian 
TA. While debates over rhe relative quality of military and civilian TAs 
cannot be conclusively settled because borh groups arc comprised of 
individuals whose abilities vary widely, cost is a quantitative issue char 
can be eliminated from the debate altogether. 
Philosophy 
If we accept rhar rhe question of abiliry is ar least sci II open 
and char rhe question of money has been addressed, we are le fr wirh 
philosophical argumenrs. This aspecr of che debare is a relarivcly fa inr 
echo of rhe ongoing concroversy over rhe role of military forces in 
humanitarian operations, and of rhe ofr-cxaggerared "culwral" diff er-
ences between milirary and civilian personnel. A key elemenr of chis 
wider conrroversy-rhe abiliry of milicary personnel ro carry our 
humanitarian rasks- has already been addressed in rhis arricle. 
Anorher concern is related ro security. This argumenr sug-
gests char humanitarian workers may be endangered because bell iger-
enrs won' t be able ro disti ngu ish between military and civilian pe rson-
nel who are engaged in similar work, or because humani tarian workers 
may become cargers by virrue of association with the mil itary. 
However, attacks on humanitarian workers (such as chose char have 
taken place in Afghanistan) are nor carried o ur because of confusion 
over rhe mili rary or civilian statu s of rhe victims, or because of a per-
ceived rainr due ro civil-m ilirary cooperation; rhcy arc carried our 
because rhe arrackers wish ro drive away humanitarian workers. 
The lasr philosophical argumcnr can be summarized as "lr 
isn ' t rheir busi ness," with a subrexr rhar rhe rnilirary is only interested 
in humanitarian mine acrion because rhey are looking for gainful 
employment in orde r ro jusrify rheir existence. In response ro rhe firsr 
point I would suggest thar ir's the business of anyone who can make an 
cfTecrivc conrriburion ro rhe efTorr, and rhar the only " turf ' we should 
be concerned about is rhar concealing rhe mines. As for the second 
po inr, rhe armies char normally provide TAs seem robe busy enough 
these days. Furthermore, in rhe smaller armies, mi litary TAs are drawn 
from a numerically small pool, and chose arm ies are ofren less rhan 
anxious ro send scarce officers and non-commissio ned officers (NCOs) 
ofT ro do work rhac they feel is nor che military's business! 
Conclusion 
Although relarive qualiry is difficult co assess, the average 
abil iry of m ili tary TAs is on par wirh rhe resr of rhe humani tarian mine 
action community and che financial and p hilosophical argumenrs 
against their use do nor srand up ro examination. Military TA~ are a 
useful and usable resource, and since it would be srarding indeed co 
hear a m ine acrion manager complain of a surfeit of resources, I must 
conclude-as promised- char humanitarian m ine actio n benefirs from 
the use of military TAs. 
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BELGIAN MILITARY EXPERTS 
For many years, a large debate over the use of military 
experts in humanitarian demining has existed. Some individuals 
are against military demining arguing the military performs dif-
ferent techniques and holds different priorities from humanitari-
an demining. Others are favourable toward military demining, as 
they are the majority of demining centres. The Belgian military 
has been active in demining since World War I (WWI). Still 
today, explosive remnants from WWI and World War II (WWII) 
remain a daily concern in the life of Belgians. The minefields 
have been cleared for many years, yet everyday military experts 
still dispose of UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). It 
is important to understand this process does not take place dur-
ing a military operation. Rather it is placed within the framework 
of helping the population, a type of humanitarian demining. 
Hi1tory 
The explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) service was created immediately after 
WWl. This service was acrive throughout 
Belgium, initially as a decachmenr ro each 
Provincial Recovery Service. In I 922, many 
landmines were disposed of, givi ng th e 
impression ic would only take a few months ro 
complere che project. Unfortunately, it 
became clear rhe UXO problem was far from 
over. In an effort to cackle this issue, rhe 
O rdnance Disposal Service was created on 
October 3, I 923 . 
After WWII , numerous Belgian 
m ilitary unirs were directed ro dispose of the 
obstacles and m ines la id in both world wars. 
T hese unirs were sent rhroughour Belgium. 
On August 16, 1941 , rhe EOD service was 
recreated, afrer rhe captive pe rsonnel were 
freed , ro dispose of all explosive devices and 
preserve any d evices of military importance. 
Bomb d isposal reams quickly formed in rowns 
char suff e red from bombing during the wars 
and in places where old minefields, ammuni-
tion dumps or explosive charges were discov-
ered. The EOD service activities conrinually 
exceeded rhe casks emrusred ro ir by staying in 
constant conracr with several resistance groups 
and wirh allies. Through this constant interac-
tion, EOD was able to inform London of p os-
sible manufacturing errors in fusing sysccms 
and of likely causes of non-exploding bombs. 
The bo mb disposal experts also recovered 
explosives of defused devices and passed on 
rhe remaining explosive fille rs to resistance 
groups for sabotage purposes. 
On Ocrober 16, 1944, the 
Explosive O rdnance and Obscacle Disposal 
Service was creared as an official addicion ro 
rhe EOD service and Belgian Armed Forces. 
In the first year, 300 men worked under chis 
by Captain Vincent Muylkens, Belgian 
Defense Staff Operations & Training EOD 
in EOD 
servtcc. The Explosive Ordnance D isposal 
Service was created on December I , 1945, ro 
unite a ll exisring bomb disposal un its under 
one single command. 
Between 1944 and 1948, rhe EOD 
service srrucrure changed constantly as 
Belgium search for an ideal organ ization and 
due ro rhc Bomb Disposal Unir consran rly 
decreasing inside. Likewise, afrer WWll, rhe 
authorities believed an EOD service was no 
longer necessary. The abolition of rhis service 
was again imminenr. However, on July 4, 
I947, a d ifferent decision was made-ro 
reduce irs srrengrh ro 42 men. Fortunately chis 
decision was never broughr ro execution , and 
by rhe end of 1948, rhe EOD service consist-
ed of 350 men. T he Explosive Ordnance and 
Obsracle Disposal Service held a temporary 
unir sraw s unril May I, 1948, when ic became 
an organization of the basic Armed Forces. 
Between I 949 and I 955, rhe EOD service saw 
many changes, essenrially as a resulc of che 
reorgani7.-ati on of rhe Armed Forces. Ar the 
end of 1955, rhe EOD service had decreased 
ro 11 5 personnel. 
In O cto ber 1971 , the army dete r-
mined rhe EOD service would no longer be an 
independent unit. However, the early 1970s 
consisted of inrernacional terrorism, which 
meanr a need for Belgian specialists capable of 
d isposing booby traps, letter bombs, car 
bombs, etc. Furthermore, rhe number of left-
over munirions from the two world wars 
exceed ed the previous estimates. Each year, 
che EOD service received 3,000-4,000 
requests ro dispose of devices of all kinds. Less 
rhan three years after its dissolution rhe EOD 
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The I mer-service Territorial 
Command (lTC) was founded in 1995 due ro 
a general reorganisation of the armed forces. 
lTC was established to bring together all 
bomb disposal units in charge of territorial 
bomb disposal operations under one com-
mand. This was the last major change for the 
EOD unit. 
CurrCIInt ActivHiC118 
Today rhe Belgian bomb disposal 
battalion comprises 23 officers, 151 non-com-
missioned officers (NCOs), and 13 1 corporals 
and civil ians, rhus a total of 305 personnel of 
which 172 are bomb disposal experts ( 16 offi-
cers, I 00 NCOs and 56 corporals) . The bat-
talion is composed of three companies decen-
tral ised to cover the all-national territory. 
T he first task of the unit is the 
clearance of UXO and AXO left in Belgium 
from the two world wars. Despite rhe propos-
al to d issolve the unit in 1971, 
.u r' ~ 1 
I .,lit t't un ~ 1 \ .u r;n gi ug 1 I 1 '' 
1:1 ,, HI~' w 1 nr.h hnmb~ up w '\1 I kgn 
rnon.: 
Consequently, the battalion han-
dles a11 average of 250 tons of ammunition 
every year. Some 20 tons of "problem ammu-
ni tion" (suspected chemical ammuni tion) are 
recovered each year, especially in the areas of 
fighting during WWI. 
The Battalion's second mission is 
rhe dismantling of roxie and chemical ammu-
nition dari ng from WWI. The dismantling 
facil ity is located at the sire of conflict during 
WWI. During 1998 and 1999, tests were car-
ried out on real ammunition ro control the 
feasibility of rhe installation. The installation 
has been opera tional since October 1999. 
The third major task calls for the 
support of juridical autho ri ties in rhe field of 
terrorism and organised crime. This responsi-
bility averages around 150 interventions a year 
fo r the EOD Battalion . Suspect devices rang-
ing from letter bombs to car bombs arc inves-
tigated and rendered safe. The unit is also in 
charge of post-explosion investigations. The 
EOD Battalion is always ready ro intervene in 
case of a military air crash to recover ammuni-
tion and pyrotechn ic elements. It can also rely 
on diver-bomb disposal expens for diving mis-
sions in the hinterland and the territorial 
water surfaces. 
T he un it instructs its own bomb 
disposal experts and organises insrructional 
courses fo r police forces, juridical authorities 
and securi ty agents. The basic course to 
become an EOD operator cakes one year. 
After five years of experience, the non-com-
missioned EOD officer operator follows an 
advanced four-monrh course. Then the NCO 
can act as an EOD ream leader. In 2003, the 
Ministry of Defence requested char the bomb 
disposal school develop an EOD ream leader 
course for foreigners to parricipare in. T his 
four-month course is available to experienced 
EOD operators. 
Belgian military experts continually 
advise researchers involved in programs to 
support humani tarian demining. Regularly, 
rhe EOD operators support Belgian universi-
ties, the Royal Military Academy and many 
civilia n universities in their studies with the 
humanitarian demining domain. The EOD 
experts constandy rest new equipment and 
provide help to the students, based on their 
field experience. 
The last support provided by the 
Belgian military experrs encompasses the tech-
nical assistance to treaty and protocol develop-
ment. Belgian Defence sends mil itary experrs 
and both EOD and non-EOD operarors to 
inrernarional workshops and symposiums. 
During these development processes, the mil-
itary experts can provide counsel to develop-
ing treaties and protocol based on thei r field 
experiences. 
Beginning in 1990, Belgium began 
requesting UN support fo r its humanitarian 
activities and inform ing the world of irs 70 
years of lessons learned. 
Thus, the EOD Barralion began 
participating in operations abroad. One mis-
sion called for the protection of thei r own 
Belgian troops du ring deployments abroad. 
Others were conducted within the framework 
of humani tarian demining. Numerous units 
senr EOD experts to Rwanda (1986, 1993-
1994), Iraq ( 199 1 ), Former Yugoslavia 
( 1992- today), Somalia (1992-1993), 
Cambodia (1994-today), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (1997, 2004), Lao 
People's Demo-cratic Republic (PDR) 
( 1998-coday), Albania ( 1999) and Benin 
(200 1). 
The Battalion currendy has the following 13 
EOD operators abroad: 
• Three military EOD operators 
are stationed in Kosovo to protect Belgian 
troops, yet the Belgian EOD operators deal 
daily with UXO in civiJian areas. 
• Four military operators EOD 
experts are stationed in Cambodia as tech-
nical advisers for the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC). Between 1994 and 
1996, the Belgian experts were involved in 
the minefields. Their main task was to 
inform and advise, in the field, the CMAC 
deminers. Between 1996 and 2000, the 
advisers assisted in the creation of an EOD 
branch in CMAC with the cooperation of 
Dutch colleagues. Since 2000, the Belgian 
advisers have been alone in the support of 
a n EOD branch. The statistics of Cambodia 
show that 65 percent of the accidents are 
due to UXO and 35 percent are due to AP 
mines. The intention of CMAC is to build 
an EOD branch able to work throughout 
the country. 
• Two military EOD experts are 
deployed in the southern province of Lao, 
Champassak, in support of the activities of 
the Lao National UXO Project (UXO 
lAO). The BeJgian advisers support all the 
domains, not only the technical and opera-
tional, but also human resources, material 
resources, finance, etc. Since 1998, Belgium 
has provided technical advisers to assist the 
operations in the province. During the 15 
years of war, bombs were dropped on Lao 
PDR. Today it is a country covered with 
tons of UXO. The experience gained in 
Belgium since 1918 gives Belgium a good 
opportunity to help Lao PDR to build a 
long-term UXO disposal capacity to reduce 
the risk due to unexploded bomb live units 
(BLUs), bombs and other UXO. 
• Four EOD operators have been 
deployed in Bosnia since November 2003 
to reinforce the Stabilization Force (SFOR ) 
mission. The mission of this team is to 
assist Bosnia in the storage, transportation 
and demolition of large stocks of ammuni-
tion. 
Following the past experiences of 
Belgium's use of military experrs in human i-
tarian demining has an advantage, even if the 
humanitarian demin ing is normally nor a mil-
itary mission. When a country uses mil itary 
experts to build a national EOD capacity to 
clear the country, the costs are substantially 
lower. The majority of armies with an EOD 
capacity developed them to support military 
operations. During peaceful rimes, this capac-
ity is available and the operators can be used to 
clear the UXO on the national territory. The 
country does not need to pay twice to develop 
an EOD capacity for military operarions and 
an EOD capacity for national territory. lr is 
also evident that the experience gained on rhc 
nationa l territory can also be used to support 
programs abroad. 
Military expcrrs usually have a mi l-
irary channel rhar gives them access to techn i-
cal information. Thus, when the military 
experts are involved in support of the human-
itarian demining, it is easier ro ger access ro 
rhe needed rechn ical informacion . Directly 
after a conflict, milita•y units are regularly sent 
to control the peace process. T he miliraty 
EOD operators are able to starr wirh the 
urgcnr clearance operations and disposal of 
UXO. The co-operation with other actors will 
only provide benefits to rhe humanitarian sir-
uarion. A better coordination between mili-
tary experts and non-military expertS is also an 
advantage for research and development of 
mine action technologies with a reduction of 
the costs and an increase in the researchers 
involved. 
In conclusion, AP mines are a prob-
lem, bur they are unfortunately not d1e only 
problem after a conflict. Many statistics 
demonstrate today char UXO represent an 
important problem rhar may be larger than 
the AP mine problem. The experience of 
Belgium shows that many decades after the 
end of the hostilities, large quantities of UXO 
still remain on the ground. The demin ing 
acriviries of mincfields and rhe disposal of 
UXO arc major tasks rhar will rake a long 
rime. lr is in the interest of the inrernarional 
community to rake into accounr all available 
resources, included military operators. They 
perform the same job as the non-military 
operators with, in some cases, other priorities 
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What Role Should the Militarv Plav;» 
O ne conrenrious ropic of debarc is 
whether or nor militaries should even be 
involved in mine acrion and if so, whar exact-
ly their role should be. Because rhe level of 
military involvement in mine action currently 
varies widely from region to region , there are 
many different views on the subject. There are 
rhose rhar believe their role should be limited, 
like Hugh Morris of Mine Tech International, 
who says, "I don'r rhink rhc military have a 
role in mine action orher rhan in a conflict sir-
uarion where rhey can nor bring in commercial 
[organizations) or NCOs. I rhink rhe military 
have a role to secure their own force protec-
tion aims, be able ro allow movement of their 
forces and maybe movement of civilians and 
movement of refugees. Bur when ir is a post-
conflict siruarion, rhe military should move on 
to other tasks, because they're nor civil admin-
istrators and they're nor geared to do rasks of 
a humanitarian mine clearing nature. Ir 
requires a lot of men and a lor of rime, and I 
d on 'r believe any military has the time to do 
ir. So I don' t rhink rhey have a role in a post-
I ll I 11 [ l l~[ OllL I I 
conflict siruarion in any counrry in rhe world 
ro clear land mines." 1 H e srresses rhat although 
rhe milirary, being paid for by rhc govern-
men t, may be able to do such tasks for less 
money, if rhey are nor p roperly trained and 
knowledgeable on international standards, 
then they will nor be as effective as commer-
cial or non-governmenral organizations. 
Morris says, "The milira1y have nothing bur a 
military role in clearing mines, and rhen your 
NCOs and commercial companies are rhe 
ones who will ridy up in a post-conflict situa-
tion, unless there is money pur into rhe mili-
tary, and they'd have ro adhere ro rhe 
lnrernario nal Mine Actio n Standards 
[IMAS)."t 
Chuck Meadows of PeaceTrees 
Vietnam believes that rhe milirary should be 
more involved in the actual clearance of 
mines: "In my view, any milirary in any coun-
try, rheir role should be in rhc removal of any 
mines ... rhar rhey may have used or pur down 
in any con flier rhar rhey have been engaged in. 
Then, in their own countries, I think rhey 
would be the appropriate ones to assist in the 
removal of any land mines rhatany insurgenrs, 
rebels or terrorists, or anybody else have in facr 
pur in rhe ground ."2 John Wilkinson of 
RONCO also sees r:he role of rhe milirary as 
one of involvement in clearance, bur in addi-
tion he emphasizes rhar their involvement in 
this aspect of mine acrion is more appropriate 
rhan in orher aspecrs such as mine risk educa-
tion (MRE): " ... I think thar the mine acrion 
in terms of the removal of rhe mines as 
opposed to MRE is probably more a role for 
rhe military to play."3 
Another view is thar the military 
should mainly be involved in rhe "behind-the-
scenes" of mine action, such as providing 
training, equipment, logistics and planning. 
Paddy Blagden, an independent consultant of 
lnrernarional Mine Acrion believes rhis ro be 
besr rype of involvemenr in mine acrion for 
the military: "There's so much that rhe mili-
tary can do to help rhe NCOs even wirhour 
getting near a minefield, and rhar I'd be far 
more happy wirh , because 1 don 'r like seeing 
soldiers being pushed into doing mine clear-
ance because ir's parr of their military dury."4 
Collaborators or Competitors;» 
W ith the military working in many 
areas alongside non-military mine action prac-
titioners, one might wonder if they see one 
another as collaborators or competitors. The 
overall feeling in the mine action communiry 
seems to be rhar the military is nor in compe-
tition wirh NGOs and commercial organiza-
tions. One reason for this cired by a number 
of non-miliraty mine acrion practitioners is 
rhat NCOs and commercial companies often 
hire ex-milirary personnel for rheir mine 
acrion work. John Wilkinson sums ir up as 
fo llows: " ... [L]et's face ir-many of the people 
we hire and rhat everybody else hires are for-
mer military, especially to run our field opera-
tions. So I've never rhought thar rhere was a 
sort of hard and fasr division between rhe rwo; 




I think rhere's different areas of interest, different areas of access, dif-
ferent areas of understandin g, bur all of rhem can be bridged and can 
be made ro work in a complementary man ner."3 
Some non-military mine action workers eire particular cases 
in which rheir organizations are working wirh rhe military in a harmo-
n ious way. As an example of how rhe rwo can work hand-in-hand 
Paddy Blagden rells a srory of a Japanese NCO working in Thailand 
alongside one of rhe Thailand Mine Acrion Cenrer's (TMAC's) 
Humanira.rian M ine Acrion Unirs (HMAUs), which are composed of 
members of rhe Thai army. The HMAU was often unable to use irs 
machines, so rhe NGO would borrow them, making sure that when 
rhe machines were returned, rhe HMAU could carry on irs work wirh 
a fully fueled and serviced machine. Thus, rhe NCO's deminers could 
use a piece of equipment too expensive for them to own for only the 
cost of fuel and servicing. "And rhis synergistic relationship worked-
we gor enormous assistance fro m the army as a res ult,"4 Blagden says. 
John Wilkinson says char when RO NCO firsr began work-
ing with the U .S. military in Afghanistan, they weren' r sure how to 
work rogerher, parrly because rhe military didn 't really understand rhe 
process of demining and irs value. lr didn'r rake long, rhough, as he 
explains: " ... IA]s soon as we starred working, rhey understood rhe 
value of dcmining, when we started finding unexploded ordnance and 
landmines that have been missed by rhe more cursory 'mine-clearing' 
rechniques."3 Bur this progress was all bur lost when rhar unit's rora-
rion ended, and RONCO had ro start over with rhe incoming unir. 
Soon, however, RONCO's value was recognized: " ... [Bjy the rime rhe 
third unit came in, our presence had been established sufficien rly long, 
and there was enough histoty of whar we'd been clearing and to what 
effect rhar rhe arriving unir immediately said, 'We wanr you guys to 
sray, we wanr you ro conrinue doing whar you're doing.' ... [T)hey 
understood the role rhar we were playing for rhem even rhough we 
were nor of rhem."3 
What Does the Mllitarv Bring to the Table;» 
So whar advanrage, if any, is rhere to having rhe mil itary 
involved in mine action' As in rhe example of Thailand mentioned 
above, some mili taries may have rools at their disposal rhat are too 
expensive fo r NCOs themselves to purchase. As John W ilkinson 
points our, "rhey have much larger resources; rhey have the trained 
EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] people."3 If militaries and non-
military organizations can work our ways ro share these tools, as in the 
TMAC example, such a partnership can be murually benefi cial to 
borh. 
Militaries also may have some more figu rative "tools" from 
which non-military originations could benefit. According to Chuck 
Meadows, "The biggest tool rhey would have is jusr 
experience and training, because in the militaries char I've been associ-
ated with, parr of rhar organ i1.arion are EO D folks and engineers that 
are trained ro do rhar, whereas an NCO by ourselves might nor have 
char personal experi ence."2 On the orher hand, J ohn Wilkinson says, 
"[ l] r's more of an organizational concept thar rhey have to bring rather 
rhan experience ... . [Y]ou've gor a hierarchical sysrem in rhe milirary, 
which, when iris given a mission or undertakes a mission, will turn ro 
and pur a lor of resources aga inst and focus irs arrenrion on it. l think 
that organizarional structure is something rhar we in the NCO com-
munity could benefit from in terms of how we approach things ... . So 
l think rhar more whar r:hey have to bring is the organizational 
approach and rhe way rhey focus logistics and effort on a particular 
rask."3 
Facing the Challenges 
Though militaries can be a valuable resource if they use 
rheir assets to mount collaborative efforts wirh non-military groups, 
there arc srill a number of challenges when involving rhe military in 
mine action. Perhaps one of rhe mosr fundamental is rhe opinions and 
prejudices rhar each group has towards rhe orher. Hugh Morris nores 
thar " ... soldiers more often rhan nor consider civilians ro be a neces-
sa•y evil and so are uncomfortable in rhei r presence." 1 Also, even 
though non-mili rary organizations may have more experience in 
humanitarian roles, soldiers may rcsisr learning from civilians. As a for-
mer military member himself, Paddy Blagden understands rhis atti-
rude: " ... ! can rell you as an ex-military that no military man likes to 
learn from [civilians] .... The lasr rhing you wanr is a rree-hugger com-
ing alo ng and telling you how to do your business."4 However, he 
thinks rhe military men would do well to overcome rheir unwilling-
ness ro learn from civilians, "because I rhink rhey would learn quite a 
lor.. .. I rhink thar if rhey can overcome rhis unwill ingness by realizing 
rhar rhey will save lives if rhey learn from people who are mine clear-
ing the whole ri me as professionals, rhen I think ir'll help enormously. 
If they won 't, then I'm afraid they've got to learn rhe ways rhar we d id 
(i.e., by making a large number of mistakes), bur rhar is a very pain ful 
process, and quire a lot of people can directly suffer as a result. "4 On 
the orher hand, as Mr. Wilkinson arriculares, non-military organ iza-
tions can be jusr as guilty of such prejudice: " ... [I] r requires a change 
of arrirude and a change of understanding on rhe parr of the military. 
lr also in some ways requires a change in arrirude on the parr of rhe 
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way rhings are going in terms of military presences, military interests, 
people working basically on either side of the wire from each other, 
rhar makes very little sense."3 Paddy Blagden agrees: "I agree fully ... 
char NGOs sometimes dislike soldiers as much as the other way round, 
bur ir depends very much on personalities wirhin both organiza-
rions."5 The firsr step to successful cooperation is for both sides to 
swallow rheir pride and be willing to admir that the other has a lot to 
offer. T his step will probably be aided enormously by the fact rhar a 
lor of NGOs and commercial organizations are comprised of some for-
mer military themselves, wh ich should create opportunities to initial-
ly bridge the gaps between the two groups. 
Another problem when mili taries become engaged in mine 
action is rhar rhey ofren have different priorities from the NCOs and 
commercial groups. Hugh Morris describes his experience wirh prior-
ities differing from rhe miliraty's: " ... [B]e we NGO or commercial, we 
clear mines to the International Mine Acrion Standards, and that 
imposes upon us a number of rules and a number of qualiry assurance 
checks .... None of those rules apply ro rbc military, and rhe military 
will clear mines as an expedient means of creating a camp, gerring ro a 
target, or gerring through a minefield barricr."l Because of these stan-
dards, demining often requires more rime and more paperwork rhan 
rhe m ilitary is used to. If they don't understand the reasoning behind 
such regulations, they can be turned off by rhe way professional mine 
action organizations carry our demining. John W ilkinson states, "In 
many ways, a lot of dem in ing, when a military person looks at it, it's 
kind of like, 'Geeze, it's a huge reporting structure; ir's relatively slow-
er rhan mine clearance; we're nor going to be here that long'-rhose 
kind of things. And rhcn on rhe ocher side of rhe wire, when an NGO 
looks ar rhe military, ir's kind of like, 'You guys arc ignoring roo m uch 
of the threat; you're just moving through and moving on,' ... and 
again, we' re both doing the same rhing, ... ir's jusr a different approach 
ro doing ir. .. . "3 This remark also rouches on another issue when rhc 
m ilir:uy gers involved in mine action: cimelines. As menrioncd before 
with RONCO's work in Afghan istan, limited engagement times ofren 
mean rhar mine acrion practitioners lose ground wirh militaries when 
units change, having w re-establish their rapport with rhe incoming 
soldiers and possibly re-explain their work. Paddy Blagden reaffirms 
this problem: "The slight trouble with [militaries] is rhar although 
they are initially pretry well-trained, as with mosr army units there's 
q uite a large amount of rurnover. "4 T o overcome th is problem, John 
Wilkinson says, " I rhink each has ro recognize rhe oth er's planning 
rimcline and its areas of primary interest .... I think it's an issue of com-
ing closer together and people starring to better understand what each 
other does, how they do ir and why rhey do it rhe way rhey do. "3 
M il itaries arc also sometimes reluctant to share information 
with non-military personnel, which can create difficulties when trying 
ro work together in mine action. John W ilkinson describes this ten-
dency: " ... [Y]ou've always got the issue of rhc m ilitary has a classifica-
tion system and that, for operational security, they ofren don't share 
information . 1 chink sometimes it's carried a little further than ir needs 
to be or should be."3 T his is probably one of the more difficult prob-
lems to overcome because militaries have an inherent level of secrecy 
to carry on their work. As H ugh Morris explains, there is "a form of 
fear by various m ili taries that the various weapons rhar [arc] dropped 
[are] classified weapons, and if they [haven't] exploded, then we as 
non-military personnel should nor see these weapons." 1 Yet Morris 
also chinks that the miliraty's tendency for elusiveness doesn't always 
hinder information sharing: " ... [l]n some cases where it is not a con-
tentious area, rhc military are pretty good at giving information to the 
United Nations Mine Action C enters [UN MACs] to pass on ro peo-
ple like us; but in other areas, they become quire rericenr because 
they've dropped weapons that they don' t wanr us ro see how it worh. 
So there the synergy is not always that simplc." 1 Morris cites Kosovo 
as an example of a place where information sharing with the military 
is currently not bad, but he admits that his organization did meet with 
some resistance when first trying to ob tain this information from the 
milirary. 
Improving Militarv/Non-Militarv Cooperation 
Obviously, there is great potential for military and 
non-military personnel to complement one anorher in mine 
action. There are a number o f cases in countries worldwide that 
demonstrate such partnership is nor only possible, but also quite ben-
eficial. However, mosr would say thar rhere IS still room 
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for improvemcnr. What suggestions do mem bers of rhe NCO 
and commercial sectors of mi ne acrion have for improving 
chis relationship? 
Many mine action practitioners realize char there is a differ-
ence between the military and non-military approaches to mine 
action. Military minefield b reach ing or even what rhey sometimes call 
"mine cl earance" are not rhe same as demin ing, and mine action p rac-
titioners think rhe miliraty needs ro understand rhe differences 
between rhem and why demining is so imporram. John Wilki nson 
states, " ! think the military needs to better understand what demining 
is ... and rhis requires a change of attitude frankly on rhe part of the 
m ilitary. W e still run into situations where people say, 'Well, we don 't 
do demining, we do mine clearance.' Well yeah, but, when you're sit-
ring in a minefield, you'd better do demining, or when you' re sitting 
in a field of UXO, you'd better do demining."3 Because military and 
no n-miliraty organ izations often have different goals in mind when 
doing their respective types of clearance, rhey may nor understand why 
the other party rakes a cerrain approach ro ir; militaries may believe 
that mine action is roo time-consum ing, wh ile mine action profession-
als think the military overlooks much of rhe problem. The bottom 
line, accord ing to Mr. Wilkinson, is "we're both d oing the same 
thing- we're both removing m ines and detecting and hopefully p ick-
ing up UXO, ir's just a d ifferent approach to doing it .... "3 
The d isadvantage thar seems to be most agreed upon is that 
many militaries getting involved in demining are not trained accord-
ing to the internationally recognized standards. Chuck Meadows 
expresses this as one of Peace Trees Viernam's major obstacles: "For us, 
the biggest challenge is training. lr's ensu ring the initial training for 
rhe folks have been at the United Nations standa rds."2 Pad dy Blagden 
calls fo r rh e m il itary to " ... carry our clearance to International Mine 
Action Standards .... I would say that until rhe m ilitary are capable of 
doing th is, I wouldn' t like ro see them carry out all that much demi-
ning, except in emergency situations, and th e reason is because in any 
one m ine-affected narion, rhere must be one national mine action pro-
gram controlled either centrally, or regionally b ur where each region 
is integrated with rhe other regions. (I]f you want to get a complete 
picture of rhe mine problem in any counrry, it is nor easy and you 
have to have a central organ ization ... fill ing in the database and pro-
ducing the rhrear maps and all rhe rest of ir. And if you get an army 
working off on tl1e side, not provid ing information into this database, 
bur having a little database of its own, which may not be compatible 
with IMSMA [rhe Information Management System for Mine 
Action], then you'll end up with information that is nor getting into 
the central, national mine plan. And if that quality assurance is not 
done in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards, 
you're really nor quire sure of what's going on."4 
Mr. Blagden cites the lack of following standards for major 
prob lems with dcm in ing in Iran, " ... where although areas have been 
cleared by rhe army, there have been so many accidenrs char rhe con-
tractors working there require the work to be done again by a proper 
mine clearance conrractor. What a waste of time and a waste of funds! 
If rhe work was done properly beforehand chen ir would have been 
alrighr. "4 H e also expressed his concern for the lack of safety of mili-
taty deminers who do nor follow these standards: "I am still though 
vety saddened when I hear of accidents amo ng the military. I'm espe-
c ially saddened when those accidents involve more rhan one person in 
an explosion, unless ir was an anti-tank or ami-vehicle m ine, in which 
case, ir's qu ire li kely to happen that way, provided rhe people were in 
a vehicle. T he reason for this is that when six peop le are hurt because 
rhey were all looking at an anti-personnel mine and somebody was 
rrying to pur a pin in it or at least sore of make it safe, I realize then 
rhat rhere was no dcmining d iscipline raking place at rhe site, rhar the 
safety regulations were being rorally ignored, that all the safety dis-
ranees char are compulsory for humanitarian deminers were being also 
ignored, and that as a result , valuable human lives were, to be honest, 
squandered, and I think char's a great piry .... "4 H e does believe, 
though , that militaries are starting to recognize the imporrance of fol-
lowing rhe example ser by non-mil itary mine action practitioners: " .. .I 
think eventually they will come around to being much nearer ro rhe 
NGOs' way of doing th ings and the commercial com panies' way of 
doing thi ngs. They are already in many cases adopting rhings like the 
l nrernarional M ine Action Standards ... [and] they are using the man-
agemenr software, IMSMA ... . "4 H opefully this trend will continue so 
that the integration of m ilitary and civilian deminers can be stream-
lined for improved cooperation. 
Although they may be reluctanr ro do so, m ilitaries should 
be more will ing to learn from the mine action communiry. H ugh 
Morris poinrs our thar because m ine action practitioners do demining 
full-rime, rhe military would be wise to learn from them: " .. . [S]oldiers 
that use mine detectors are trained in rhe usc of the m ine detector and 
they mighr use it fo r at rhe most five or six percenr of their time on an 
operation, whereas a commercial deminer ... uses a mine detector for 
eight hours a d ay every single day of his life in-theatre ... . " 1 Paddy 
Blagden is also a proponent of rhis idea: " .. . 1 don' t believe that armies 
who try to do humanitarian dem ining look sideways enough ar rhe 
h umanitarian mine clearing NGOs and commercial companies who 
do the job full- ri me. Because I th ink they would learn quire a lot .. .. 
(T]here have been considerable developments in rhe procedures and 
equipmenr available to NCOs, and I am constantly telling armies ... 
that rhey would be very wise to look at the kinds of equipments that 
are being used, and in fact, quire a lot of them are sensible enough to 
have done so already."4 
Another suggestion for improved cooperation is for the mil-
itary to provide supporr to rhe mine action community in matte rs the 
military may be better suited for rhan NGOs or commercial organiza-
tions and vice versa. Chuck Meadows, for example, believes " .. . the 
improvement is really one of being supportive of each other's goals in 
what we're doing. And in our case, that support is providing whatev-
er the necessary assets. For us rhat means financial assets, ir means 
equipment-it's worki ng rogerher in a partnership where there is 
understand ing rhat the hosr nation is still in charge, but being sup-
portive of what rheir needs are .... [I]t's nor a matter of manpower, ir's 
a matter of training and rhen being able to provide the necessaty 
equipment in cooperation with the other government officials that 
oversee thar work and efforrs."2 Paddy Blagden also suggests ways for 
the military to assist mine action practitioners: " ... I bel ieve rhe mili-
tary can help the NGO community immensely. T hey have equip-
ment, they have transport; they have barracks; rhcy have training areas. 
None of these things rhe NGOs have in nearly the same quantity . .. . I 
believe char rhere arc lots of army barracks thar are available rhar could 
make very good NGO headquarte rs-just let them have a corner of 
the barracks-and there are a lot of army training areas, which NGOs 
need for training themselves. It's very hard find ing a training area .... "4 
Such assets would be incredibly beneficia l for NCO or com mercial 
groups and are a way for the military to help without having to com-
mit irs own people where it may nor have the time, training o r logis-
tics ro do so. 
Along the lines of providing support but nor necessarily 
"on-th e-ground " manpower, some in the mine action community 
propose that m ilitary cooperation be more on rhe administrative side. 
Hugh Morris has had experiences wirh MincTech in which this type 
of cooperation has worked wel l. " .. . I do know of places where liaison 
with the militaty at the UN MAC level is very good, and that is where 
ir should rake place. And th is is where the military should be encour-
aged to open up to the people in the m ine action centers and mine 
action center managers should be selected in their ability ro get on 
with and operate alongside rhe milirary."l He continues, " I think that 
we can work particularly well together, and rhar should be encouraged 
ar rhe highest possible level, and I think this should be something that 
should be pur together p rior to rhe nexr war, that civilian organiza-
tions,NGOs arc brought in straight away to work alongside the mili-
tary, opera ring in support of rheir main aim, which again is force p ro-
tection, and then we can get on with our hu manitarian roles of clear-
ing up rhe problem fo r the local population." 1 
Conclusion 
I n many countries throughout rhe world, NGOs and com-
mercial demining companies are finding themselves having to coexist 
with militaries, wherher they be vis iring or indigenous. W h ile rherc are 
ch allenges to this coexistence, there have been success stories and rela-
tions are im proving constantly as borh sides starr ro bener understand 













l11is article is dedicated to tbe L'ictim~ we were unable to belp iu spite of all our efforts. 
Introduction 
After th e implementation of the UN Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) at the end of the tlrst Gulf War in 
1990, a medical team was set up in 1991 ro support the UN troops in 
their difficult tasks in the demilitarised zone (DMZ), a remote desert 
area between Kuwait and lraq. 1 The medical team was designed ro 
take care of the medical treatment for the UNIKOM members and the 
nomadic people living in the DMZ as pointed out in UN Secretary-
General rcporrs S/200 1/287 and S/200 1/913 on the official UN web-
sitc.2 
Despite the continuing mine clearance and the UN Mine 
Awareness Program on both sides of the DMZ, the management of 
mine injuries remained a challenging rask for our medical teams.3 In 
addition to these major problems, the usual day-to-day 
outpatient department (OPD) visits fo r the militaty and local staff 
personnel, dehydrations, scorpion bites, infectious diseases and road 
traftlc accidents also had ro be managed.4 During rhe tlrst few years, 
the medical duties and responsibilircs for rhc troops from 33 nations 
were carried out by an Austrian and later a Norwegian Medical Team 
(NORMED). In October 1995, this role was given to Germany, and 
since then, 15 voluntary German Medical Teams (GERMED I w 
15), equipped and managed by the Foreign Service of the Knights of 
Malta hom Cologne, were responsible fo r providing the emergency 
medical service (EMS) in the desert of the DMZ between Kuwait and 
Iraq until the second Gulf War began in March 2003.5 
Mine InJury-Related cxpenences During the 
Missinnc: From 1996 to ?00? 
The rescue area included 3,800 sq km of rhe DMZ and the 
remote desert surroundings. Five ambulances from three rescue sta-
tions with seven paramedics equipped with necessary supplies provid-
ed 24-hour service fo r the 1 ,200 UN personnel and the nearby 
nomadic population. During 200 I , there were about 4,000 regular 
OPD visits and about 50 calls for casualty evacuations (CASEVACS). 
Forry percent of the CASEVACs were mine-related and most of these 
injuries happened on the Iraqi side of rhe DMZ. Therefore, this prob-
lem was greater than the road accident problem and had a political 
component as well because the injuries happened in the Iraqi rerrito-
rics to the south of the DMZ where no domestic help was available for 
the victims. In many cases, the victims had to be transported to the 
southern paramedics rescue station to get access to the medical service 
carried our from rhe United Nations within this area. 
The mine clearing was always carried out by the 
TABLE 1: CASEVACs for GERM ED 12 










Argenrenian Engineering (ARGENG) demining specialists. During 
each of the 75 mine blasting days, ARGENG had to be accompanied 
by our paramedics. 
To prepare the medical teams for their new tasks, mine 
injury treatment guidelines and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) classit!cation of the mine-injured patients were dis-
cussed and compared with the regional mine injury epidemiology of 
previous missions. These basic prepara tions for the medical teams were 
usually accompanied by weekly concurrent medical education based 
on the advice of R. Coupland from ICRC as well as M. King and P. 
Bewes in their handbook Primary Surgery (on the web ar 
www.meb.uni-bonn.de/dtc/primsurg).G T he basic preparations also 
included training for special situations as well as some research abour 
possible tclcmedicine support for medical treatment in these remote 
areas.? The medical challenges in this remote area required the stric t 
cooperation of the medical team members wirh representatives of dif-
ferent disciplines within the multinational ON-peacekeeping military 
envtronment. 
The chain of rescue from the two forward medical posts out 
in the deserr to rhe UN level one hospital was equipped with rescue 
equipment nearly approaching the European Standard (EN), and the 
equipment had to be maintained within the extreme climatic circum-
stances, which included dust and temperatures up to 50 degrees 
Celsius. Long rescue rimes had to be managed in certain instances in 
rhe difficult environment of the desen. To achieve the minimal rescue 
by Dr. B.M. Schneider, V . Ehmann, M. Gebler, M. Pohlers, J . Bronnert, M. 
Schneider, V . Bartke, H. Woltering and B. Domres, WADEM Landmine Task Force 
times, rwo helicopters from Banair, a company that specializes in test-
ing equipment, or one of the rhree available ambulances had to be 
coordinated in the most eftlcienr manner. Unfortunately, sometimes 
rhe road conditions of the DMZ were nor easily manageable. 
The UN level one hospital was located in rhe UNIKOM 
headquarters. Therein basic life support could be provided and emer-
gency operations could be done under emergency anesthesia-both 
with limited resources. No X-ray, computerized tomography (CT) or 
intensive care units (ICUs) from known EN were available. Due to 
political reasons, the well-equipped Kuwaiti Health System was nor 
available for the Iraqi patients. After rhe emergency treatment by the 
United Nations, those patients had to be referred to their country. 
Based on the reports of the former medical reams, the figures of the 
missions were as shown in Table 2 . 
It is interesting to note that the number of mine 
incidents increased within the years of interest in sp ite of 
the improving mine clearance conducted by the ARGENG 
demining teams. 
TABLE 2: UNIKOM: Mine Injuries 










TABLE 3: Average Times for GERMED 12's 
CASEVACs 
Range Times 
Access Time 2-85 min 18 min 
Response Time 5-80 min 44 min 
Scene Time 10-75 min 28 min 
Transport Time 2-125 min 44 min 
1 
[Calculatt'd from 23 C4SEVACS (I 3 ground transport, I 0 air transport} 
- 3 hours) 
According to M. Helm, the chance of survival in these 
severe injuries lowers by one percent for every three minutes of rescue 
time. The Injury Severity Score (ISS) for the mine-injured patients 
from GERMED \2 varied from 50 to 2. According to the Trauma 
Injury Severity Score (TRISS), the survival probabilities resulting from 
these and other necessary parameters had to be calculated berween 9 .5 
percenr and 96.8 percent mostly depending on the complexity of the 
injuries described in Table 4. 
. : • -. 
Injury Pattern GERMED12 Total from 1996 to 2002 
Head 4 17 
Thorax 2 4 
Abdominal 2 37 
Limbs 7 88 
Upper Body 3 37 
Lower Body 4 51 
Both Sides 3 7 
Amputation > 32 
For comparison, read Husum and Strata 5 2002 report on measuring 
injury severity. 8 
In spite of the large number of injuries in the lower extrem-
ities, some individual patients' injury patterns with injuries only in rhe 
upper part of the body gave evidence that some of the patients had 
been handling UXO or mines before the explosions of Hazards No. 
TABLE 5: Fatalities Report 
(according to the UN documents2) 








TOTAL > 15 
III.2.1.2.9 
• The UN official reports only mention the ji~ttzlities. 
For comparison, read janunlu, Husum and Wisborg's rl'port. 10 
These figures extracted from the official UN documents arc 
to be seen as minimal figures. Some dead on-the-scene patients from 
accidents from outside the DMZ didn't get access to the help from the 
UN medical reams in time. The follow-up for patients mostly referred 
to care from the Basra hospitals with limited resources, which at that 
time were not accessible to UNIKOM authorities. 
t.,;onchJ<:Inn 
From the end of the t!rsr GulfWar (1991) until the begin-
ning of the second Gulf War in March 2003, UNIKOM attempted to 
guarantee the stability of this post-conflict area between Kuwait and 
lraq. Mine-related injuries remained the major problem fo r the EMS 
services. Most victims were young Iraqi civilians who had been enter-
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Appendix: Anaesthesia in the Field During the 
GERMED-12 Mission 
During the GERMED-12-Mission anaesthesia was started in the 
field. According to the recommendations of the UN Peacekeeping Mission, 
the paramedics did the basic-level medical support. An ambulance car was 
available at this level of primary care. The treatment included cardiopul-
monary resuscitation, haemorrhage control, fracture immobilisation, 
wound dressing, casualty transport and evacuation. There was the possibil-
ity of communication and reporting by radio, so the paramedic had to 
report the emergency situation to the doctor on duty at the operations cen-
tre. The medical treatment was coordinated on the advice of the emergency 
physician. 
For treatment and evacuation of casualties the tactical operation, 
casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) was started. Especially under the condi-
tions of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), 
a Forward Medical T earn (FMT) was sent to provide short-term medical 
support in the field. The FMT was transported by helicopter or ambulance 
car to the emergency scene. Both were equipped with modern emergency 
appliances and medicine. 
The task was to perform emergency resuscitation procedures: 
maintenance of airway, breathing, and circulation and advanced life sup-
port, haemorrhage control, and life- and limb-saving emergency procedures. 
Especially in GERMED-12 the physicians were trained to use 
Ketamine in combination with intubation and ventilation. Ketamine could 
be used in most wounded patients without problems. It proved to be very 
safe and had only a few side effects: 
• Hyper salivation: Atropine is necessary. 
• Hallucinations: Diazepam or midazolam was given to prevent 
these. 
• Increased blood pressure: Preferred medicine for hypovolaemic 
patients. 
The transportation time was sometimes over one hour (see Table 
3 on previous page) before arriving at the Level-One medical support facil-
ities. 
In our field hospital, it was possible to do surgery under general 
anaesthesia in an operating room. We used an apparatus from the Drager 
Company. We have administered general anaesthesia with nitrous oxide and 
oxygen in combination with Ketamine. One physician was the anaesthetist 
and two surgeons, one nurse, and one paramedic were on duty daily. 
At this level, we could perform limb and life-saving surgery. It 
includes laparotomy, thoracocentesis, wound exploration, and debridement, 
fracture ftxation and amputation. 
For post-operative monitoring at our ward, we have used emer-
gency medical equipment like mobile ECG and transportable respirators. A 
nurse or paramedic did the post-operative observation. 
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ical support from the different UN medical reams pro-
vided in the UN level one hospital in the former 
UNIKOM headquarters near Umm Quasr. 
The lessons learned have been used to estab-
lish the World Association for Disaster and Emergency 
Medicine (WADEM) Landmine Task Force to formu-
late an u pdate of WADEM's 1997 declaration on the 
mine hazard siruarion of rhe world at rhe beginning of 
the new millennium (preliminary URL: www.dismed-
master.de) . Further work has to be done ro learn more 
about rhe outcome and rhe rehabilitation of the surviv-
ing victims. For th is purpose, contacts have been estab-
lished to the reaching IC RC's Superfluous Injury or 
Unnecessary Suffering (S irUS) Project Team from 
Geneva, the UN Portfolio of M ine Action Projects 
Team in New Yorkl l as well as the journal of Mine 
Action and surrounding institutions. We are hoping that 
these contacts will help ro improve the living conditions 
of the survivors of landmines. 
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Jordan is a country ri ch rn history and beauty. 
Throughout the years, w ith the increase of tensions in 
the Middle East, Jordan has been forced to protect its 
borders. As a resu It, Jordan has become a major actor 
in the mine action community and has taken a different 
approach by promoting the use of its military for 
demining and its non-governmenta l organi zations 
(NGO s) for rehabilitation and mine awareness. 
History 
The first mines were laid in Jordan in 1948 during 
a war with Israel. Later, during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli 
War in 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank 
and developed a new cease-fire line, Jordan began planting 
more mines along its western border. In the 1970s, Jorda n 
experienced a Syrian threat, and numerous internal 
problems led to more mine planting. Thus, Jordan quickly 
moved from a mine-free country to a kingdom burdened 
with minefields along its western and northern borders. 
Over 15,000 acres of land, bountiful in natural 
resources and sacred sites, quickly became consumed with 
mines. The total number of landmines stretched beyond 
300,000, of which over 225,000 were laid by the Jordanian 
Armed Forces (JAF) and over 70,000 by Israel.! 
Before his death, His Majesty King Hussein called 
for the clearance of all minefields by the year 2000. In 
March 1993, the Jordanian government implemented its 
first phase in a three-phase demining plan. In 1998, Jordan 
signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty. Today, the govern-
by Kristen Frahler, MAIC 
ment continues to support numerous mine action conven-
tions and conferences, and submits updates on the status of 
its stockpile destruction program.2 
King Abdullah commissioned the National 
Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC) in 
MaKh of 2000. Th-is committee participates in vMious 
demining aspects from mine risk education (MRE) to mine 
clearance. New associations continue to emerge in Jordan, 
such as the Hashemite Society for Soldiers with Special 
Needs, Landmine Survivors Network, the In ternational 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Al Hussein 
Foundation for the Habilitation and Rehabilitation of the 
Disabled , and Queen Noor still plays an active role in dem-
ining. However , the Jordanian army's Royal E ngineers 
Corps (REC) remains the key force in demining.3 
Through the REC's success in Jordan, the army 
has begun to stretch its boundaries. Currently, the REC is 
working in Afghanistan in an effort to demine the country 
and return the land back to the Afghan people. Aiding 
Afghanistan in its move to rebuild a country torn apart by 
the Taliban is not only noble, but it will also provide the 
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Interview With a Jordan Military Mine Specialists 
Q: What skills does the milttary bring to humanitarian demining that humamtarian organizations might 
lack? 
A: The sole deminer in Jordan is the military's Royal Engineer Corps (REC). The military deminers are 
skillful, professional, highly motivated and adapting to tnrernational Jemining ~tandards. REC has led 
in the removal of mines from inhabited and agricultural :treas, rhus lowering che number of casualties. 
Through these operations REC's knowledge has increased in humanitarian aspects of demining, and 
they have exchanged importam information wich concerned parries. 
Q: How do you feel the military approach co mine action is d ilferem from the humanitarian approach? 
A: The military approach is diffe rent in that demining is only a small portion of their professional goal. 
Their main goal is to serve thei r coumry without concern for extraordinary remuneration. They never 
hesitate to do their duty, while trying to do their hesr in preserving their countrymen's lives and their 
equipment. 
Q : H.!.S the role of the Jordan military changed humanitarian demining: the methods used, the 
strategy, ccc .... ? 
A: Jordan's demining project has had its own challenges, which has led ro adopting special 
methods and strategies. These can only be achieved by che military chrough proper training, 
professionalism and discipline. 
Q: What challenges has che Jordan milttary experienced tn humanttanan demining operations? 
A: Many challenges were faced, which can be summarized in the following: 
- High temperatures and severe weather - Erosion and shifting minefields 
- Heavy vegetation -Sensitivity of mines due ro passage of rime 
- Deeply buried mines -Some mineficlds are in swampy areas 
Q: Can you tell me how the Jordan military became involved in Afghanistan? 
A: The Jordanian milirary went ro Afghanistan because of irs good repuration and to enhance Jordan's 
role in international humanirarian acciviries in respect to international agreements. 
Q: Whac goals does Jordan hope for t n Afghan tstan? 
A: That our operations in Afghanistan show Jordan's commitment to humanir.arian demining and che 
role we play in the international arena. 
Q: Have you experienced difficulties: Taliban, rebels, environment and dealing wtch other countries? 
A: Every job comes with difficulties. The REC found that pieces of UXO brought che most 
difficulty as they are very dangerous because there are many different rypes. 
Q: h rhere any added benefit tn ustng the mtlitary m Atghantstan instead of NGOs? 
A: We cannot answer that question, but we can say that in an uns.tfe environment iris becrer ro give the 
job to che military, as they can protect themselves. 
Q: I low do you coordinate efforts with NGOs? 
A: Presently, che National Commicree for Demining and Rehabilitation handles the coordination; how-
ever, originally REC was responsible for coordinating visics co demining sires. 
Q: What are some of the success scories in Afghanistan? 
A: We helieve the best success stories are shown through our numbers: 
-Area cleared: 225,000 sq m -UXO and mine removal: 473 -Total cost: $1.5 million (U.S.) 
Beyond the numbers, we have cleared roads, purified water and provided medical assistance. 
Q: Is the Jordan milttary currendy or thmktng about performmg demining operations in ocher coumnes? 
A: We are ready ro srudy any request through our chain of command . 
Q: What are the future plans or possibilines for the Jordan mihtary m hurnanitanan demining? 
A: The REC will continue demining in Jordan umil we achieve our goal of a "Jordan free of mine;." 
However, rhis will require no less than $150 million through coordination with the donors. 
Current REC Efforts 
The new estimated completion dare 
for rhe three-phase demining plan in Jordan is 
the year 2009.2 To dace, the REC asserrs ics 
clearance actions are progressing well, as it has 
cleared nea rly I 00,000 AP and ami-veh icle 
(AV) mines2 Ge neral Fayez Al-Dwairi, 
Commander of REC. told the Landmine 
Monitor Rrport that Jordan's first goal is co 
concenrrare on clearing land that w ill help 
improve Jordan 's eco nomy through develop-
ment, even though this land can be the most 
difficult co reclaim2 
Jo rdan is one of the many land-
mine- in fested countries in the Middle East. 
Thus, the REC's superior knowledge in dcm-
ining and Jordan's efforts to promote a mine-
safe world were the main reasons the interna-
tional community was delighted to have 13 
Royal Jordanian Engineer Corps d eminers 
d eploy ro Afghaniscan. December 2002 
marked Jordan 's first effort co participate in an 
international mine clearance operation. 
Afghanistan Efforts 
The Jordanian m ili ta ry, along w ith 
numerous coalition forces, is also raking part 
in Operation Enduring Freedom by sending 
soldiers to Afghanistan in an effort ro rebuild 
che country. After numerous banles a nd espe-
cially the Russian occupation in the 1980s, it 
is estimated rhar over I 0 million mines exist in 
Afghanistan, which cominue to severely hin-
der the international reconstruction efforts. 
Bagram Airbase 
The first d eploym ent of REC dem-
iners was stationed at the Bagram Airbase. By 
using the Aardvark chain flail system that is 
designed ro desrroy AP and AT mines while 
cuning th rough vegetation, over 23,100 sq m 
have been cleared by Jordanian REC dem-
iners.7 The Aardvark has been h ighly success-
ful, detonating 95 percent of the AP mines 
and I 00 percent of the AT mines. 
With the expertise and skills gained 
in Jordan, the REC demining ream provided 
in-depth knowledge co the demining opera-
tio ns in Bagram. This 13-member team con-
sisted of mechan ics, drivers, guides and main-
tenance specialises. Although the Jordanians 
have experienced great difficulty in demining 
their country, Afghanistan has proven to be 
even more challenging to the ream. The 
rugged terrai n and numerous batcles wich 
their associated debris forced the ream to 
replace rhc chains o n rhe flail once a week. 
The camaraderie at Bagram Airbase 
was valuable to the Jordanian ream. American 
fo rces provided "shelter , food and security for 
the engineers. "8 Other coalition forces provid-
ed maintenance and pans to rhe demin ing 
ream, w hile Afghans followed behind che 
Aardvark clearing the land of detonated 
mines. 
Kandahar Air Field 
Wich the completion ac Bagram 
ai rbasc, the Jordanian ream was redeployed for 
a three-month tour to Kandahar A ir Field 
(KAF) to clear the surrounding area. Their 
equipment did nor stand up as well as the 
ream members. The REC soon discovered rhe 
Aardvark's rotor was broken. Due to irs mas-
sive weight, five tons, the new rotor took four 
months co deliver from Britain. After prompt-
ly installing rhe new rotor, che 13-member 
rea m began working. 
Unfortunately, che REC team 
found it once more d ifficult to dem ine the 
debris-infested desert ground. The hammers 
located at the end of each chain, wh ich "deliv-
er one con of pressure and dig 12-20 inches 
in co the ground, for a coral of 72 tons of pres-
sure on a space chree inches wide and I 0 feer 
long,"6 were frequently desrroyed by rhe harsh 
gro und conditions. In fact, I st Lt. Ashraf Odar 
sta ted , "We scop every 15 minutes and check 
the rotor. W e replace about 10 hammers a 
day."6 The KAF demining proved to be a con-
siderably slower process chan Bagram A irbase. 
The Jordan REC demining team is 
o ne of rwo unics stationed at KAF. Jordan's 
team is led by the Task Force Devil mine 
action center, which searches for cleared land, 
new bui ldings and roads that can be con-
structed. Once rhe KAF is cleared and safe, 
coalition forces will turn ir over ro the Afghan 
governmenr. As Scaff Sgr. Oscar Rodriguez, 
U .S. Army 27th Engineer Battalion our of 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, stared, "Every 
inch they [the members of the Jordanian 
ream) clear is o ne more inch we can usc. And 
when we leave, it's ground the Afghan people 
can usc ."6 
Conclusion 
Jo rdanian mine action efforts by the 
military have cleared about I 00,000 mines 
since 1993. The REC has notably changed 
Jordan from a country constricted by mines to 
a country thriving in new developmenr. The 
Jordanian government felc the economic and 
social pain from m ines, buc rook action ro 
bring back the freedom they once had as a 
mine-free country. Now the government con-
tinues ics search for freedom and peace beyond 
the Kingdom 's borders. Jordan rakes an active 
role in che international arena and impacts 
nations by irs example of promoting mine 
clearance through mil itary demining efforts. 
On a WorldNec D ialogue among 
numerous countries, one Jordanian general 
urged fellow leaders ro pursue dem in ing 
efforts by using their militaries and to leave 
rehabilitation and mine awareness to NGOs. 
His strong endorsement of this "more benefi-
cial and effective" method of mine clearance 
will hopefully encourage other nacions to fol-
low sui r.7 Although Jordan has had great suc-
cess in its military demining effort, irs m ilitary 
clearance campaign has nor yet taken great 
effect around the world. NGOs remain the 
number one demining agents. Fortunately, 
Jordan continues to assert irs campaign by 
sending its experienced reams to m ine-infest-
ed regions such as Afghanistan and other pans 
of the world. 
• Photo c/o AP. 
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The objecrive of rhe Millen ni um Developmenr plan of rhe 
Unired Narions is ro "eradicate extreme poverty and hunger [and} guar-
tmtee the sttStttinabiliry of tbe environment. "Th rough rhe sel fless efforrs 
of rhe humanitarian dcmining programs in Central and South 
America by rhe U n ired Narions, rhe Orga nization of American Srares 
(OAS) and the lnrer-American Defense Board (IADB), the preceding 
objectives are being accom plished . Thus, I am overwhelmingly com-
pelled ro share rh e successes and sing the praises of the personal sacri-
fices taken on hy demining personnel. 
In rhis article, I seck ro manifest rhe experiences of rhe 
Armed Forces' h uman itarian dcmining reams stationed in mine-affect-
ed countries. T nformation expressing the imporrant roles of different 
military componenrs, i.e., hosr o r visiting military, will be given 
throughour rhis article. 
l:)acKQrouna 
The mandares for humanitarian d emining programs by rhe 
OAS were honored in rhe 32nd ord inary session of the General 
Assembly, where rhe following resolurions were approved: GAIRES 
1889 (XXXII-0/02) "Th e Wesrern Hemisphere as an anti-personnel-
landmine-free zone;" GA/RES 1878 (XXXll-0 /02) " Supporr fo r the 
program of ln regral Acrion against ami-personnel mines in Cenrral 
America;" and GA/RES 1875 "Suppo rt fo r action against anti-person-
nel mines in Peru and Ecuad or ." 
In 1998, the OAS's Unit for rhe Promotion of Democracy 
(UPD) created the Comprehensive Action Against Ami-personnel 
Mines (AlCMA) ro confront rhe complex, difficult and persistent 
aspects related ro crises caused by ami-personnel (AP) mines. In 1991 , 
rhe Assistance Program for Demin ing in Central America (PADCA) 
was incorporated wirhin rhe framework of rhe AlCMA per rhe requesr 
of numerous AP mine-affecred countries in Central America. A dis-
rincrive facer of rhe AICMA program is irs eminenrly humanitarian 
character. In conjunction with IADB, AICMA seeks ro rcsrore living 
conditions, increase rhe confidence of the inhabitanrs, reduce 
UXO/AP mine threars and dangers, and restore cleared land in mine-
affected areas for use in agricultu re and carrie-ranching acriviries. 
This program also covers rhe following fields of acrion: 
assistance in surveying, mapping, locating and clearing of minefields; 
mine risk education (MRE) fo r rhe civilian population; support for 
mine vicrims, including physical and psychological rehabilitation; 
socio-economic reintegration of mined areas; and supervision and sup-
porr for rhe desn·ucrion of stockpiled mines. The p rincipal responsibil-
ities of rhe U PD with in A!CMA are ro collect funds from the interna-
rional communi ry, administer and manage resources, and coordinate 
the program from a diplomatic and political perspective. The IADB is 
rhe enrity respo nsible fo r organizing a ream of international supervi-
sors for countries supported by rhe AICMA program. T hey are also 
responsible for providing technica l assistance, training demining 
rroops, and guaranreeing rhar rhe operation s are appropriate and com-
ply wirh international securi ry standards. 
The achievemenrs of rhe AICMA are due, in grear measure, 
to rhe invaluable and generous support of various Member Srares 
by Colonel Mell ado , IADB 
(Argenrina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Venezuela and the Unired Srates). These 
Member Scares have provided technical advis-
ers and supervisors through IADB. As well, 
rhc achievements of AICMA would nor have 
been accomplished wirhour the numerous 
con tributions of key inrcrnarional donors such 
as Germany, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South 
Korea, Denmark, Spain , rhe Unired Srares, 
Russia, the European Union, France, lraly, 
Japan, Norway, rhe United Kingdom and 
Sweden, among orhcrs. 
Furd1ermore, wirhour rhc narional 
commirmcnr and conrriburions from the ben-
eficiary countries of rhc AICMA program, 
where rh c.: Assistance Mission for Mine 
Clearance in Central America (MARM INCA) 
and the Assistance Mission for Mine 
C learance in Sourh America (MARMINAS) 
are operating, rhe key aspecr of rhe program's 
~trucrure would have been missing. In Cenrral 
America, rhe mission o f MARMINCA con-
tinues supporting rhe national efforts of 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, while 
rhe program in Cosra Rica has concluded. 
Likewise, within rhe mission of MARMINAS, 
rhe demining acriviries in Ecuador and Peru 
have gained momenrum. 
V1s1ons From on External 
)erspedive 
The acriviries relared to rhe support 
and rehabilirarion of people affected by mines 
make up rhe wide range of rasks and efforts 
from wh ich valuable experiences can be 
drawn. Some of rhe diverse rasks carried our in 
humanitarian demining require rhe participa-
tion and coordination of high-level OAS indi-
viduals. lr is imperative rhar rhese OAS offi-
cials provide incenrives for donors to con-
rribure and for rhese contributing countries ro 
provide Armed Forces officers to compose 
reams of supervisors and monitors. There also 
needs ro be a commirmenr and coord ination 
among rhe countries providing milirary forces 
and wirhin rhe differenr levels of governmenr 
of rhc beneficiary counrry. This enables large 
geographic extensions of land where land-
mines are impeding rhe developmenr of rhe 
region to be cleared. 
Through rhe coordinated efforts of 
civilian and milirary personnel, rhese objec-
tives arc being achieved. A testament ro this is 
Cosra Rica, which became rhe first country 
free of AP land mines through the successes of 
irs humanitarian demining program. Irs pro-
gram included joinr efforts by civilians and 
military organisms unired by the call to 
humanitarian service. Being conscious rhat 
rhis is nor a particular task of rhe Armed 
Forces, rhe perspective rhat is soughr wirhin 
rhis article is ro highlight rhe praiseworthy and 
self-sacrificing rask of milirary personnel. 
Drive and Dedication 
During one of rhe firsr field vis irs ro 
Honduras, an opportunity was presenrcd ro 
verifY rhe work and "drive" being carried our 
by military personnel in Cholureca. lr became 
cvidcnr rhar rhe responsibiliry of clearing 
mines in areas where rhe remperarure is nor-
mally higher rhan 35 degrees Celsius is nor an 
easy job. In addirion ro rhe remperarure, 
Hurricane Mirch added more difficulry to rhe 
















and depths, affecting their detection and 
destruction. However, these adverse condi-
tions did nor discourage the specialists nor 
decrease their d rive. 
T he successes of this work are the 
d irect result of the functions carried out by the 
international supervisors and monitors. These 
reams of professionals, army or marine offi-
cers, and non-commissioned officers, are rep-
resenrarives of diverse countries rhroughom 
the Americas. Their principal mission is to 
supervise dcmining tasks, ensure rhat opera-
tions follow international demining norms 
and provide for the safety of rhe soldiers rhat 
execute the tasks. In addi tion, they participate 
in the planning of the tasks related ro impact 
surveys and certifying that the work is being 
carried our in compliance with strict securi ty 
norms. In order to carry out rhcse tasks, they 
must arrend an intense training program in 
order ro be qualified. Wirh rime, camaraderie 
and a sense of purpose begin ro develop with-
in the demin ing teams; rhese aspects con-
tribute significantly to strengthening the ries 
between civilians and the military. Thus, the 
confidence and affection of the civilian popu-
latio n toward their soldiers are reinforced. 
On a daily basis, rhe ream coordi-
nates with national military authorities rhat 
are responsible fo r clearing their territories. 
They have the responsibility of suspending 
work if it is not being executed in accordance 
with established norms. However, they musr 
also observe the realities of the terrain and par-
ticular siwations and ensure that they do not 
become an impediment to the work, all while 
staying within the perspective of security. 
One of the most imporranr aspects 
o f rhis type of work, where the daily 
relationship of soldiers from diverse countries 
is motivated by the sense of serving a country 
and the international community, is rhe sig-
nificant increase in confidence and security 
rhe community gains. A situation that demon-
strates rhis rook place last year between Peru 
and Ecuador. These two governments com-
mitred to clearing areas in Peru and formed a 
sense of camaraderie as rhey worked toward a 
humanitarian objective. These efforts were 
significant in helping to overcome historical 
differences between nations and in calming 
the mine-related fears of Peruvians. 
Although confronted w ith hard 
work and transferred to border areas where 
memories of conflict can easily return, the 
teams strive roward the objective of cama-
raderie and a humanitarian end. This is seen 
in the displayed energy of sold iers as they 
demonstrate motivation for what rhey are 
doing. They can personally verif}r how recov-
ered terrain is now being utilized for agricul-
tural production in once-affected regions. 
Additionally, rhey directly receive the expres-
sions of fondness from rhe people when rhey 
see rheir lands cleared and rerurned. 
The unit commanders designated 
by the host country to direct these missions 
discover how their capacity ro manage can 
exceed borders. The resul t of rhei r efforts nor 
only is projected directly ro rhe communi ties 
of their own countries, but also remains 
inserted in the international community. This 
is because they have taken parr in an effort 
where various countries participate in human-
itarian objectives and goals. 
The d emining experiences carried 
our by Armed Forces personnel have achieved 
great results in respect to fulfi ll ing a job with a 
high incidence of security. These tasks have 
cleared terrai n contaminated by mines and 
have offered tranquility and secu rity to rhe cit-
izens rhar live in these sectors. Thus, rhe 
efforts of international organizations aimed 
toward peace and security in rhe hemisphere 




During 2003, important efforts 
toward the elimination of AP mines sown in 
Central America were accomplished. T he 
number of mines and UXO that have been 
destroyed as of August 31, 2003, reached a 
total of 28,793. The area cleared reached 
1,280,453 sq m among the coun tries of Cosra 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
In April 2002, MARMlNCA began 
ro support the humanitarian demin ing activi-
ties both in Peru and Ecuador. MARMINCA 
sent international supervisors on assignment, 
suppl ied technical assistance to rhe armies, 
and d ictated basic courses to the sappers and 
Demining Operation Planning. 
l n I 998, Ecuador and Peru initiat-
ed the task of eliminating mines from their 
respective territories. Both countries devel-
oped different methods for demining their ter-
ritories, realizing that their situations were dif-
ferent. Ecuador rarified the Ottawa 
Convention on April 20, 1999. Later, o n 
September 22, 1999, the Demining Center of 
Ecuador (CENDESMI) was created through 
Executive Decree Number 1297. In March 
2001, rhe agreement between Ecuador and 
the OAS was signed and pur into practice with 
the AICMA program. Peru, in turn, devel-
oped the first phase of demining operations in 
1999 with bilateral assistance from the United 
Stares and Canada. In May 200 I, the OAS 
and rhe Peruvian government signed the 
agreement for the coordination of internation-
al support, through rhe AICMA. On May I, 
2003, MARMINAS was created wi th head-
quarters in Zarumilla, Peru. 
onciUSIOn 
As an observer, I have seen the 
importance of humanitarian demining in 
Central and South America. The important 
and unselfish work carried our by rhe Armed 
Forces wi thi n the different roles that they exe-
cute is inspiring. Through this article, one can 
only visualize the great successes of the OAS 
and lA DB's coordinated efforts between civil-
ian and military organizations. Although nor 
well known, rhey have achieved a great degree 
of success in liberating countries from rhe 
threat o f AP mines, allowing for economic 
and developmental activities to boom in coun-
tries. It only remains to congratulate rhe 
efforts of all of the members of rhe demining 
battalions for rheir unselfish work, which 
make praiseworthy the activities of rhc mili-
taries today and project their role for rhe 
furure. 
Contact Information: 
First photo c/o JADE. 
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Inter-American Defense Board 
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In November 2003, rhe Stares 
Parries ro the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) met in 
Geneva and agreed ro rhe creation of a fifth 
protocol on explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). 1 This new international humanitari-
an law is designed ro minimise the risks and 
effects of ERW in the post-conflict period. 
While rhe Ottawa Convention has 
focused attention on the issue of AP land-
mines, the mine action community has long 
known rhar in rhe post-conflict environment, 
rhere are many different explosive hazards that 
can be found. In 2000, ir was rhe high num-
ber of injuries caused by cluster bomblcts in 
Kosovo that led rhe lnrernarional Committee 
of the Red C ross (I CRC) to call fo r new inter-
national law to address ERW2 Three years 
later, the new "Proto col on Explosive 
Remnants of War" was concluded. 
The new protocol is a recognmon 
by rhe states of the serious post-conflict 
humanitarian problems caused by ERW. The 
protocol contains 11 articles and a separate 
(non-binding) technical annex. These articles 
specify post-conflict remedial measures of a 
generic nature co minimise rhe humanitarian 
risks and effects of ERW. The main articles in 
this p rotocol are Article Two, which provides 
definitions of explosive ordnance (EO), UXO, 
abandoned EO and ERW, thereby becoming 
a legal term in international law;3 Article 
Three, wh ich covers clearance, removal or 
destruction of ERW; and Article Four, on rhe 
recording, retaining and transmission of infor-
mation. 
The future successful impact of the 
protocol will d epend on how the states imple-
ment irs contents. There is scope for differen t 
interpretations of whar is requi red from signa-
tories. However, if we rake a positive view and 
by Paul Ellis, Technology and Standards Expert, 
GICHD 
assume the states enact all measures of the pro-
tocol and the technical annex, the main differ-
ence for rhe members of mine action commu-
nity will be to make their job easier and more 
efficient in the post-conflict period. 
First, the disciplines of mine clear-
ance and mine risk education (MRE) should 
benefit. 4 T he prorocol makes Stares Parries 
responsible, to varying degrees, for the provi-
sion of resources (technical, financial, material 
and personnel) to undertake work in these 
areas. What is nor clear, however, is how many 
and through which channels resources will be 
allocated. The protocol allows for the states ro 
undertake work in such areas as clearance, sur-
vey and MRE, either directly or via a third 
parry (which could be rhc U nited Nations or 
other supra-national body) or other parries 
involved in post-conflict clearance, such as 
no n-governmental organisations (NGOs).5 
There may be a concern rhar mili-
tary forces, with little understand ing of the 
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List of the Articles in the Protocol on 
Explosive Remnants of War11 
Preamble 
Article I: General provision and scope of 
application 
Article 2: Definitions 
Article 3: Clearance, removal or destruction 
ofERW 
Article 4: Recording, retaining and transmission 
of information 
Article 5: Other precautions for the protection of 
the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects from the risks and effects of ERW 
Article 6: Provisions for the protection of 
humanitarian missions and organisations from 
the effects of ERW 
Article 7: Assistance with respect to existing ERW 
Article 8: Cooperation and assistance 
Article 9: Generic preventive measures 
Article I 0: Consultations of high contracting 
parties 
Article Il: Compliance 
Technical Annex: Contains the suggested best 
practice for achieving the objectives contained in 
Articles 4, 5 and 9 of this protocol. High 
contracting parties will implement this technical 
annex on a voluntary basis. 
* Part 1: Recording, storage and 
release of information for UXO and 
abandoned EO 
* Part II: Warnings, MRE, marking, fencing 
and monitoring 
* Part III: Generic preventive measures 
come from the release 
of information. The 
protocol asks the states 
and parties to an 
armed conflict to pro-
vide information, as far 
as practicable, to assist 
mine action. The spe-
cific list of information 
is provided in the tech-
nical annex and 
includes: the targets 
for EO, approximate 
amoums used, the type 
and nature of EO, and 
general locations of 
known and probable 
UXO. Further, provi-
sion is specifically 
made to provide infor-
mation on abandoned 
munitions, including 
rhe location, approxi-
mate numbers and 
types of munitions 
abandoned. Of partic-
ular relevance to clear-
ance and MRE is the 
recommendation that 
information on UXO 
should include meth-
ods o f identification 
and methods for the 
"safe disposal" of EO.? 
Agai n, while the path 
by which information 
is passed is not precise, 
the text of the protocol 
is clear that NGOs are 
included as possible 
recipients of informa-
tion.S 
The key to rhe 
rake a more acti ve role. Recem studies suggest 
that military units are not ideally suited to all 
aspects of mine action, though they do have 
some relevam capabilities. 6 U nder the proto-
col, it could be argued that we will see the mil-
itaty playing an increased role. However, it is 
unlikely that we will see rhe military emering 
mine action in larger numbers than in previ-
ous rimes. T he world's militaries, with limi ted 
resources and a large number of competing 
tasks, will probably continue to welcome rhe 
assistance of mine action organisations. 
Indeed, rhe protocol repeatedly states rhar 
stares can use a third parry to deal with ERW. 
T he second positive impact will 
military-mine action 
community relationship will be rhe imple-
mentation of rhe Protocol V articles. In many 
countries, contingency plann ing for post-con-
flier work is already done jointly by aid organ-
isations and governments. This work now 
needs to be expanded to ensure that military 
forces also rake into account the requirements 
of the protocol on ERW. T hese issues are nor 
something that can be field-tested, but by 
engaging with the political and military actors 
now, NGOs can at least provide evidence of 
rheir experience in these matters, which states 
will hopefully recognise as useful for imple-
menting the protocol on ERW. 
The Fifth Protocol is not perfect. 
Many believe thar the language is roo condi-
tional, and these caveats allow stares ro do lit-
de and yet still legally fu lfil their obligations. 
Many would have liked rhe technical annex to 
be legally binding. Many of the cri ticisms are 
right; from a humanitarian point of view rhe 
p rotocol could have been stronger. However, 
diplomacy such as these negotiations over the 
last three years is rhe art of rhe possible. The 
coordinator of the discussions on ERW, 
Ambassador Chr is Sanders of rhe 
Netherland s, stated in the final session of 
debate that in h is view, the text was the best 
that could be achieved at the timc.9 
Ambassador Sanders is the only person who is 
fu lly aware of the haggling and compromises 
required to ger to the final rext; his judgement 
that the protocol was the best the process 
could produce is probably accurate. 
For proponents of a stronger proto-
col there was some risk to continuing the d is-
cussions. T he alternative to not agreeing in 
November 2003 would have been to p rolong 
the discussions for at least another year, if not 
more. There were many States and NGOs who 
were concerned that furthe r negotiatio ns 
would result in a further weakening of the text. 
The issues had, after all, been exhaustively de-
bared and few could see what new grounds for 
discussion existed. Significanrly, many of the 
srates who agreed w the protocol are nor part 
of the Ottawa Convention, including India, 
Pakistan, Russia, China and the United States. 
Overall, rhe protocol has the agreement of 92 
nations, although the states still have to indi-
vidually sign the protocol.' 0 
If the Fifth Protocol contributes 
anything, it is a requirement rhar rhe states 
now consider the humanitarian impact of 
ERW and they have some guidance on the 
measures rhar can be used to reduce the effects 
in the post-conflict environment. Much will 
depend on how the states will implement the 
protocol. Some of the states have already start-
ed to consider the implications of rhe proto-
col-the United Kingdom used the 2002 
Gulf Conflict to rest some of its ideas for deal-
ing with ERW, such as in formation provision 
to clearance organisations. 
The challenge ahead is to ensure 
that the protocol is implemented in the 
strongest possible manner. While the text of 
rhe protocol carries many caveats, such as 
"where feasible" and "where possible," it is for 
states to d ecide how to incorporate the terms 
of the protocol into their military doctrine. 
The importance of bow the protocol is imple-
mented is perhaps most clearly shown with 
regard to the technical annex. The annex sets 
out clear requirements on the provision of 
information for ordnance used , the obliga-
tions concerning abandoned munitions and to 
whom information is to be given; however, ir 
is all voluntary. The provisions of the tech ni-
cal annex are nor onerous, and it might 
become a measure of a stare's commitment to 
dealing with ERW as to whether or not they 
adop t the technical annex along wirh the for-
mal protocol. 
The mine action community could 
- and should-provide a pivotal role by 
engaging with policy makers wherever possi-
ble ro ensure that states introduce the terms of 
the protocol and the technical an nex into their 
military doctrine. For example, the mine 
action community can provide field experi-
ence to illustrate the importance of informa-
tion provision in reducing the humani tarian 
impact of ERW. For organisations involved in 
mine action, now is the opportunity to try to 
influence how the protocol is implemented. 
Where countries require national legislation to 
enact rhe protocol, political pressure can be 
used to ensure that a state introduces all meas-
ures of the p rotocol and perhaps goes even 
further, for example, by making the provisions 
of the technical annex legally binding. Once 
procedures and laws are written , ir will be 
much more difficult to persuade governments 
to rewrite rhem. H ow stares implement the 
rreary is where the furure success of the proto-
col will be decid ed. 
I. The full title of rhc convention is ''The Convemion 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on rhe Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons \XIhich May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects." 
The framework convention has five prorocols, which ban or 
restrict rhe use o f various types of weapons that are deemed 
to cause unnecessary suffering or affect ei ther sold iers or 
civilians indiscrim inately. The weapons covered include: 
weapons thar leave undetectable fragments in the body 
(Prorocol I); mines, booby-traps and ot·her devices 
(Prorocol II , amende d in 1996); incendiary weapons 
(Proroeol Ill); blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV); and 
ERW (Prorocol V). A5 of March 2004, rhere were 92 states 
that were party to the convenrion. 
2. For a history of how the ERW process began and 
was developed, see: "Explosive Remnants of War: The 
Impact of Curren t Negotiations," Paul Ell is1 journal of 
Mine Action. Issue 7 .1 , April 2003; and "' Explosive 
RemnarHS of\XIar: The Negotiations Contin ue," Paul Ellis, 
Journal o[Mi1u Actio11, i>sue 7.2, August 2003. 
3. The definition of EO excludes mines, booby tra ps 
and orher devices as defined in Prorocol I I of rhe CCW. 
While there is rarely a clear disrincrion between rhe location 
of mines and UXO. booby traps and rdued devices could 
nor be included in rhis protocol on ER\V for legal reasons, 
as they already had their own Prmocol (II. amended 1996). 
4. Vicrim assistance does nor have the same promi-
nence in Protocol V as in [he Onawa Convention. The 
issue of how much prominence to give tO vicrim assistance 
was strongly debated. A number of countries, parricubr lr 
South Africa, argued for much !ltronger provision for this 
area. ln the end it was nor possible ro do more rhan include 
ir as a paragraph in Article 8 on Cooperat ion and 
Assistance. 
5. Article 3 of the prowcol on "CIC"arance, Removal or 
Destruction of ER\Xf.'' paragraph 5. states: "High 
Contracting Parries shall cooperate, where appropriate, 
both among themselves and with other states, relevant 
regional and inrcrnarional organisations and non·govern~ 
memaJ organisations on the provision of inter alia tcchn i~ 
cal, financial, material and human resources assistance 
including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of 
joint operations necessary ro fulfil rhe provisions of this 
Art icle ... 
6. See Tbe Role ofth' Military in M i11e Action, GICHD, 
2003. 
7. The rechnical annex has adopted many of the in for~ 
marion requirements thar the rnine action community 
asked for, see the report Explmivt' Rttnnmw of \f'nr-
Jnfonnmion Requiremen/s, G ICHD, 2003. 
8. In Technical Annex l.c.ii, it is stated that: 
"Recipient: The information should be released ro rhe party 
or parties in conrrol of rhe affecred territory and to those 
persons or insti tutions that the releasing Stare is satisfied 
are, or will be, involved in UXO or AXO !abandoned 
explosive ord na nce] clearance in the affected area. in the 
edu cation of rhe civilian population on rhe risks of UXO 
and AXO." 
9 . Paul Ellis' personal norcs from the Meeting of the 
Group of Government Experts to the CC\'7, Geneva, 24 
November 2003. 
I 0. The protocol will come inro fOrce six months after 
the 20th rJ.tification by a srare. 
11. T he full tt:xt of rhe convenrion in rhe six l anguage.~ 
of rhe United Narions can be fo und on rhe GICHD web-
sire at: http://www.gichd.ch/CCW/index.htm or rhe UN 
Departmen t of Disarmament Affai rs websir~: hrtp:// 
disarmamenr2.un.orglccw/index.html, accessed 29 March 
2004 . 
* Photo c/o JCRC. 
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Paul Ellis 
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Rethinking Humanitarian Demining Efforts, continued 
from page 27 
Conclusion 
So where do we go from here? 
Although our focus is to eliminate donor 
funding in rl1c future, we are worki ng with the 
IC and the BHMAC ro generate donor fund-
ing for rhe initial equipment costs. We are 
confident that lC donors will support this ini-
tiative based on rhe much-improved rate of 
return for their investment in this future EU 
member. Over the next few months, the team 
will be working with the SFOR AF BiH 
Restructuring Working Group to integrate 
rh is demining initiative into rhe future of 
BiH. Based on guidance from the OHR, the 
new military structure for BiH is to be imple-
mented in Januaty of 2004. The Defense 
Review Commission is working diligently to 
resolve any legislative or legal roadblocks fo r 
restructuring success. lf we are successful, the 
ream sees this as the beginning of a new era fo r 
coalition military operations. BiH is at a cross-
roads in its history where it may be the best 
suited and most capable country to help coali-
tion countries make this paradigm shift. 
References 
I. MNB(N) Mine Cell Records. June 2003. 
2. BHMAC Brochure, 2002. 
3. Widely accepted by BHMAC, SFOR and industry 
conracts. 
4 . Based on interviews with International Community 
financial and diplomatic acrivirics. 
5. UNDP Landmine Monitor Report. 2002. 
6. Stephanie Schlosser, "The Slovcnian International 
Trust Fund for Demining-Help On rhe \X!ay ... It's 
Already Here. " Journal of Mine Action, Issue 4 . 1. Available 
online: hrrp://maic.jmu.edu/journ:.l /4.1/s lov/rrut.hrm . 
7. Estimate based on the operational rates of the pro-
posed mechanical sy~rems for the H DBN and the know 
performance rates of rhe AF BiH manu:.l demining reams. 
Contact Information: 
MAJ Tom Barnett 
E-mail: thomas.c.barnett@us.army.mil 
CPT Kyle Shaffer 
E-mail: william.k.shaffer@us.army.mil 



































The Sdok I<ok Thorn 
INTEGRA TED DEMINING PROJECT 
The Sdok Kok Thorn Project in Thailand was an ideal 
project in o rder for the Japan Alliance for Humanitarian 
Demining QAHDS) to create a mine clearance capability. The 
project site was compact, easily accessible and the vegetation var-
ied from sparse to very dense, which made it possible to create a pro-
gressive training scheme of increasing complexity. This allowed the 
mine clearers to progress in steps towards the most difficult and chal-
lenging stages. One of the main points of the project was to incorporate 
a high degree of integrated demining, i.e. , demining using rhe three major 
tools in the mine clearer's toolbag: manual clearers, machines and mine 
detection dogs. This was only possible due to th e generosity and cooperation 
of rhe T hailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) and specifically their Thai 
M ilitary H umanita rian Mine Actio n Un it 1 (HMAUJ), based no r far fro m Sdok Ko k 
Thom in Aran yaprarher, w hich allowed JA H DS w use some o f thei r mechan ical equip-
ment and also rheir dog ream s. T he p ro jeer was co mpleted and rhe sire was hand ed back co 
rhe Sa Keo province on January 23, 200 4. 
What is Integrated Demining? 
Integrated mine clearance is not a 
new concept, bur rather one rhar has developed 
over rime with the combination of increasing 
experience and advancing technologies aiming 
to achieve the most cost-effect ive mine and 
UXO clearance possible given the available 
resources. Integrated mine clearance involves 
the application of a range of tools, technology 
and procedures in rhe mosr logical and cost-
effective combination to clear suspected mined 
areas safely in rhe shortest possible time. 
Integrated demining is increasingly being used 
as more managers gain experience with rhe use 
of machines and dogs. Some of rhe more expe-
rienced non-governmental organizat ions 
(NGOs), including Norwegian People's Aid 
(NPA) and Mensehen gegen M inen (MgM; 
People Against Landmines), use all three com-
ponent tools. The potential for high cost-effec-
tiveness is great, bur the potential for waste and 
low efficiency is also grear. 
The advantages and d isadvantages 
of rhe three components of demining 
ope rations are well-known. Manual mine 
clearance is slow and potentially dangerous, 
bur ir can be efficient. M ine detection dogs 
can speed up mine clearance, bur are 
expensive and can be unreliable. Machines can 
also speed up the process of mine clearance, 
bur can be a heavy initial investment and 
require consid erable maintenance and logistic 
support. On rhe other hand, when used 
together as an integrated system, they can 
make mine clearance faster, safer and more 
cosr-effecrivc. 
Methodology of Integration 
The integration of rhe rhree di ffer-
ent components ar Sdok Kok Thorn was the 
responsibility ofjohan Van Zyl, who had con-
siderable demining experience from his work 
in southern Africa and the Balkans. Before 
mine clearance could srarr, he had to assess rhe 
most effective methods of clearance rhar could 
be deployed for rhe rask. The fi rst factor was 
the size of the project area with special atten-
tion to rhe rype of soil, the gradient and rhe 
vegetation. T his was established by a technical 
su rvey, which also enabled rhe manager to 
divide rhe area into manageable blocks accord-
ing to natural fearures and boundaries, such as 
roads, footpaths and walls. T he ground at 
Sdok Kok Thorn was firm and relatively 
stone-free with no major slopes and a rural 
area of about 407,000 sq m. The area was ini-
tially d ivided into nine blocks. One block, 
which was a silted-up lake, was liable to mud-
diness or even flooding, so work on ir had to 
be completed by the end of the d ty season. 
The nexr factor was an assessment 
of rhe mine threat. There was a known Khmer 
Rouge camp in rhe area, bur parrs of rhe work-
sire were already well-rrodden by rhe local 
people. T he mines were mostly C hinese type 
69 bounding fragmentation mines along with 
some UXO. These were in the middle and east 
of rhe sire and were laid for protection in rhe 
directio n that the Khmer Rouge expected rhe 
Vietnamese forces to arrack. In some cases, rhe 
mi nes were still active- a tenth block was 
added to the contracr following a mine inci-
dent involving a Thai border patrol soldier 
close to rhe original project area. T hreat infor-
mation came from rhe natio nal Level I Survey 
reports, rhe TMAC database, rhe local mili-
raty commanders, soldiers and ex-soldiers, 
police, local au thorities and villagers, and was 
in general accurate enough for planning and 
training purposes. As the mines in the area 
were predominantly rripwirc-acrivared mines, 
any tripwires rhar had nor corroded had to be 
removed by mechanical operation or during 
rhe manual clearance process. 
A further factor was rhe assessment 
of resources. T he resources available were 
manual deminers from General C harrichai 
C hoonhaven Foundation (GCCF), starring 
wirh 14 initially inexperienced staff recruited 
from local villages, bur by rhe end of rhe proj-
by Paddy Blagden, International Mine Action 
ecr increasing to a sraff of 45 well-trained indi-
vid uals. All deminers were trained in a special 
four-week civilian demining course o rganised 
and carried our by TMAC, which concentrat-
ed o n the immediate clearance needs. All dem-
iners were trained o n the CEIA Mil-D I mine 
detecto r, wh ich gave excellent resulrs, even in 
larerirc soils. For machines, JAHDS was forru-
nare in being able ro borrow U.S.-fund ed , 
T MAC-owned machin es from H MAU l; a 
brush deminer (BDM 48), and later a Tem-
pest 3 and a Pearson Surviv able D mining 
Tractor and Tools (SDIT). JAHDS itself 
owned a Hitachi BM307 brushcurrer. JAHDS 
was also allowed to use between rwo and duee 
HMAUI dog reams when they were nor 
deployed elsewhere. 
Although availabil ity of dogs and 
machines fluctuated, overall rhe resources 
available mad e for an effective " toolbox" fo r 
rhe project. T he BDM 48 and Hitachi were 
effective in clearing dense und ergrowth , as 
well as preparing rhe ground with rhcir rotat-
ing milli ng heads. The Tempest mini-flail was 
used for vegetation clearance in and around 
trees, rh us minimizing rhe damage to the local 
environment. The SDIT was effective in 
prepari ng the ground before rhe manual oper-
ation starred, which sped up the clearance 
process and made it safer for rhe manual oper-
ators. Ir nor o nly removed vegetatio n, bur rhe 
ground-contact magnet of rhe sorr also 
sped up the man ual process by removing rhe 
majority of meral fragments from rhe area to 
be searched by rhe manual reams. This fearu rc 
eliminated borh a large percentage of false sig-
nals in the manual reams' derecrors and a sub-
sequent waste of detection rime. When used 
in combination wirh a rake or plough , which 
loosened rhe ground up ro 20 em, and by 
repeati ng rhe process with multiple sweeps, 
clearance using magnets proved ro be highly 
effective and removed an estimated 80 percent 
of metal debris from rhe soil. The dog reams 
were used ro assist rhe manual deminers fol-
lowing vegetation clearance and for verifica-
tion purposes. T hey identified a considerable 
number of rhe mines found. 
From these assessments, ir was pos-
sible ro scr up a clearance plan. Each individ-
ual block received individual attention and 
was allorred rhe clearance methods rhat were 
the most applicable. Teams were rasked, rhe 
equipment was disrribured (depending on 
ava ilability) and rhe projecred completion 
dares were recorded. This allowed the genera-
tion of a flexible, safe and cosr-cffecrive oper-
ation. Because of the flexibility provided by 
the cooperation wirh T MAC and HMAU I , ir 
was possible to retain all the clearance compo-
nents (i .e., manual reams, dog teams and 
machines) in balance with each other, so no 
resources were wasted by being present bur 
inactive. This balance was only achieved by 
rhe rho rough knowledge and experience of the 
capabilities of all components under a variery 
of working conditions. 
Implications of the Sdok Kok 
Thorn Project 
In summary, the Sdok Kok Thorn 
was a good project on which ro carry our inte-
grated mine action. Every mine action sire is 
different, bur rhe principles and methodology 
used ar Sdok Kok Thom were general enough 
to be used in a wide spectrum of scenarios and 
will be used again in the next JAHDS project. 
JAHD S was lucky to have rhc support of 
T MAC and especially HMAU I, which 
allowed rhc usc of a range of equipment nor 
usually ava ilable to small NGOs. The civilian 
mine clearers of rhe GCCF proved ro be very 
effective despite rhe facr that rhis was the first 
project in Thailand where civilians were used 
as d eminers. Again , rh is project was fu lly sup-
ported by rhe all-miliraty TMAC. The success 
of rhe Sdok Kok Thorn Project may pave rhe 
way for more civilian mine clearance in 
Thailand. JAHDS also enjoyed rhe sup port of 
rhc governor of Sa Keo province and rhe 
Ministry of C ul rure. T hrough good ream-
work, rhis integrated project was successfully 
concluded both quickly and safely-making ir 
an cxcelknr starr fo r JAHDS' efforts in mine 
clearance. 
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Mine Tech International (MTI) has been stationed in south-
ern Iraq since May 2003, working o n humanitarian mine and ammu-
nition clearing projects, and as part of irs brief history, working to 
deliver rapid response demi ni ng support for the United Nations 
Office of Project Services (UNOPS). 
MTI flm arrived in Basrah wirh a ream of around 90 explo-
sive ordnance d isposal (EOD) and m ine clearance professionals 
including m ine detecting dogs (MODs) and dog handling teams. Four 
und • 
20 years . Ammunition that should have been destroyed has been 
dumped in rural areas-much of which has deteriorated over rhe years 
due to the high saline comem in rhe soil. 
Added to this is the large amount of ammunition stockpiled 
by the Iraqi milita1y chroughom rhe region. With the breakdown of 
law and ord er, much of this ammunition has been removed from stor-
age so chat the copper, b rass and alumin ium componenrs can be sep-
arated and sold in Iran. The result is char rhe conrenrs of mun itions 
crates have been abandoned and spread over a wide area. There is also 
rhc rhrcar of loose propellant having been widely scattered when loot-
ers trashed ammu nition emergency survey reams were 
also deployed to carry our 
Level 2 technical surveys, ini-
tially to locate and identify 
explosive renanrs of war with-
in rhe southern Basral1 gover-
nare using rhc Information 
Management System for 
M ine Action (TMSMA) for-
mat. H owever, in June 2003, 
MTI's survey teams were 
retasked to conduct the 
National Emergency Survey, 
with rhe prime focus of gath-
ering informacion to measure 
the effect of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in south-
ern Iraq. As a result, eight 
survey teams have been work-
Despite the dangers, local people appear 
to be. largely unperturbed about the risks within 
their communities. This cr'eated some problems 
srorage facilities. This has 
created safety issues nor 
only for rhe local popula-
tion bur also for the EOD 
reams dealing with the 
resulting mess. for the MTI survey teams who were frequently 
told that there was nothing dangerous within the 
community when, in fact, there were stockpiles 
of ammunition. More often than not, the chil-
dren, shepherds and nomads proved to b'e the 
best source of information on the whereabouts of 
dangerous areas-not the village elders. 
In rhe first few 
months of activity, the 
mine clearance teams made 
a concentrated effort ro 
help farmers gain access co 
their land in rime co pre-
pare fields for cultivation, 
removing cluster m u nitions 
from agricultural land in 
the Az Zubayr region, near 
Kuwait. 
ing to identify populated areas withi n each of rhe eight governates in 
southern Iraq and ro identify rhe dangerous areas chat are within close 
proximity to villages . 
Southern Iraq comprises eight governatcs from Baghdad to 
the Kuwait border in the south. The area is bounded by Saudi Arab ia 
to rhe west, Kuwait in the south and a long land border with Iran to 
the east. T he area has experienced rhree major conflicts: the Iran/Iraq 
War ( 1980-1988), the Kuwait Campaign (Gulf War) from 
1990- 1991, and most recenrly Operation Enduring Freedom. I n their 
wake is an enormous accumulation of explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) among which rhc local people have been living wirh fo r rhe lasr 
Basrah 
The survey reams, initially working in Basral1, encounrered 
a large amount of ordnance rhar had been lcfr over from rhe Iran/Iraq 
War, in particular a high concentration around the Shan At Arab 
waterway, which was subject to heavy fighting. There had been no 
ancmpr by Iraqi governmenral organisations ro make the area safe for 
the local population. One particular minefield along the Shan At Arab 
water course is situated in a marshy area wirh up to 1.5 m of water in 
some places. The locals usc dug our canoes to go about their business 
for fear of detonating mines. T heir animals, on rhe orher hand, wade 
by Jo Foster, Wide Blue Yonder LTD. 
in ro graze and regularly fall victim to rhe mines. 
In rhe first week of July 2003, rhe Survey Teams deployed 
to the oil facility in AI Fao township. The teams surveyed from the 
lower At Fao peninsula northwards. H ighlights included the location 
and survey of a major minefield to rhe north of At Fao that is hamper-
ing and blocking the rebuilding of homes, cultivation of agriculrural 
land and fish ing activities. The minefield was laid during rhc I ran/Iraq 
War and has a heavy metal contamination. The local people are clear-
ing mines and UXO where they are identified. 
South of Basrah, rhe teams found large quantities of 
ordnan ce ranging from stored ammunition to abandoned 
explosive ordnance (EO) from rhc last three conflicts. The EO was in 
varying states of conditio n and stabi li ty, with most sites 
containing large quantities of loose propellant scarrered among the 
munitions. Additionally, another mined area was located 400-500 m 
south of the greater c iry limits of Basrah, which the MTI 
manual clearance teams cleared. 
Of all rhe governates surveyed, Basrah posed the most chal-
lenges to the survey teams. It had a high number of internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) with in rhe province who were creating their 
own communities with "villages" literally springing up overnight. In 
the end it was decided that if rhe people considered themselves to be a 
communiry, rhen rhey would be surveyed as one. In practice, this 
meant reams were covering a far larger n umber of communities than 
the original mapping information suggested. T he survey reams had to 
travel the road systems and rely on local sou rces of information to be 
able to guaranree they had picked up the required information and 
covered all of the villages in rhe area. Additionally, there was ERW 
strewn across rhc province from three previous conflicts. T he levels of 
ERW contamination, particularly in the Basrah governate, led the sur-
vey reams having to complete m ul tiple dangerous areas for individual 
villages. 
To rhe north of the province, rhe teams ran into security 
problems such as being warned off from entering certain areas, 
encounrering potential h ijack situations or having to address funda-
mental issues such as lack of electricity, water, medicine, and law and 
order. 
The Threat From Border Minefields 
Compared to rhe EOD problems, mine clearance issues in 
Iraq are of much less consequence, largely because there are few, if any, 
minefields in rhe country and these are mainly scattered defensive 
minefields located around a few ex-Iraqi mil itary installations and are 
considered to be strategic installations, such as oil and gas fields or 
refi neries. The significant exception is the entire length of rhc eastern 
border wirh Iran, which has been heavily mined, denying access to 
thousands of hectares of land. Currently, rhe Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) does nor wish any clearance of the border mineflelds, 
although MTJ personnel have completed a specific six-week mine 
clearance task to create a safe area around a key border-crossing water 
point. As movement restrictions have lifted, more people arc moving 
to rhe Iran border, where the grazing is untouched. T hey are moving 
into mineficlds that are extremely dangerous and cannot compare with 
anything in MTI's experience. In the short rime worki ng in rhe bor-
der area, MTI personnel have evacuated six civilians who were injured 
after returning to the minefields with their livestock. Although rhe 
barrier minefields in the border regions arc known, ir has been report-
ed that the area is prone to flooding during the wet season and conse-
quenrly mines migrate into areas where people conduct agriculrural 
activiry- in some cases preventing farmers from producing crops. 
Mine awareness educarion will be viral to protect rhe families who are 
now returning to rhe area if nothing is done to rackle rhe mineflelds 
themselves. 
Missan 
D u ring rhe first rhrcc weeks of October, the survey reams 
worked in rhe Missan governare. There are limited Coalition Forces 
EO within the province and rhe main source of ERW is Iraqi in ori-
gin from both the former Iraqi army and rhe Iraq/Iran conflict. The 
Missan province had been home to an Iraqi Army Corps, rh us there is 
a huge amount of amm un ition stockpiled in various degrees of securi-
ty and condition, ranging from permanenr bunker facilities to open 




































der minefields laid during rhe Iran/Iraq War. 
The Missan governate in many ways is an easier environ-
ment in which to work. The local people removed the Baath Parry 
from power, liberating their governate without rhe help o f Coalition 
Forces, and there was no conflict in the governate during Operation 
Enduring Freedom. MTI was given assistance by all local community 
leaders, which ensured a significant element of security, although 
problems with armed gangs in the somhern portion of the governate 
did limit activity. 
Once the survey along rhe various axes of rhe Missan gover-
nate was completed, the survey group moved to the town of AI Kur in 
the Wassit province, northwest ofMissan, at the end of October. MTI 
was again welcomed by rhe local governor, who recognised the major 
problem with ERWin the province, borh from field storage areas and 
from rhe minefields running along rhe Iran border. Here, rhe problem 
has been exacerbated by rhe number of Iranian pilgrims crossing the 
border illegally on pilgrimages co Shiite holy sites. As in Missan, mines 
are migrating from laid minefields into areas where local people carry 
out their daily business. 
The survey reams continued operations in the Wassir gover-
nare in early November with the intention of moving to rhe Thi Quar 
governare, bur due ro the deteriorating security siruarion, the teams 
had to srop the survey approximately 40 km south of the Wassir/Thi 
Quar border. The main difficulties for the mine clearance teams were 
caused by the conviction among the local people chat the survey teams 
were involved with, or part of, the Coalition Forces. Survey reams pen-
etrated into the Thi Quar and Babil governates from the east and 
north; however, they did nor continue due ro rhe security situation. 
The Legacy 
What is apparent to everyone is the enormity of the prob-
lem still facing the Iraqi people. Latest estimates are char there are still 
I ,000 ,000 tonnes of ammunition scattered over Iraq, equivalent to 
more than half the srockpile of the entire U.S. military machine, and 
that figure excludes the minefields. 
The final count of community villages surveyed was record-
ed as I ,029, with data collected on 527 dangerous areas within close 
proximity ro rhe villages. The impacr o n the population is continual 
and devastating. While deployed in rhe Missan province, a key project 
for the EOD teams from December through February of rhis year was 
the clearance of a school at AI Musharrah, a town 40 km north of 
Almarah. T his school, like many others in Iraq, had been used as an 
ammunirion srorage depot in the belief that Coalition troops would 
nor target it. Unfortunately, the chi ldren managed to set off a portion 
of the stockpile, and the resulti ng explosion caused a wing of the com-
plex to collapse, scattering ordnance throughout the school grounds. 
The EOD clearance teams in general now face a wide range of chal-
lenges, from both the scale of the project and the stare of the explosive 
materials, which can be rusty and corroded, buried up to a metre deep. 
In Az Zub ayr, reams have been clearing EO remains from 
under three sections of collapsed roofing. Searching through rhe rub-
ble is slow and tedious because the tar roof covering has melted into 
the rubble and congealed a lot of it into a semi-solid mass. Despite 
chis, in one week the teams recovered I ,609 items weighing 7,905 kg. 
The teams are working in varied climatic conditions with, 
on the one hand, extremes of heat that make it difficul t for the dog 
teams and, on rhe other, strong winds and thick dust clouds. 
Communications have been limited and there is still no network sig-
nal in southern Iraq. All e-mails have to be accessed and sent from rhe 
CPA internet rerminal, which was out of order for prolonged periods 
in Februa1y and March of2004. However, without doubt, the biggest 
challenge f.1eing all teams, and inevitably all future reconstruction and 
aid reams, is the issue of security. 
The Security Challenge 
Often the problem from the Iraqi community was rhe 
misidentification of MTI staff as part of the Coalition Forces. Four 
main issues/questions were continually asked when the reams arrived 
in a village: When will the village have electricity, clean water, medica-
tion and security from banditry? In some cases, unless an answer was 
forthcoming on those questions, the local people would refuse to dis-
cuss anything else. 
As with all irs logistical requirements, MTl has successfully 
managed irs own security, independently recruiting and training irs 
Four main issues/questions were 
continually asked when the teams arrived in a vil-
lage: When will the village have electricity, clean 
water, medication and security from banditry? In 
some cases, unless an answer was forthcoming on 
those questions, the local people would refuse to 
discuss anything else. 
own armed protection and security serv-
ices, enabling our teams to work secure-
ly and safely across southern Iraq. 
To mitigate the security 
threat, all survey reams were accompa-
nied by a policeman where available and 
had their own security guard , hired by 
MTI. However, even this had its uncer-
tai nti es . These police escorts were 
adamant they would do nothing if 
required to respond for fear of retribu-
tion on rheir families. Also, there was 
ini tial confusion with regards to the pol-
icy on rules of engagement. Although 
permitted to carry weapo ns, many 
policemen were not issued any ammuni-
tion due to a ruling by the Coalition 
Forces. 
Because the Missan province 
ejected the Baath Parry prior ro the end 
of the war, there does nor seem to be the 
intensity of anti-Western sentiment that 
the Coalition reports elsewhere. All secu-
rity threats to date seem to be from law-
lessness and poverty, rather than con-
certed resistance activities. Having said 
that, it is still commonplace ro hear gun-
fire, though mostly from local weddings 
and other celebrations. The local people 
have been friendly and supportive and 
MineTech has been accepted into the 
community. 
Differing attitudes and threats 
in the north and south arc the result of 
both religious feeling and the interaction 
between the military and the local popu-
lation. The threat in the south is mainly 
from banditry and criminal behaviour, 
with most of the political unrest targeted 
at the north. However, several of the 
MTI survey teams were caught up in 
rioting and stone throwing in Basrah, 
and a whole team was trapped in the AI 
Qurnah Civil Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) building during another angry 
protest. Yet, the main problem for MTI 
has been the hassle with thieves, which is 
handled by its own security processes. 
The security situation that 
prevailed in Iraq hampered the com ple-
tion of the Emergency Survey; however, 
what was achieved under the circum-
stances made the contract worthwhile 
and successful. MTI would like to thank 
all the UN Area Mine Action Coor-
dination Team (AMA-CT) staff for its 
cooperation and assistance throughout 
the contract, despite rhe sometimes dif-
ficult security climate that prevailed. 
As of the end of February 
2004, the reams had destroyed approxi-
mately 1,162 ronnes of ammunition, 
492,033 irems of EO and 33,024 land-
mines-clearing a total of 4,422,574 sq 
m ofland. 
* Photos c/o the authors. 
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• Dispensers, dusters and launchers 
• Projectiles 
• Fuzes/firing devices 
• Grenades 
• Rockets 
• Guided missiles 
• Landmines 
• Pyrotechnics 
• Miscellaneous explosive devices 
• Naval mines 
• Depth charges/underwater UXO 
• Scatterables 
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ITEP/JMU Database of Intemational 
Experiences: Supporting the Test and 
Eval ation Community 
Introduction 
A new database has been added to 
the James Madison University UMU) Lessons 
Learned database, with more specific content 
and aim. The specific content reflects the 
main tasks that the Imernational Test and 
Evaluation Program (ITEP) for humanitarian 
demining has agreed on in irs Memorandum 
of Understanding, namely to evaluate and 
standardise rhe process of equipment resting 
Generic Considerations to T&E 
in the humanitarian demining industry. The 
JMU Mine Action Informacion Centre 
(MAIC) maimains the database, whereas rhe 
ITEP Secretariat is responsible for irs conrenr. 
The ITEP/)MU Database of 
Inrernational Experiences in Support of the 
Test and Evaluation Community (DIETEC) 
was created in order to summarise test and 
evaluation (T &E) experiences that are refer-
enced to the original test reports. The most 
l 
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Figure 1: Structure of the DIETEC database. 
demanding part was ro work out the database 
structure and to discuss the concrete conrribu-
rions currenrly included. There are fine divid-
ing lines, when at all, between lessons learned , 
experiences and test results. A remaining ques-
tion is whether ir is opportune to also include 
technical questions related to the use of rested 
equipment (test results) or to strictly focus on 
rhe resting process. In rhis regard, we would 
like to invite the reader to share his/her opin-
ion with the ITEP Secrerariat. 
Currently, rhe database only con-
tains experiences relared to rhe T &E process. 
I r was found that the rest reports coma in an 
imporranr amounr of informacion, either gen-
eral or specific, which could be useful for rhe 
T&E community as a whole. In order to make 
these hidden experiences more widely and eas-
ily available ro rhe test community, ITEP 
decided to join up with the MAIC. Funding 
was provided by the U.S. Department of 
Defense. 
Aim 
The main aim ofDIETEC is to col-
leer and publish information derived from 
experiences in T&E of humanitarian demi-
ning equipment. The collected "experiences" 
are intended ro highlight key areas of consid-
eration in the T &E process, as well as specific 
observations related to the evaluation of 
humanitarian dem ining equipment in opera-
tional use. Moreover, it attempts to provide a 
common structural approach for T&E of 
equipment used in humanitarian demining. 
The database should provide useful informa-
tion for a variety of T&E stakeholders, rang-
ing from test engineers and entities involved 
in large-scale T&E campaigns to the individ-
ual user ar the field level interested in evaluat-
ing his/her specific piece of equipment. 
by Franciska Borry, ITEP Secretariat 
Definitions and Approa ch 
The database, in irs current version, 
provides a I isr of experiences. The experience 
may be positive or negative bur should meet 
the following criteria: 
• It should be significant in rhar ir 
has real or assumed impact on the T&E oper-
ation. 
• It should be valid in that iris fac-
tually and technically correct. 
• I r should be applicable in that it 
identifies a specific process or decision char 
reduces or limits rhe potential for failures and 
mishaps, or reinforces a positive result. 
• It should be u nderstandable for a 
skilled person nor necessarily intimately famil-
iar with the subject matter (adapted from rhe 
U .S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's d efinition of lessons learned). 
The experience may be generic or 
equipment-specific and can be submitted by 
any individual or organisation. However, a 
core set of experiences is extracted from pub-
licly available resources (T&E reports on 
humanitarian demining equipment) and from 
T&E activities undertaken under the umbrel-
la of the Inrernacional Test and Evaluation 
Program for Humani tarian Demining 
Equipment. 
T he intention is that all experiences 
entered in the database will be periodically 
reviewed by an international panel of experts 
from the ITEP network and ocher organisa-
tions performing activities relared ro T&E, 
e.g., the United Nations or rhe Geneva 
J nternational Centre for H umanirarian 
Demining (G!CHD). During this process, the 
relevance of the experiences to T&E stan-
dards, technical nares and/or methodologies 
will be assessed. 
An entry could become one of rhe 
following four things: 
I. An item added to an ITEP 
T & E methodology: The experience is seen as 
an important or/and a new way of carrying 
out tests. A spin-off of this could be a request 
fo r further research to be carried our to back 
u p a new test methodology. This further 
research could ultimately be executed in the 
form of a collaborative project under the !TEP 
umbrella. 
2. An i tem added to the Lesso ns 
Learned/ Ex periences d a tabase: The experi-
ence is judged to have a significant impact on 
rhe resting method and is preferably backed 
up by ar least rwo other experiences. An exist-
ing test methodology may be changed or 
Table 1: Two examples of testing and evaluation experiences I 
extracted from DIETEC. 
Category L Generic Considerations to T&E > Planning > Supporting information _ 
Subject 1 Test site layout and facilities 
Experience/ Detailed prior knowledge of the test site layout and facilities will allow for -
Advice more efficient data collection and archiving schemes to be designed. For 
instance, if a large amount of data are planned to be collected in order to 
evaluate the performance of detection equipment under development, 
knowledge of the test site layout could allow for automating part of the 
data collection process and/or use of purpose built data collection 
platforms. Also, knowledge of internet connection characteristics might 
influence the data archiving provis ions. 
Reference I.M. Dibsdall, S.M. Bowen, D.J. Allsopp, Portable Humanitarian Mine 
Detector 2003 US Trials, 2003 
Reference Link http://www. itep. ws/pdf/PH MD_ 2003 _ US_ trialsreport.pdf -
ITEP Secretariat (ITEP) on 2t14i2004 Posted by 
Category t Equipment Specific Considerations to T&E > Detection > Metal 
Subject Test design, environmental data records ----
The following environmental characteristics of the test area should be Experience/ 
Advice recorded, in order to more efficiently compare test results: magnetic ground 
properties, scrap metal content density and distribution, soil composition 
and texture, distribution of stones/rocks, soil moisture content, vegetation 
type, density and development, meteorological conditions. Furthermore, 
details on how the environmental characteristics were measured also need 
~be registered . 
Reference D. Guelle, A. Smith, A. Lewis, T. Bloodworth, Metal Detector Handbook for 




Posted by ITEP Secretariat (ITEP) on 2/14/2004 
updated ro rake into account rhis experience. 
An entry can also fall into this category if the 
experience reports on an unexpected evenr 
during resting and outlines a strategy for deal-
ing wirh it. 
3. An item circulated to the User 
Community: The experience has an impact 
on the operational usc of demining equip-
ment/systems. It should be passed on to the 
User Community, for instance through a 
Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) 
issued by rhe G!CHD. 
4. Dismissed: The experience does 
nor f.,ll into one of the above categories. I r 
may be dismissed wirh reasons scared. 
In its initial srage, the database will 
mainly include "experiences." After review, 
the database will be expanded with "lessons 
learned," referenced to a ser of experiences. 
These lessons learned can then further be 
incorporated inro standards and similar docu-
ments whenever rdcvanr. 
Struc ture 
Figure gives an overview of the 
database structure. The category and sub-cat-
egory fields have been selected in order ro pro-
vide rhe user with a structured overview of rhe 
main stages and factors that should be consid-
ered during T &E of humanitarian demining 
equipment. The structure may be used as a 
guide when drawing up a rest plan. Thecate-
gories distinguished expand on rhe structure 
given in rhe !MAS 03.40 on Test and 
Evaluation of Mine Action Equipment (first 
edition, 0 I .0 1.2003) and include rhe main 
technical categories used by ITEP and the 
GICHD Mechanical Demining Equipment 
Catalogue. 
Imp lem en tatio n 
The database consists of two main 
categories: Generic Considerations and 
Equipmcnr-Specific Considerations. Each 
main category has subcategories to explore the 
experiences in d erail and to guide rhe user ro 
add relevant experiences. Each subcategory 
can be browsed by clicking on the correspon-
ding individual cell or by executing a detailed 
search. The user can add an experience to a 
subcategory by clicking on the corresponding 
individual cell or on "Add Experience." Table 
I includes two examples cxrracted from the 
database in order ro illustrate rhe type of infor-
mation provided by DIETEC. 































International Conference \ssembles 
Military Considerations within 
Mine Actio11 Technology Trends 
During the "International Conference on Requirements and 
Technologies for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of 
Landmines and UXO" held in Brussels September 15-18, 2003, many 
global viewpoints and models emerged from the discussions. Some of the 
ideas triggered strong emotional reactions during the conference. Several 
of the new ideas might have a short lifetime; others have the potential of 
forcing breakthroughs; and all of them are subject to further debate. 
The EUDEM2-SCOT 2003 conference was an open forum for 
discussing state-of-the art humanitarian demining technology research 
and development (R&D) and practice. New technology developments and 
demining systems and scenarios were confronted with viewpoints from 
daily practice in demining on the field. 
I" 1\ 
P Busquin, a member of the 
European Commission, has acknowledged the 
advances made in information management 
rools, integration of geographic information 
systems (GIS), and incremental improvement 
of sensors, area reduction and international 
standards, but mentioned also that "delivery 
of new tools and equipment to improve the 
search for individual mines has nor mer early 
expectations."! He pointed to the complexiry 
of the problem, rhe mismatch between 
research ideas and application requirements in 
the field and the significant non-technological 
problems in finding the resources to turn pro-
totypes into fully rested commercial products 
read y to use in the field. 
( , I L 1/ II 
Although different goals are pursued 
and different practices are used in military and 
humanitarian demining, there is a large poten-
tial for technology sharing (Petersberg Tasks).2 
P. Busquin emphasized rhar even financial 
support will gradually be opened by rhe 
European Union for joint technology develop-
ments in the context of (civil) security. This 
may certainly help bridge rhe chasm between 
research results and deploymen t. 
James L. Jones, General and 
Sup reme Allied Commander Europe for the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , 
has pur the mine problem in a broad histori-
cal perspective. T he notion of mili tary neces-
sity makes the case rhar inadvertent harm to 
civilians and civilian objects, though regret-
table, is acceptable if a significant military gain 
results and there is no other way to proceed. 
The Ottawa Convention3 (which bans the 
use, rhe stockpiling, the production and trans-
port of AP mines) and rhc diminishing threat 
of warfare with massed armies (hence the 
decreasing "milita1y necessiry") are the two 
main reasons fo r optimism in the futu re evo-
lution of the worldwide mine problem. 
However, "non -state actors see the land mine 
and its horrifying, indiscri minate nature as 
being a very useful weapon if the objective is 
ro psychologically terrorize and influence pop-
ulations and government."4 
{untc rpr< lmg ( ontrolkcl I -, tms 
.1'1( L" llu 11Jon 
The evidence rhat lirrle is under-
stood abour why current successful demining 
works (dogs, prodding, metal detectors and 
machines) rriggers rhe following questions: 
What is the baseline to which new 
tech nology has to be compared? 
In the presence of urgency, is it 
nor appropriate to be less rei ucrant towards 
fast uptake of new technology ar an earlier 
srage in current practice? 
• User requirements have nor been 
updated in 10 yea rs and technology has 
evolved substantially. Isn't it the right time to 
bridge rhis newly developing gap, so that we 
can move forward and introduce some of rhe 
new technologies by associating them in rhe 
operations even if they are nor I 00-percenr 
effective? 
Amazingly low probabil ities of 
derecrion were presented for rwo standard 
demining tools, namely prodders and meral 
detectors, in three conference prescntations,5 
even in controlled rest conditions. C. Mueller 
et al. repon ed success rates with metal detec-
tors beginning ar about 50 percent and rarely 
reaching above 80 percent;5 R. Fjellanger er al. 
reported detection performance down to 
approximately 70 percenr based on the 
vapour-sensing capabilities of dogs; and J. 
Trevelyan described success rates with prod-
ders down to 50 percent. lr is certainly true 
that, in p ractice, locally adapted operational 
procedures, based on the contextual a priori 
knowledge, reduces the risks and increases rhe 
probability of detection. Nevertheless, the 
rhree papers on re trospective scienrific analysis 
of well-adopted sensors remain extremely 
valuable- if their results are being con-
fi rmed-because they describe the objective 
intrinsic behaviour and limitations of sensors 
when operated independently of an opera-
tional procedure based on human expertise in 
controlled conditions for a variety of soils and 
foreign objects. 
Producing these kinds of figures for 
an experimental new sensor probe resulting 
from an R&D project would probably be and 
has often been inrerprered as unsuccessful. 
by Jan Cornelis and Hichem Sahli, 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
Nevertheless, the end-user community has 
adopted prodders and metal detectors as 
workable instruments a long rime ago. This 
leads to rhe conclusion that deployment of 
new technologies in the field should occur at 
an earlier stage, and rime should be explicitly 
provided for developing appropriate proce-
dures and contextual scenarios to complement 
the toolbox of instrumentation so rhar more 
and more specific situations can be covered. 
Bnd~lllS th ( hdsm Be I\\ c ( 1 
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Struc lure<> 
The major impediment to ad option 
of new technology in rhe field is the absence of 
support for bridging rhe gap between R&D 
results and fieldable systems. For a small gov-
ernment and a financially unattractive marker 
(with no explosive marker increase), such sup-
port is a prerequisite for ach ieving a brea k-
through. Dual use developments within civil 
applications, common military/civilian tech-
nology development and incorporation in the 
broader field of security are encouraged to 
solve that problem but rake away some of rhe 
needed focus on specific technology to solve 
the mine problem. A debate concerning rhe 
European Commission (EC)-co-fund ed re-
search and technical developmen t (RTD) 
projects leads to rhe conclusion that no struc-
ture for support exists at this rime in Europe 
fo r carrying the results of EC-funded R&D 
projects towards fi eldable systems. The crude 
question is raised : Why fund research, since it 
is well-known that "research only generates 
new research," if the results are nor exploited' 
The reluctance of donors and their 
li mited interest to participate in technology 
transfer can be explained by the high budget 
require men ts in this area. Grossly, J . 
Trevelyan stared rhat for every Euro spent in 
supporting research, 10 Euros are req uired for 
development, wh ile an investment of I 00 
Euros is needed for turning these develop-
ments into successfully marketed products. 
Moreover, as stated earl ier, in humanitarian 
demining technology, we are confronted with 
modest market perspectives and markets cre-
ated by government decisio ns.? 
Borrlenecks hampering the struc-
tural fu nding of the transition activities 
berween R&D results and fieldable systems in 
Europe include the partitioning of Directorate 
General (DG) responsibilities, rhe strict inter-
prerarion of laws on falsification of competi-
tion and the limited interest of donors in this 
area due to high budget requirements. To get 
rid of th is situation, urgent political action on 
rhe decision level is required . 
The overview of rhe Canadian land-
mine detection R&D program,5 presented by 
J. McFee, and rhe overview of the currenr U.S. 
Army basic research on landmine and UXO 
detection, presented by R.S. Harmon, illus-
trate rhe North American structural approach 
for the continuous cross-ferrilisarion of labora-
tory research towards applications in practice: 
the U.S. Army research office has as a mission 
to invest in fundamental research at uni versi-
ties, and a parallel structure within rhe Army 
for applied research is picking up the results of 
rhe fundamenta l research. An equ ivalent 
approach does nor exisr in rhe European 
Union (EU) at th is moment. 
David Daniels raised the point of 
Eu rope lagging far behind commercially. If 
Europe does nor srart u p a voluntary acrion in 
p icking up rhe R&D results and turning rhem 
into commercial products, U.S. government-
funded technology will monopolise the mar-
ker. lr is in the interest of everybody rhar sec-
ond and rhird source suppliers exist. 
Progress has been made in many 
domains and this was covered by rhe confer-
ence contriburions.5 Nevertheless, P. Blagden 
mad e the statement that, except for ground 
penetrating radar (G PR), none of the tech-
nologies appeared near being ready to be taken 
into rhe field for close-in derecrion. The gen-
eral opinion at rhe conference is rhar close-in 
detection of individual mines and area reduc-
tion are rhe priority domains for demonstrat-
ing progress. 
In rhe area of mulrisensor platforms 
and data fusion, the following three ideas are 
essential: 
Sharing: Info rmation exchange 
certainly occurs now wirhin the humanitarian 
demining communiry. 
(Demonstrated) p romise: We are 
on the way, bur have not yet arrived, e.g., 
good results on learning sets are nor sufficient-
ly convincing. 
• Real rime: Appropriate processing 
architectures are being conceived to go from 
simulation towards practice. 
From rhe work presented, a coher-
ent framework emerges wirh opportunities fo r 
improvement, both on sensors (e.g., chemical 
derecrion) and on software (e.g., integrated 
G IS environments, image interpretation 
methods). Ir involves the roral usage and inte-
gration of all available information over the 
area from small-scale to large-scale, past and 
presenr- aerial and satellite mulrimodal clara, 
ground surveys, interviews and local knowl-
edge about culture and land usage. T he means 
to obtain all of this information are generally 
known; rhe integration and structuri ng 
schemes arc emerging and being validated. 
"Everything would have been easier 
if we had the JMU Uames Madison U nivers-
iry] clearinghouse at the start. "5 This state-
ment heard from D. Radmore, a professional 
deminer, illustrates how initially hostile atti-
tudes towards a technology coming from 
another scientific community outside rhe 
humanitarian demining field can gradually 
gain acceptance when developed in collabora-
tion wi rh end users. 
Information systems are now being 
equ ipped wirh extra communication means 
and decision support sysrems. The primary 
question raised is how to harmonise rhem 
around the Information Management System 
for M ine Action (IMSMA). It is generally 
acknowledged rhar IMSMA has brought stan-
dardisation in the field and enforces correct 
documentation and reporting of mine actions. 
Therefore, there is a tendency to encourage 
add-on developments rhar are compatible 
with IMSMA, which has gained wide accept-
ance within rhe d emining communiry.6 
It was suggested that a structured 
knowledge base on "lessons learned from field 
experience" would be useful, particularly for 
bringing back the results and experience 
gained with new technologies on the field 
towards researchers and developers. 
I ' 
T he European Committee for 
concinued on page 67, lntern arional Conference 
Assembles Military Considerations with_in 
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The Topography of a Broken Land 
Afghanistan is a dry, landlocked 
nation made up mosrly of rugged mountains 
that run norrheasr ro southwest and d ivide the 
northern provinces from rhe rest of rhe coun-
try. Bordered by Pakistan , Iran, Turkmen-
istan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it also shares 
a riny strip of land with China. Because of its 
cold winters and hot summers, nearly all of 
Afghanistan 's supply of natural fresh water 
begins as snow. This limited supply, however, 
has been severely depleted because of a four 
year d rought from 1998-2002. D rought and 
rhe added rhirsr of rwo million returning 
refugees has left nearly 80 percent of 
Afghanistan's population witho ut access ro 
safe drinking warer. 1 The drought has also 
affected Afghanistan 's struggling fa rm and 
livestock (mosrly sheep and goats) production. 
T he country is highly dependent upon fo reign 
aid ro meet irs most basic needs such as food 
and medical care. 
Bin Ladin and Taliban and Warlords, 
OhMy.' 
Following Soviet military with -
drawal in 1989, local leaders fought in b loody 
civil battles over con trol of the nation. C ivil 
unrest ended with the rise of rhe Ta liban, a 
group of ethnic Pashtuns backed by Pakistan. 
In 1994, the Tali ban took Kandahar, and they 
entered Kabul unopposed in September 1996. 
The Taliban, whose rule was oppress ive and 
often brmal, eventually seized power over 95 
percent of the nation. T he September I I rh 
terrorist attacks in 200 I prompted rhe Uni ted 
Stares and Allied forces ro action in support of 
rhe opposition. Near rhe end of that yea r, 
major leaders fro m these Afghan opposition 
groups mer in Bonn, Germany, and agreed on 
a plan for the formulation of a new govern-
ment structure rhat resulted in the inaugura-
tion of Hamid Kan_ai as Chairman of rhe 
Afghan Interim Authority (AlA). The AlA 
A Profile of • 
an1s an 
held a natio nwide Loya Jirga (Grand 
Assembly) in June 2002, and Karzai was elect-
ed Presidenr. 
Despite these developments, most 
of the people in Afghanistan continue ro live 
in fear of oppress ion and violence. W ith only 
about 20,000 peacekeepers and Karzai's 
inability ro control any parr of rhe country 
o utside of Kabul, Afghanistan has come under 
the power of warlords who siphon federal 
funds and participate in illegal opium trading 
to finance their own personal militias. Only a 
fraction of the duties and taxes collected by 
provincial leaders find their way ro rhe central 
government. UN experrs expect this year's 
crop to yield 3,600 tons of opium; char makes 
up three-fourths of rhe world's heroin. Also, 
some of rhe warlords are as brutal as rhei r 
predecessors. The Kabul-based Afghan Inde-
pendent Human Righrs Commission has 
observed Afghan commanders eliciting forced 
marriages, making illegal land grabs in Kabul 
and performing several execurions. 
In add irion to these problems, the 
Taliban continues to maintai n a presence in 
areas of rhc sourh. Taliban leader Mullah 
Mohammed Omar, in hiding, is said ro be 
controll ing nearly a third of rhe country's rer-
ritory. New offensives and more troops were 
deployed by rhe United Stares in the spring of 
2004 in efforts to capture terrorist leader 
Osama Bin Laden and end T aliban control of 
rhe sourh. Years of conflict have left Karzai 
with the rask of rebuilding demolished road-
ways and bridges and helping a large segment 
of the population gain basic resources such as 
...... 
continuous power and runn ing water. 
The Continuing Problem of Landmines 
Afghan istan's greatest man-made 
environmental problem is, of course, land-
mines. Planted by Soviet troops, rhe Muja-
hedin and the Taliban, some estimate rhe 
number of landmi nes in Afghanistan to be 
around 40 mill ion. The types of landmines 
found rhere make up a smorgasbord of vari-
eties. Deminers have encountered over 50 
types of AP (blast and fragmentation) mines 
and the AT mines of eigh r different countries. 
More than half of these varieties were of 
Russian/CIS origin. The most common AP 
mines found arc PMN, PMN-2, POMZ, 
POMZ-2, Type 72 and OZM 3/72. The AT 
mines found are mostly Russian TM (46/57), 
TC-6 and Pakistani P2. 
Most of these landmines arc con-
centrated in the western, eastern and southern 
regions of rhc country. They are scattered 
indiscriminately through both urban and rural 
areas restricting commercial and agricultural 
growth. They also line ma ny of the transport 
roads hindering safe and timely transportation 
th roughout rhe country. Despite conrinuing 
efforts to clear land in Afghanistan, unstable 
security and limited resources have kept it o n 
the top of the list of rhe world 's most mine-
infested countries. According to rhe 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL), "Landm ines contaminate all but rwo 
of Afghanistan's provinces and are scattered 
over an area of more rhan 780 sq km, includ-
ing rowns and villages, grazing land and 
roads."2 These land mines were responsible for 
I ,286 deaths in rhe year 2002 alone. 
Recent and prior conflicr has also 
lcfr large amounts of UXO, which have killed 
another 154 people and lefr I, 132 injured in 
2002.3 H ighly explosive bombs, cluster muni-
tions and missiles were used in great numbers 
during military operations of coalition forces 
since October 200 1. The additional UXO 
compounds the problem of landmines and 
furthe r debilitates rhe population. Efforrs to 
clear the land of both landmines and UXO 
have been frustrated by irs rugged terrain and 
political instability. 
Deminers and demining agencies in 
Afghanistan have faced some d ifficulty in 
clearing certain areas that lack adequate secu-
rity. UN demining staff was forced to hair 
demining activities along parts of the road 
between Kabul and Kandahar after a series of 
attacks in the beginning of May 2003. Afrer 
anorher arrack, deminers in six southern 
provinces began traveling with local armed 
escorts to ensure safety. Finally, on May 22, 
the United Nations suspended all demining 
activity in I 0 provinces of sourhern and 
southwestern Afghanistan , as wel l as along a 
road from Kabul ro Jalalabad. Demincrs were 
then redeployed to other regions. Attacks con-
tinued into June when a rocker was launched 
into a demining camp, fail ing to damage or 
hurt anyone. Nine deminers were injured in 
yet another attack, which prompted the 
United Nations to conduct a review of the 
security siruation. In July 2003, UN opera-
tions were resumed in all provinces with 
added security measures in place.2 In February 
2004, violence against deminers struck once 
again when suspecred Taliban gunmen killed 
four deminers working for rhe Organization 
for Mine Clearance and Afghan 
Rehabilitation (OMAR) in the western parr of 
rhe country. 
In response to rhis recent tragedy, 
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA) 
spokesperson Takuto Kubo writes: "We never 
send deminers to areas where factional fight-
ing or military operations are going on, and 
also areas that !the United Nations] thinks 
high risks of security instability and possible 
security incidents. However, these artacks 
happen where deminers have been safely oper-
ating for a long rime, so ir is hard ro predicr 
and prevent (as was rhe case in most of terror-
ist attacks in anywhere in rhe world). It also 
means char local people in urgent need of 
mine and UXO clearance may nor be able to 
receive our clearance and mine risk education 
due to our suspension of operations."3 
Avoiding the Fate of Sisyphus 
The United Nation's oldest mtne 
action program is the Mine Acrion Program 
for Afghanistan (MAPA) (in operation since 
1989). Ir, along with scores of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and UN affili-
ates, has been working diligently through war 
and peace ro reduce the massive numbers of 
landmines in Afghanistan. Despire nearly 15 
years of effort, however, Afghanisran contin-
ues to be one of the most mined nations in the 
world. Although rhe Taliban have been oust-
ed from national power, lingering Taliban ele-
ments in the south and ease continue to use 
landmines as booby traps against occupying 
forces. L1sr June, two U.S. soldiers were killed 
when their veh icle drove over a manually det-
onated mine in the city of Asadabar. Renewed 
conflict and bombing continue to increase the 
number of UXO. Like the mythic figure of 
Sisyphus, who was doomed ro ceaselessly roll 
a rock to rhe rop of a mountain and watch it 
roll back down again, so have mine acrion 
workers in Afghanistan watched rhe size of 
their rask grow with each new offensive. 
Mine action in Afghanistan is not a 
Sisyphusian rask, however, because percepti-
ble progress has been made. In the past three 
years especially, with rhe relatively greater 
freedom of posr-Taliban rule, mine action 
workers have accomplished much in terms of 
policy, clearance, awareness and victim assis-
tance. According ro rhe Landmine Monitor, 
funding for mine action has quadrupled since 
200 I, rotaling approximately $64 million 
(U.S.). About $51 .4 million of this was pro-
vided through UN MACA and about $12.9 
mill ion was provided through bilateral dona-
tions and in-kind contributions. Japan contin-
ues ro be the leading donor of funds, giving a 
total of $21.2 million in 2002. T he European 
Commission (EC) and rhe United Stares were 
second and third respectively in donations. 
Stockpile Destruction 
M inis ter of Foreign Affa irs 
Abdullah signed the Mine Ban Treaty on July 
29, 2002, which officially went into force last 
March. Afrer the government acceded to rhe 
T reary in September 2002, a few of rhe 
provincial authorities were willing ro hand 
over stockpiled mines and explosive ordnance 
(EO). At that rime, an explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) ream from the Afghan Technical 
Consultants (A TC) went to these provinces 
and destroyed 400 AP mines, 500 mortars, 
1,000 projectiles and 200 fuses. Currently, 
ATC has 12 EOD reams, each consisting of 
14 men, working throughout rhe country. In 
their 14 years of operation, ATC has located 
and destroyed a total of 3,437 AT mines, 
143,392 AP mines and 1,6 11 ,676 items of 
UXO. The ministry of defense plans ro con-
duct a countrywide assessment to prepare an 
inventory list of the number, location and 
type of mine caches before creating a compre-
hensive plan for stockpile destruction. 
Survey and Assessment 
Survey and Assessment has been 
problematic in recenr years due ro an explo-
sion of economic regrowth in urban sectors. 
















clearance ac tivities in reconstructio n p rojects. 
According to T akuto Kubo, Surveyors must 
now try to balance humanitarian needs with 
the needs of d evelopment. Prioritizatio ns o f 
m ine acrion activities have made a perceptible 
shift towards reconstruction and d evelopment 
due ro posr-conAict securiry issues in 2002 
and 2003 . T he Mine Clearance Planning 
Agency (MC PA), with ove rsight and monitor-
ing by the Survey Action Center (SAC), start-
ed a new 14- month survey in June 2003. The 
foll owing are some tentative survey and 
destroyed devices figures for 2003. 
CLearance 
According to the Landmine Mo-
ni tor, about 263 sq km of mined land has 
been cleared in addi tion to 422 sq km of ba r-
rlefield areas fro m 1989-2002. In that rime, 
over 268,000 AP mines, nea rly 13,000 AT 
m ines and over 2,488,000 items of UXO were 
detected and destroyed. Below are tentative 
figures fo r the year 2003. 
Through February 2004, ATC had 
cleared 82 .4 sq km of high-priority mined 
areas and 192.7 sq km of former battlefields. 
It is currently working to clear battle and 
minefield areas in and around the Kabul 
International Airport, the Kabul-Jalalabad 
Highway and nearby secondary roads that 
could serve as alte rnate routes to the highway. 
ATC is also working on a few clearance side 
projects o n provincial roads (funded by the 
U.S. Agency for Inte rnational Devclopmcnr) 
and at the Sardeh D am in Ghazni province. 
T he organization currently has 25 manual 
minefi eld and barrie area clear ance reams of 
40 men each (including operations and sup-
port staff), and I 0 m echanical clearance un its 
using excavators, backhoe loaders o r rotary 
Cll[tcrs. As the first organization to implement 
a Demobilization, D isarmamenr and Reinte-
gration of Ex-combatants (DDR) Program in 
the northern Kundoz province, ATC has suc-
ceed ed in facilitating the absorption of II 0 ex-
combatants into a clearance, mine risk educa-
tion (MRE) and permanent marking pro-
gram. Last February, ATC starred a new D DR 
program in Parwan province (north of Kabul) 
with 49 enrollments. 
T he main age ncies working on 
clearance, in addition ro ATC, are rhe Agency 
fo r Rehabili tation & Energy Conservation 
(A REA), rhe Danish Demining Group 
(DOG), the D emining Agency for 
Afghanistan (DAFA), the HALO T rust, rhc 
M ine Detection and Dog Center (MDC), 
O MAR , MCPA, the Monitoring, Evaluarion 
and Training Agency (M ETA) and RONCO 
Consulting Corporation under contract to 
U.S . Department of Srare. AREA is an Afghan 
NGO established in 1993 d evoted to comm u-
ni ty mine cleara nce. DO G is an inte rnational 
N G O wo rking in various regions. DAFA 
clears bat tlefields and mined areas mainly in 
southern and western regions of rhe country. 
The HALO Trust began demin ing in 
Afghanistan in 1988 and clears multiple types 
of areas, mainly in the central and norrhcrn 
regions. The MDC has been training mine 
detectio n dogs (MODs) and handlers since 
1989. O MAR conducts both mine awareness 
and clearance activities. The MCPA primarily 
conduc ts surveys of mine- and battlefi elds. 
M ETA is responsible for training and rhe 
mon itori ng and evaluation of m ine action 
ope rations. RONC O Consulring Corpora-
tion is a U.S. commercial mine clearance con-
tracror wo rking with 13 Jo rdanian engineers 
to demine areas in Bagram and Kandahar. 
Pakistan recently anno unced rhe 
planned srart of the Torkhum-Jalalabad high-
way consrrucrion project in May 2004 . With 
an estimated cosr of $20 million , rhe road is 
due robe comple rcd by June 2005. W ith sur-
veying already done, deminers are currently 
wo rking ro clear the area for construc tion. 
Mine Risk Education (MRE) and 
Victirn Assistance 
MRE in Afghanistan has three focus 
groups: returning refugees, children, and aid 
worke rs and journalists. T he programs utilizes 
such approaches as M RE briefings at schools, 
informal education for women and girls, ses-
sio ns held in mosques, community centers or 
cl inics, and mass m edia campaigns. The 
Landmine Monitor states that at least 12 
N GO s have been providing MRE to civilians 
and refugees in high-risk areas. These o rgani-
zations are OMAR, AREA, HALO Trust, the 
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan (AAR), 
Ansar Reli ef Institute (ARI) , Save the 
C hildren- USA, rhe Afghan Red Crescent 
Society (ARCS), Handicap lnre rnario nal 
Belgium (H!B), MCPA, the BBC Afghan 
Educatio n Project, DAFA, META, and the 
Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) . 
Conclusion 
Afghanistan has a long history as one 
of the world's great centers of culture and arr. It 
produced such cultural icons as famed Central 
Asian poet Rahman Baba and the ancient rel i-
gion of Zoroastrian ism. Once th e seat of the 
great Mogul empire, it boasted some of rhe 
richest archeological arrifacts in the world 
(most of which are now either looted or 
destroyed). Afghanistan's indomitably rich tra-
d itional culture, however, remains intact 
despi te decades of warfare that have destroyed 
most of irs rangiblc artifacts and relics. 
T he beauty and d epth of Afghan is 
and the ir land persist despite rhe ravages of 
war, fami nc and eco nomic instability. T hei r 
ab ility ro endure is a trait that seems to have 
passed on to the m ine ac tion workers from 
around the world who have been vigila ntly 
work ing for over a decade ro clear the land of 
mines. As rhe poet D urrani elicits, it is nor rhe 
barrenness of Afghanistan's deserts that draw 
h im, bur the oneness he claims with rhem. 
The sense of home chat D urrani describes in 
his poem remains in the hearts of Afghans 
today, fuel ing their tenacious affection fo r 
what we perceive to be mere d esert. For this 
reason, mill ions of Afghan refugees have 
returned and cominue to return to their still-
da ngerous homeland. T hei r determ ination to 
reclaim th is broken land motivates rhe world 
to strive with rhem. 
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International Conference Assembles Military 
Considerations within Mine Action Technology 
Trends, continued from page 63 
Standardization (CEN) Workshop? activities 
on standardisation are deemed useful and nec-
essary, certainly fo r manufacturers, but the 
timeliness of the activities is questioned in the 
presence of a shrinking marker.8 Standards 
should gai n acceptance also by the end-users 
and manufacturers befo re geHing maximal 
utility. Practical questions of end users should 
be taken into accounr, e.g., the appropriate 
footprint size at a specified depth {Vernon 
Jo int) in rela tio n to full area coverage. 
Standardisation in general could be useful as 
one of the elements in procuremcm decisions 
of existing tools. 
In itial step s towards a scientific 
approach to econom ic modelling of cost-
effectiveness of d emini ng technologies were 
proposed by R. Keeley as an al ternative or 
complement to the ad hoc analyses of today.5 
The main challenge will be the acceptance of 
the models and their abiliry to be tuned to 
local c ircumstances. One of rhe main identi-
fied bottlenecks is the availability and the cer-
tainty of rhe inpll[ information. The laHcr 
problem is related co the previously raised 
question: How does one ensure adequate and 
exchangeable reporting from mine actions? 
Solving this question is an essential prerequi-
site for further development of economic 
models, ICT decision support systems, infor-
macion systems and socio-economic impact 
studies that can identifY priority and less use-
fu l areas for demining operations. 
The chinking behind the following 
three observed evolutions converges towards a 
similar way ro move forward, and it calls for 
the investigation of a pa radigm shift in 
research, development, deployment and 
donor atrirude from humanitarian demining 
cowards restoring local communities and evi-
dence-based risk management. 
1. At the organizarionallevcl in EC-
FP6, R&D on human itarian d emining is parr 
of "Improvement of Risk Management." The 
rexr of the "Call for Proposals" is tech nically 
orienred towards (open) system development 
and should be interpreted as a transcription of 
the global objective to achieve high-level soci-
ety benefirs.9 
2. At the level of field actions, in 
practice, mine action centres (1\ifACs) are 
adapting their priorities ro rhose of the locals. 
Avoiding famine by food supply, medical 
assistance and agricultural activities or restOra-
tion of water sources might come first before 
the removal of mines. S. Grainger presented a 
case study in Lebanon in which urban rescora-
tion of the infrastructure started before rhe 
contracted demining organisation had rhe 
opportunity of ful ly removing rhe mine 
threat.5 In certain situations, the risk of 
fam ine or socio-economic failu re might either 
subjectively be perceived or objectively be 
higher rhan the mine rhreat, influencing rhc 
priority of action . Ranking of risks is impl icit-
ly made. 
3. At the level of designing models 
and R&D, J. Trevelyan presented a possible 
model of agricultural exploitation in the pres-
ence of AP mine risk.5 The model is an initial 
proposal and includes m ine-resistant agricul-
tural machinery development and new agricul-
rural practice. The idea is certainly not mature 
yet bur deserves to be taken up further. 
The fundamental question was 
raised of whether or not this viewpoint is 
compatible with the Ottawa Convention} In 
our opinion, it is: "the fencing of minefields 
rhat have little impact on the socio-economic 
life rarher than their removal" and "prior itis-
ing a solution to the threat of famine by culti-
vating the land rather than ro clear ir" can be 
seen as interim solutions co solve urgent local 
problems causing immediate and high risk, 
taken up before the actual mine clearance. 
The emerging new paradigm also 
triggered a lot of organisational questions. 
New views are required on the quality of 
results and liabil ity defined in rerms of achiev-
ing acceptable risks, which should be adopted 
by the donors in their conrracts. Probably due 
ro the presence of representatives from several 
demining companies, the difficulry of the 
statement of work in the contracts was raised 
at several occasions: e.g., the specification of 
quality assurance and the definition of failure. 
The UN requirement for humanitarian mine 
clearance efficiency of 99.6 percent is in con-
tradiction to the term "acceptable risk,"" wh ich 
primarily depends on the end use of the 
cleared land. IO 
11 I 1 1011 ml D " I'\ 1on 
The EUDEM2-SCOT 2003 con-
ference has brought together subsets of all 
players in the field of humanitarian demining. 
The presentations and discussions were char-
acterised by an increasing maturity, trans-
parency and honesry abour rhe achievements. 
Views were exchanged frankly berween differ-
ent pam of the community, including analy-
ses of where we have gone wrong. 
The authors wish to thank all rhe 
EUDEM2-SCOT conference participants, and 
mainly the ones that have conrribmed to 
extracting the general trends, conclusions and 
open questions described in this paper. Some 
were obvious to pick up; others were slightly 
hidden and needed collaborative digging ro be 
extracted. Special thanks go to Karin De 
Bruyn , Claudio Brusch ini, Russell Gasser, 
Stewart Grainger, Vernon Joynt, Paddy 
Blagden, David Daniels, James Trevelyan, 
Chris Weickerr, Noel M u lliner, Helmut 
Kraenzle, Russell H armon and Francois 
Littmann. 
continued on page: 76, International Conferenc e 
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Brings Renewed Hope to Landmine Victims 1n Kabul 
Foot Camp 
resident of Kabul, 
Afghanistan, lost both of her legs in a landmine explosion. After 
the accident, she felt like a burden to her family. Through an 
advertisement on television, Faribo heard about the ]aipur Foot 
Camp and decided to see what it had to offer her. At the camp, she 
received a light and comfortable prosthesis. Faribo testifies that it has 
given a new meaning to her life. It is experiences like this that incite Help Handicapped 
lnrernarional (HHI) ro organize camps in various parts of the 
world for the free firmenr of Jaipur, an Indian prosthesis. These pros-
theses have proved ro be durable, versatile and cost-efficienr. 
Background 
HHI has focused irs work in rhe srrif e-rorn areas of Kenya, 
Burundi, Sudan and recently, Mghanisran. The number of landmine 
amputees in these areas is ove1whelming, and concerted relief efforts 
are limited due ro shortages of funding, impassable geographical ter -
rain and inadequate security considerations. 
In light of the nearly 300,000 amputees-mostly landmine 
and war victims-an advance HHI team went to Kabul in August 
2003 ro explore the possibility of conducting a Jaipur Foot Camp 
there. Discussions were held and officials promised whatever assistance 
was possible for the war-ravaged city. Ir was decided that a one-month 
camp would be conducted at the orthopedic center inside Wazir Akbar 
Khan Hospital in Kabul. Although the technicians at rhis center were 
inexperienced in Jaipur foot technology, they could provide valuable 
assistance to the ream from India, as well as act as interpreters. 
The ream working at the camp in Kabul was comprised of 
a project coordinator, a counselor and experienced technicians. 
Machinery and raw materials were flown into Kabul from India in 
October 2003. 
In order to notifY survivors in rhe area about the camp, the 
following steps were taken: 
• Banners were hung at strategic places in Kabul, especially 
at the entrances into Kabul from the provinces. 
• Pamphlets were placed at various locations within the city, 
by Mahendra G. Mehta, Help Handicapped International 
on many cabs and buses in Kabul as well as distributed through young 
people who normally sell newspapers at traffic junctions in Kabul. 
• Announcements were made on the local radio and relevi-
sion. 
• Journalists from three local newspapers-Anees, Hewad 
and Kabul Times-were invited to and carried them the activities of 
rhe camp prominently in their newspapers. 
• An FM channel-Radio Sadai Azadi-also covered rhe 
event. 
• Kabul television featured the activity in rheir weekly 
"Health" program. 
• HHI staff went ro some health centers around Kabul and 
requested they send their handicapped patients fo r free fitting of the 
prostheses. 
This multi-media coverage helped ro mobilize beneficiaries 
and over 400 limbs were fitted at the camp within a one-month rime 
period. 
The camp was a unique experience both for HHI as well as 
the amputees. Indo-Afghan relations have always been warm, so the 
HHI ream was well-received, and they built a rapport with the local 
officials, beneficiaries and the technicians. 
Con c lu s io n 
 
   
 
   
 
 
    








~ Photo c/o the author. 
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31 Dr DD Sathye Marg 
Mumhai 400 004 India 
Tel: 91 22 238 98930 
Fax: 91 22 238 21969 
E-mail: promain@vsnl.net or mgmehta@rediffmail.com 
Website: www.hhiindia.org 
ITEP, continued from page G I 
As memioned in the inrroducrion, during rhe analysis of the 
reports, valuable information was also encountered char is related to 
technical and operational deployment of the equipment. For instance, 
the report The Severe Duty Vegetation Shredder Technical Test-ing of 
Capability by rhe U.S. Night Vision and Electronic Sensors 
Directorate (NVESD, onl ine ar h rrp://www. humanitarian-demi-
ning.org/demining/pubs/clearance/svc_test_ reporr.asp) mentions the 
fact that fence wire tangled up in rhe rotating machinery and inflicted 
considerable damage/disturbances during the resting. This findi ng 
could also have implications for rhe operational use of this type of 
equipment, not only in fenced minefields bur also in dense vegetation 
where liana-like plants can have the same effect. Hours may be need-
ed for the machinery to become operational again. Important feedback 
from the reader could be an indication that similar information would 
be worthy of being included in DIETEC. 
Final Rernarks 
Care should be taken when using the rerm "lessons learned. " 
In general, the process followed for compiling a "lesson learned" is 
quite complex and consists of an information-gathering and-processing 
chain spread over a considerable rime period. For instance, the Swedish 
EOD and Demining Centre (SWEDEC) lessons learned project 
includes several phases such as the collection of an "experience report" 
using a standard form, which is then analysed and commented on in an 
"extended experience report." This stage is fo llowed by validation of the 
information (i.e., Did it happen several rimes? Is it useful for another 
organisation? ere.), which leads to the implementation phase and the 
compilation of the "lessons learned report." A similar process is being 
applied by the Department of Energy (DOE) Corporate Lessons 
Learned Collection database, for example. However, this is nor the 
approach followed at present by the JMU MAIC lessons learned data-
base and is, in our opinion, at rhis momem in rime nor necessary, 
mainly due ro the given structure of the database. 
Both the JMU MAIC database and DIETEC are currendy 
being evaluated by an international ream of "experts." No final results 
are available yet, bur preliminary results of the assessment indicate that 
an imporram percentage of the DIETEC experiences have been classi-
fied as relevanr to rhe T&E process. 
The /TEP would like to get your ftedback and opinions when 
you are visiting the dlltabase via http://maic.jmu.edu!iteplessons/ or 
http://www. itep. wsl. 
Contact Information 
ITEP Secretariat 
JRC/EC T.P. 723 
IT-21020 lspra (VA) 
Italy 
Franciska Borry 
Tel: +39 0332 789138 
E-mail: Franciska.horry@jrc.it 
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The Role of Polish Engineers in Afghanistan 
The Polish Military Contingent, located at Bagram Base, 65 
km from Kabul, has been contributing to peacekeeping missions with-
in Operation Enduring Freedom since March 2002. In addition to the 
platoon 's main responsibilities of engineering reconnaissance and mine 
clearance, the platoon is also responsible fo r building fortification struc-
tures, developing base infrastructure, loading and transporting con-
structing materials, and conducting differenr kinds of ground works, 
mainly in the surrounding area of the base. 
The area surrounding Bagram Base is a vety difficult area for 
engineering tasks. The surface of the area is flat; however, there are 
many hollows from the remains of firing positions, the elements of 
engineering barrier systems, anti-armoured vehicle ditches, craters, and 
wire and mine barriers. The diversity of the region, considering the 
building techniques and various constructing materials that were used 
in the past, creates many problems for the Polish engineers. 
Furthermore, the structure of the ground itself creates problems. 
Several centimetres of ash cover the ground during the summer, while 
the spring and the autumn bring mud that fo rms into a solid shell with 
the extremely low winter temperatures. 
The entire civilian infrastructure in the region was adj usted 
to support combat action . Firing positions, minefields, engineering 
barriers and dams are everywhere. Minefield plans and documentation 
are imprecise or even deliberately misleading. It is very common for 
actual minefields to lay several metres from the marked minefields, 
which often lay barren. This is a characteristic of the mine battles that 
were conducted several years ago in this region. Often, booby traps 
1----------------------- by Col. Boguslaw Bebenek. Hanna Madziar and Capt. 
Wojcieeh Chyla. Polish Land Forces 
were built on the approaches to the firing positions during these battles. 
The battles also left behind the wreckage of vehicles and planes, aban-
doned combat equipment and thousands of landmines. Jn these condi-
tions, it is necessary for Polish engineers to be well-prepared, properly 
equipped, well-regulated and highly qualified in order ro succeed. 
At the moment, the priorities for the Polish Engineering 
Platoon include mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 
minefield and road marking, reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, 
and water purification and distribution. U nfortunately, due to the relief 
of the ground, location or degree of complication, most of these tasks 
must be executed manually from the beginning through the end. 
Clearing minefields around gas stations and ammunition depots or even 
removing mines from under the wheels of aircraft that had to make an 
emergency landing in a minefield are examples of those tasks. 
Checking the ground is usually done with help of tentacles 
and detectors. Soldiers working on minefields have anti-mine shoes that 
at least partially protect them from the detonation of AP mines. When 
the terrain allows, a mine flail is used for clearing minefields, which can 
clear abour 250 sq m of the ground in one hour. However, there is often 
the necessity to prepare the terrain before and check it after sweeping. 
For clearing rerrain of AP mines, heavy chain sweeping gear is used 
(Hydrena). In favourable conditions, rhe Hydrena can clean 700 sq m of 
the ground in one hour. When there is a risk of damaging the sweeping 
gea r or it cannot be used due to the relief of the ground, bunch charges 
of explosives are substiruted. 
The occurrence of extremely large amoums of arrillery, aerial 
and ami-aircraft ammunition, from manual grenades to scarrcrablc 
mines, gas-fuel bombs, and a variery of AP and AT mines, poses an enor-
mous threat for the Polish engineers. According to statistics, Polish engi-
neering platoons in this region can recognize and clear areas an average 
of abour 15 ha of mines, defuse about 300 AP mines, 20 AT mines, 60 
scatterable mines of different types, 20 aerial bombs, 30 missiles and 
arrillery shells, 30 mortar bombs and manual grenades, 80 bomb fuses of 
different types, 50 different ammunitions, and about 80 other danger-
ous ttems. 
Despite enormous work and effort, the Bagram Base is contin-
uously in danger. Missile or bomb artacks, ambushes and mine traps are 
no rarity. However, there is an atmosphere of mutual respect and eager-
ness for accomplishing tasks in the Polish contingent. The support of the 
contingent commander, the chaplain and the soldiers themselves keep 
spirits high during this difficult period of their lives. 
*Photos c/o the authors. 
Contact Information: 
Capt. Wojciech Chyla 
Engineering Department 
HQ Polish Land Forces 
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01-783 Warszawa 
Poland 
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communities. A significam end-product of the 
process is rhe ability ro identify rhe high-, 
medium- and low-impact communities. 
These scores can then be used as markers 
against progress. The Afghan survey includes a 
reuofir component so that the data collected 
over the past 14 years can be incorporated into 
the LIS's impact grading system. 
ec 
Reconstruction funding is provided 
for the coordination and execution of mine 
and UXO clearance activities that are a precur-
sor to major infrastructure projects such as 
road construction, power line repairs and irri-
gation system rehabilitation. This rype of 
funding, whether provided through a grant or 
a service contract, rends ro come from the same 
donor rhar is funding rhe infrastructure proj-
ect. T his allows rhe donors and their collabora-
tors amongst Ministries and implememing 
partners to rrear the demining reams as parr of 
their overall available assets. This provides for 
maximum flexibility as the same donor con-
trols the fund allocations for both rhe demi-
ning conrracror and other construction con-
tractors, and can thus line manage all of the 
contractors whose work is necessaty for the 
completion of rhe reconstruction project. 
e a 
Peace-building funding is provided 
fo r the coordination and execution of the 
Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) initiative and 
rhe destruction of anti-personnel mine stock-
piles. 
MAFP is a reintegration project 
designed to assist former fighters demobilized 
through an Mghanisran-wide demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration process to fir 
into civil life again. Former fighters are trained 
in manual clearance, permanent marking, and 
mine risk education techniques and are given 
employment for 13 monrhs. While parr of 
each day is spent in mine action operations, 
rhe orher parr is spent in literacy and vocation-
al training. The aim of the project is to devel-
op a viable reintegration strategy for each for-
mer fighter. 
This project is a full spectrum 
demobilisation option. lr addresses rhe eco-
nomic needs of demobilized fighters bur also 
deals wirh problems of psychological adjust-
ment and community acceptance. Ir also has 
the potential of expanding MAPA's mine and 
UXO clearance rates. The current project plan 
is to open places for 8,000 soldiers over a 
three-year period. In addition ro providing a 
first-class reintegration option for the former 
fighters involved, this project will add a total 
of 8,000 man-years of demining ro rhe 
Programme. 
Given rhar Afghanistan became a 
Srare Parry to the Ottawa Convention on 1 
March 2003, the country must destroy all 
stockpiles of ami-personnel mines on irs terri-
tory within four years. Despite rhe destruction 
of over 5,000 stockpiled anti-personnel mines 
since the tteaty cmered into force, there is still 
a srrong need ro identify and destroy rhe large 
quantities of ami-personnel mines stockpiled 
around the counuy. As a result, the Ministry of 
Defence, with support from the North 
Arlamic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led 
ISAF and rhe MAPA, has developed a Strategic 
Plan for rhe National Destruction of Ami-
Personnel Mines, which is based on lessons 
learned from a successful srockpile destruction 
pilot project carried out in Kabul in 2003 and 
early 2004. The stockpile destruction project 
aims to survey, assess, collect and destroy ami-
personnel srockpiles around rhe counrry, 
develop national regulations on the trans-
portation, storage and desrrucrion of ami-per-
sonnel mines, and to conduct a public infor-
mation campaign on the significance and 
scope of rhe stockpile destruction initiative. 
The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
(NAMSA), which is NATO's principal logistic 
support management agency, will also be prov-
ing project management staff ro assist the 
Ministry of Defence. 
In order to mobilize resources 
through the humanitarian, reconstruction and 
peace-building channels, rhe United Nations 
and the MAPA NGOs have had to accept a 
myriad of different funding modalities along-
side the traditional grants-based approach of 
the VTF. This has taxed rhe NGOs' ability ro 
administer rhe grants and contracts manage-
ment side of rheir operations. The United 
Nations has also been forced to increase and 
diversify its skills base. The United Nations 
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan 
(UNMACA), working out of eight major cities 
in Mghanisran, now employs over 150 people, 
including 17 expatriates, to coordinate the 
increasingly complex MAPA and to manage 
host government and donor relations. Five of 
these expatriates, (including lawyers, fund-rais-
ers and finance sraff) work full rime and anoth-
er three senior managers dedicate parr of their 
rime ro raise money or help rhe NGOs admin-
ister and report on the money rhar has been 
raised, with the rest of rhe expatriate rime spent 
coordinating rhe NGOs' field operations or in 
support functions. To lessen the reliance on 
expatriates and ro smooth rhe way for the 
evenrual transition to national administration, 
rhe UNMACA has also beefed up rhe training 
capacity within the Programme and has inrro-
duced dedicated training courses for rhe 
NGOs 111 financial adminisrrarion and 
accounting. 
Despite the challenges, the emer-
gence of a post-Taliban Mghan governmenr 
has had a positive impact on mine action in rhe 
country, both in terms of being able ro plan 
with a recognized government that is a State 
Parry to rhe Ottawa Convention and also in 
being able to work with that government ro 
raise rhe resources necessaty ro pay for rhe plan. 
The next challenge is to create the opportunity 
to transition a programme rhar has been 
administered by the United Nations for rhe 
past 14 years to a national authority rhar has the 
capacity to continue ro manage this complex 
Programme in rhe years ahead. A thorough and 
derailed transition plan that sets out the criteria 
and milestones for a successful transition 
should be released in the coming months. 
Contact Information: 
Patrick F rucher 
UNMACA External Relations Officer 
P.O. Box No. 520 
Kabul, Afghanistan 
Tel: +870 762 918 170 





Seldom has a name caused such 
polarity among like-minded people, in this 
case those concerned with mine action. The 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APM-
BC) of 1997, commonly called the "Mine Ban 
Treaty," or more often the "Orrawa Treary," is 
loved by some- loathed by ochers. To some ir 
is rhe lynchpin of mine action activities, ro 
others ir is a disrracter from pragmatic mine 
action challenges. Some will nor take action 
against mines without "it" being invoked, oth-
ers will nor rake action if "ir" is invoked. 
As an American involved in rhe 
mine action community, being a citizen of a 
major non-signatory to the convention, I 
often fed rhe scorn of Orrawa boosters. 
Usually this comes in rhe form of icy silence (I 
am often given the role of rhe Invisible Man at 
APMBC-relared gatherings), and sometimes 
via obstructionism. Bur as rhc director of a 
global outreach cemer, I also observe the dis-
dain of "Ottawa" doubters who seem to have 
little time for reflection on rhe benefits of rhe 
convention. 
As we approach rhe review of rhe 
APMBC, I think iris rime to rake a forthright 
look ar it and have the courage and good sense 
ro accept ir for what it is and does-and what 
it is not and does nor do. 
The Stlqma of Landmine Use 
The "Mine Ban Treaty" has cer-
tainly chilled the production, use and transfer 
of landmines. The public's knowledge about 
rhe latent landmine threat has, ro some 
degree, been engaged by Princess Diana and 
the APMBC. Bur even among policy makers 
and rhe international community, there is no 
doubt that rhe issue of anti-personnel land-
mines has come ro rhe fore largely because of 
rhe dialog, meetings, discussions, and provi-
sions of the convention and that the doctrinal 
and conventional use of landmines has been 
dramatically reduced because of the stigma 
attached to them. This is no small fear and 
provides a global mindser within which mine 
action can now effectively rake place. 
tockplle Destruction 
Another clear benefit of rhc 
APMBC is rhar it has provided a finite, 
acceptable and measurable way to destroy 
stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. We 
need nor assume rhat all landmines rhar have 
been rhus destroyed were viable or that all 
landmine stocks have been accurately 
accounted for. T he salient fact is rhat massive 
numbers oflandmines have been systematical-
ly destroyed and thar national programs 
brought into being for this purpose have been 
not only successful, bur have facilitated the 
coordination of complementary humanitarian 
efforts within some countries. Indeed the use 
of some military organizations to carry our rhe 
destruction of landmine stockpiles has 
enhanced their role in humanitarian efforts. 
Communication, Coordination and 
Consensus 
A third effect of rhe APMBC is that 
ir has focused much arrention and facilitated 
much action on the activities and functions of 
what we have come to call "mine action." 
Without the meetings of rhe lnrersessional 
Workgroups, steering committees, the sub-
mission of reports and presentations, many 
governments, non governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) , donors, and the United 
Nations would not have been able to define 
and propose action plans ro address rhe wide 
scope of mine action challenges. The pure acr 
of having real-rime discussions among groups 
rhar might ordinarily never see one another, 
much less engage in dialog, has lead to new 
partnerships, new approaches to mine action 
activities, and if nor always a clear consensus, 
rhen ar least a greater understanding of rhe 
p roblem and an awareness of others engaged 
in the effort. The fact rhar national govern-
mental agencies of countries at risk are rou-
tinely coordinating wirh NGOs, visiting mili-
taries, rhe United Nations, regional organiza-
tions and donor countries is truly amazing. 
The meetings of rhe various venues of the 
APMBC provide a good sounding board in 
which ideas compere for arrention and gener-
al approval. 
estrlction of HPLs by the 
.onuention on Conventional 
JJeapons 
On the other hand, rhe APMBC is 
nor rhe only international instrument to 
restrict rhe use of anti-personnel landmines, 
but for some reason, many "Mine Ban Treaty" 
advocates often fail to add rhe aurhoriry of 
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